

MODERN AGE

A CONSERVATIVE REVIEW

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MODERN AGE

A Conservative Review



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Conservatism, Reaction, and Fascism

FROM TIME TO TIME the question of the curious as well as of the ill-intentioned is raised—"How would you define the difference between the Conservative, the Reactionary, and the Fascist?" Since the historians, political scientists, philosophers, and metaphysicians who write for MODERN AGE will continue to search out the roots and forms of conservatism, I shall try here only to make some distinctions that seem to have clearly separated these positions.

The historical meaning of "Conservative" as it supplanted Tory in the early nineteenth century has changed as must every word that has to do with political contexts. The Conservative in Post-World War II England is above all the one who rejects the welfare state of the Labour Party; who saw in it, and caused the uncommitted electorate to see in it, the party

of economic stagnation and of diminishing returns, while nevertheless accepting some of its popular—if theoretically reprehensible—devices such as that of the National Health Service Program.

In West Germany, too, a conservative party has been in power since a federal government was established in 1949, despite the fact that all the rehabilitated parties licensed under the Four Power Occupation in 1945 or 1946 were originally addicted to some form of socialism. The conservatives in the *Bundesrepublik* are democrats by way of the bitter history they have experienced. That is why Germany has legislation outlawing any party of the Right or Left that threatens the democratic order. They have unleashed the energies of the free market and thus enabled the country to bear its heavy burdens of restitution,

war pensions, rebuilding, the upkeep of West Berlin, and to absorb the thirteen million or more people who have found refuge inside its borders. In addition, in the political forms and purposes they have helped to create, they have restored to the refugees as well as to the native population virtues that had been wholly lost of a free community accepting its responsibilities to a malign past and to a new European and Western order.

In Spain, as Mr. Wilson's article shows, the conservative is of another kind, a monarchist very likely, but here again pulling his weight against the pretensions of a State to impose its naked power—whether for the public welfare or what it takes to be the glory of God. Thus the post-war conservative in Western Europe has been *l'homme révolté*, the rebel against statist prescription, and it is mainly this reaction, in the case of the Germans to a criminal state that called itself socialist, in the case of the English to the bureaucratic benevolence and fatuity of a genuinely socialist government, that has been the source of the coalitions behind the conservative rise to power and public approval. Of course, conservatives everywhere oppose the kind of régime Mrs. Conant so well describes in her article on East Germany; there are no "yes, buts" in their opposition to a so-called revolutionary government that is reactionary as Hitler and Mussolini were reactionary, where any conservatives who survive have had to deal for thirty years with the same masters in different uniforms reciting contradictory slogans. The conservative Germans and Italians and Czechs who made common cause with the authoritarian state in its beginnings, whether reluctantly, or naively, because they thought they could bring it to reason, have long since discovered their powerlessness once the force of reaction, of the revolutions of both Left and Right, is in motion. Konrad

Adenauer, who has led the conservative party of post-war Germany, languished in a Nazi prison. So did men like Schacht, who once thought they could tame Hitler, and the revolt of July 20, 1944, sent to their deaths soldiers and civilians who believed they had the right and duty to judge the head of state and find him guilty. Nor had this been the first resistance of German conservatives in high and low places in the army and government who, before Munich and in the early stages of Hitler's Germany, tried first to curb and then depose him. They failed and they paid full measure, as they had known they would, for their failure.

In the United States, conservatism until recently has been swamped among intellectuals, writers, teachers, politicians, and in the press, by the shallow tides of a pseudo liberalism bringing in our own kind of welfare state. A conservative like Robert Taft was spoken of admiringly only after he died, for doing battle against Harry Truman's intention of putting striking railroad workers into the Army, for speaking up against the newly invented law of Nuremberg where men were tried for real crimes but also for others, like the alleged crime of aggression, contrived for the occasion and for which no one in history had ever been tried before. Now Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung and Castro, too, are able to identify an aggressor long before they see one, and there is small doubt of the uses they would make, if they could, of the Nuremberg precedent.

It is true that a coalition of expediency may unite conservatives with temporary allies who have no genuine belief in their principles. Anti-communism, like any embattled movement, brings people of widely disparate views together for what seems to be a moment of truth. But the conservative may be readily distinguished from those who are merely anti-communist. He be-

believes that the state exists for the individual, not the other way around, in the need to extend as far as possible the choice and consent of the individual in a time of technology and vast enterprises both private and public with their enormous power to submerge him. He rejects an affluent society where a government determines how he may best buy something or whether he will be allowed to buy it. He may, like Ludwig von Mises, give mankind the heady vision of a promised land far removed from Mr. Roosevelt's airy vistas of one world under four policemen. In Mises' free economy, goods, raw materials, and people of the entire earth could travel without let or hindrance where they were needed, and thus deprive even the most underdeveloped nation of any serious cause of war. This, like Voegelin's transcendental view of the political process, takes men further from reaction, further from the measures of coercion for a better life for which there is so much nostalgia among people who call themselves liberals.

Conservatism, it should be added, is

compatible with radical forms in the arts. Eliot, who helped turn academic notions about the nature of poetry upside down in the 'twenties, is a conservative in philosophy and politics. Kafka dredging among nightmares that came true of the Twentieth century, Joyce recasting the ancient myths and journeyings of mankind, St. John Perse, Claudel, Rilke—all write about the human condition *sub specie aeternitatis*. No struggle of the artist to make plain something never seen before or, out of the stresses and turbulence of his time, to restate a truth about people in their societies can be limited by inherited techniques. Here, too, it is the reactionary literature of the Soviet Union, of East Germany, of Yugoslavia that returns to rituals in praise of the Ruler, of the status quo kept inviolate in the local koran, to borrow Voegelin's word. The conservative in his belief in criticism, in his individual quality of a judging, evaluating man, sifts experience in an attempt to enhance it, to turn the ruin and triumph of the past to a somehow wiser account.—E.D.

MODERN AGE

A Conservative Review



The Cold War of the Mind: Regimentation in East Germany

GRACE RICHARDS CONANT

The state of education and culture in the "Democratic Peoples' Republic."

IT IS DIFFICULT for Americans to realize the scope and impact of thought control in a modern police-state. We need not fear that the police will be informed if we pick up a newspaper in the subway or listen to a forbidden radio program. We read what we choose. It is not dangerous for us to applaud in the theatre a striking line about liberty. No one indoctrinates our little children with fear and loathing of "the enemy." We do not need to watch, day in, day out, for ideological spies, both young

and old, in our schools and universities. We find it almost impossible to comprehend that academic and cultural institutions, which we cherish as sources of enlightenment, can be degraded into training-squads and rallying-points in the cold war of the mind.

Yet this is what happened in Hitler's Germany. And today from West Berlin one can look across to the so-called "German Democratic Republic," the puppet-state set up by the Soviets in their zone of occupa-

tion, and see from year to year the frightening process of systematic intimidation and control of all free minds. The directives of the Communist functionaries, fanatics, and opportunists in the seats of power are implemented under the prying eyes of an elaborate spy-system and supported by the ever-present threat of force. Nearly 40,000 teachers, scholars, and students have escaped from this tyranny. The refugees who still come over to West Berlin in thousands every week tell poignant stories of intrigue, blackmail, and persecution.

The ruthless application of Communist techniques embraces all manifestations of cultural life and all phases of education. Children must pass a course that indoctrinates them to hate the capitalistic enemy before they can be promoted to the next grade. In 1958 the practice of training children to stand watch at vacation camps was defended because the enemy would not hesitate to attack them on holiday. Political significance—a “provocative” allegiance to the West—is read even into the personal attire of the young (blue jeans!) and their choice of dance-music is considered a “class issue.” School textbooks are permeated by propaganda. School-teachers must write out their own treatment of a subject before presenting it in class, and hand it in to the responsible authority, so that there is little chance to evade the party line. Any deviation is regarded as suspicious and may be denounced as “sabotage of the Socialist state.”

The pressure in many ways is grimmer, the spy-system more ramified, than in Nazi days. Under Hitler, the fervent and prolonged applause of Berlin audiences for a line in one of Schiller’s plays—“Give us freedom of thought, sire!”—amounted, as the *New York Times* correspondent reported at the time, to a political demonstration against the Nazi régime. Such a demonstration is unlikely today in East

Germany. After 15 years of Communist rule the people have learnt to preserve their masks; the “*deutscher Blick*” (a glance over each shoulder before committing one’s self to anything) has become a habit. The people have been trained to watch for ideological traps that may lead to police interrogation and perhaps jail. They know that a scene in an opera, a line of poetry, even an article on art must be interpreted in terms of political loyalties and the power conflict between Communism and the West.

To us it may seem absurd that the history of art, for instance, must be taught from the Marxist point of view, and that philosophy is considered primarily a weapon against the “capitalist bandits.” History is deliberately twisted to add to its lethal power. For “the criterion of scholarliness of our political and legal studies is their usefulness for the practical purposes of socialism,” as Ulbricht, the Communist boss of East Germany, recently declared. All intellectual attitudes and cultural undertakings in the “German Democratic Republic” have political implications. Religion is no longer a private spiritual aspiration, but an enemy of the Communist state. The famous theological faculty in Leipzig is now a center for the teaching of materialism.

The Communist leaders have often declared that the highest duty of a teacher is to mold his pupils into convinced Marxists. They insist that the upbringing of children cannot be regarded by the state as a private affair. From the “socialist christening,” which in East Germany has now almost replaced religious christenings, to the atheistic “youth consecration” designed to replace confirmation, the child is to be dominated by “socialist principles.” The new school law explicitly states that home influences must follow these lines. For, as Grotewohl, Ulbricht’s second in the Communist hierarchy, declared at a meeting

called in 1959 to discuss the planning of *Kulturpolitik*, "morality is what serves the cause of Socialism" (read "Communism"). Religious parents in East Germany once again suffer from the painful conflict of conscience which they endured in Nazi times. Shall they speak honestly to their children and take the risk that a child may quote them to some teacher eager for advancement? Or should they rather relinquish the attempt to inculcate their own beliefs in their children and leave them to party indoctrination?

There has been no "thaw" worthy of the name in East Germany. Stalin's statue still stands in East Berlin in the place of honor on the spacious avenue that bears his name. His disciple, Walter Ulbricht, long chief of the S.E.D., the Communist party in the "German Democratic Republic" and now officially the head of the state, continues to enforce a repressive policy which rankles all the more bitterly because it must be endured by a people already once "liberated" from dictatorship. There is a grotesque similarity between the methods of the German Communist functionaries and those of the Nazis. It all seems like a bad film beginning again—the exploitation of culture in the service of a totalitarian régime striving to dominate Germany.

Hitler believed that "power comes from culture." By a thorough-going purge of those who stood for creative freedom in art, science, and scholarship, the Nazis strove to exclude all but Nazi ideas, "Aryan" science, art, and literature. The official Nazi praise of "Nordic culture" sounds like raving to our ears. But a similar chorus is to be heard daily in East Germany with a new refrain — praise of the "Soviet man" and his achievements, coupled with denunciation of Western imperialists and their corrupt culture. All are warned that what the West regards as cul-

ture is but a trap to beguile the innocent into the greedy jaws of "monopoly-capitalism."

The East German functionaries strive to exploit the great figures of German history for the purposes of the Communist cause. They struggle to show the continuity of German culture leading, as they put it, to the "socialist triumphs" of their puppet state. Sometimes their propaganda efforts miscarry. During the Schiller anniversary year (1955) they endeavored to enlist Schiller as a fellow-traveler, and benefit from the veneration in which he is held all over Germany. Perhaps they should have been warned by the memory that the Nazis had found this passionate crusader a prickly bedfellow. Eventually Goebbels was forced to banish "Wilhelm Tell" even from the school-room because of its ringing appeals for liberty.

The verse of Schiller selected in the anniversary year for propaganda use by the East German régime seemed nicely in line with official policy. It read "We want to be a people of united brothers." This reinforced the constant appeals of the Soviets for negotiations between the "two Germanies"—"all Germans at one table," as the gaudy streamers plastered on public buildings in East Berlin put it. But when these few words from Schiller appeared prominently displayed on a large red and white sign near an East zone railway station, an experienced American observer immediately prophesied that "this will not work" as propaganda—it could not be allowed to remain!—because of the disastrous echoes it would awaken in every German mind. The German people know their Schiller well, and the line which seemed to support the political policy of their oppressors would serve to remind them of the verses which immediately follow it in the poet's text: "*We want to be free as our fathers were. Rather death than slavery!*"

Three weeks later the sign had disappeared, as prophesied.

The official Communist exploitation of drama and music for political purposes reached a high point when the Soviet zone government could announce the re-opening of the East Berlin opera-house. In free West Berlin, essential rebuilding of housing and industry, and care for the thousands of refugees who since 1952 have come over every week from the East were given first priority by the city authorities. Even now the West Berlin opera is still performing in makeshift quarters, although the completion of a new house is hoped for late in 1961. But a totalitarian régime can overlook humanitarian scruples and arbitrarily channel great sums into a favored official project. By 1955, the East Berlin opera-house had been splendidly rebuilt and decorated, and a gala première was planned to add luster to the capital of the "German Democratic Republic." This great occasion should have been a glorious victory, but instead, at the eleventh hour, it turned into a dramatic reversal. Shortly before he was to preside at the première, Erich Kleiber, the famous conductor who had recently been appointed Musical Director of the East Berlin opera, escaped to the West. In his farewell letter, the conductor complained that the promises of the management had not been kept; he had come to feel that "politics and propaganda will not come to a halt outside the door of this temple." The Director of the opera immediately published an angry open letter in rejoinder, implying that the West had conspired to subvert the great musician. This remarkable document underlines the political implications of all culture in a totalitarian state. "The Dulles and Adenauer intriguers realize the worth of such a man to opera in the East," he wrote. "If only Kleiber's ear for politics were as good as his ear for music!"

One footnote may be of interest as exemplifying the intense emotional significance that a work of art can carry in the war for men's minds. Here Beethoven emerges,—like Schiller a torchbearer for liberty, and deeply revered by all Germans. For the gala opening night of the restored opera-house in East Berlin the production of Beethoven's *Fidelio* was originally announced. But at the last moment the Executive Committee of the S.E.D. substituted *Die Meistersinger*—"a national folk opera standing for the unity of the Fatherland," to quote from the official statement. Such a decision would hardly be made on the basis of musical values alone. To understand the factors involved, one must realize that *Fidelio* has a special message to those who have suffered under tyranny. This opera has become a deeply loved symbol of liberation. Many Berliners will testify that at the first performance after the Nazi defeat, the entire Berlin audience broke down and wept. The scene where gaunt political prisoners come up out of their dungeon to the light of day was to the Berliners a picture of their own life. The Communist officials in East Berlin had good reason for their second thoughts about scheduling *Fidelio*. The sight of released political prisoners, even on the stage, so soon after the revolt of 1953 and the many following arrests, would have cast a dark cloud over the occasion. In this connection a *New York Times* dispatch from Budapest in the summer of 1957 is significant. It reported that in Szeged, a city in southern Hungary, the manager of the opera had announced that in future some of the scenes in *Fidelio* would be altered, to avoid the demonstrations that had been taking place at every performance.

The effort to impress the great figures in the German past into the Communist army and to prove that only since the triumph of Communism has it been possi-

ble to understand their contribution to the German cultural heritage leads to surprising re-evaluations. For instance, to quote from a statement of the Executive Committee of the S.E.D. inaugurating the celebration of the Bach anniversary year: "a truly objective evaluation and appreciation of Bach has only been possible since the destruction of German fascism by the defeat of the German imperialists at the hands of the armies of the Socialist Soviet Union." Reading further, we find that the significance of Bach in musical history is that he burst the "ecclesiastical fetters" of music. He represents the bourgeois opposition to a decaying feudal society, and by introducing folk songs and dances into his music, he "secularized" church music! A specimen of the results of the process of secularization, a sample of the proletarian and materialistic music of the Soviet zone, was performed by an East German choir at an all-German music festival in Coburg. The "White Bread Cantata" by Hans Eisler shocked and angered those attending the festival from West Germany by its deliberately blasphemous propaganda line: "For a man who has no white bread . . . Jesus was never born."

It is a curious fact that an article exists written in 1937 by Ulbricht, the very man responsible for Stalinist repression in East Germany, in which he echoes Schiller's line "Give us freedom of thought." There has been no freedom of thought in East Germany since 1945, except for dialectical materialism. Ulbricht now echoes the view of his Moscow patron, Khrushchev, who in a famous speech in 1957 declared: "In the world of today a bitter struggle is going on between two ideologies and in this struggle no one can be neutral." Earlier in the same speech Khrushchev said: "For an artist who truly serves his people, there is no question about whether he is free or not." A German translation of this speech

was prominently on display in the East Berlin bookshop where I bought my copy a year ago.

In the face of vilification, threats, and reprisals, the writer and the artist in East Germany have been forced to take sides and become cultural hacks and government mercenaries in the cold war of the mind. On the surface they must conform. Their private opinions and creative efforts must be hidden away, as in the Nazi time, in the "literature of the desk drawer." The writing demanded by the Communist régime is a militant literature, "a literature of rolled-up shirt-sleeves."

The most brilliant star in the East German literary galaxy was the late Berthold Brecht, the revolutionary playwright. A few poems recently published in the West seem to testify to his secret disillusionment and sense of guilt. But whatever his inner conflicts may have been, during his lifetime he accepted the privileged position accorded him by the Communist police-state without any public indication that he repudiated its sickening excesses. Another member of the literary "avant-garde," Johannes R. Becher, became a government functionary. Until his recent death he occupied the impressive post of Minister of Culture in the "German Democratic Republic." His career as a bureaucrat had a pronounced effect on his literary style. I quote the last lines of one of his "activist" poems:

The mining collective calls thee.
The tractor challenges thee.
Be thou also a power-plant!"

Ulbricht has often declared that the highest task of the writer—as of the teacher—is to build up socialism. At a conference in East Berlin in April, 1960, he called on the workers to "storm the heights of culture." The importance of art and literature in his program is emphasized by

the fact that according to an official journal, the party-controlled trade unions in East Germany now have almost a quarter of a million "culture functionaries" attached to them. The workers themselves are now being urged to "seize the pen" and compose "progressive literature." For, to quote a line by Heinrich Mann which was featured at one East German culture conference, "the books of today are the deeds of tomorrow."

Ulbricht has often repeated with approval Stalin's dictum that "artists have the task of being engineers of the human soul." In East Germany, art and literature are skills to be harnessed for the indoctrination of the masses and for the prestige and greater glory of the state. As one shrewd Swiss observer put it, "art is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means."

It is not surprising that some of the painters who in Nazi times were "well-tried soldiers of the cultural war" and did their best to exalt "the prototype of Nordic man" are now busy under other colors. Their task in East Germany is to express the "heroic" optimism of "socialist realism." They paint in a naturalistic-sentimental style reminiscent of their Nazi days such subjects as girls driving tractors, Red soldiers being kind to children, "worker and soldier clasping hands," and "peasant delegation meets with brigade of socialist artists." Modern art is taboo as it was under Hitler's rule. The few modern pictures that were left after the confiscations and bonfires of the Nazis have been returned to the museum cellars. Many artists, unable to exhibit, have fled to the West. Functional modern architecture, so brilliantly developed elsewhere by the architects Hitler banished, is condemned in East Germany with Marxian smear-words ("cosmopolitan," "eclectic," "formalist"). Its steel construction has been alleged to reveal "im-

perialist preparations for war." The pretentious new buildings on Stalinallee in East Berlin are patterned after the Moscow confectioners' pseudo-classic style. The directive laid down in 1951 by Otto Grotewohl, then Prime Minister of the "German Democratic Republic," is still being followed in East Germany. "Literature and the arts," he said, "are subordinate to politics. The idea of art must follow the line of march of the political struggle."

But in spite of sixteen years of systematic repression and indoctrination, the "German Democratic Republic" is not yet completely sovietized. Compulsory inoculation with Marxist-Leninist philosophy has not worked well. Fifty per cent of the refugees escaping to West Berlin are under 25 years old. These young people have been conditioned for years by a socialist education. They represent a large government investment, and their loss is a bad blow to the future of the economy. The intellectuals who have escaped to the West report much spiritual misery among those skilled professional groups most needed in a modern industrialized society. The leakage of technical personnel has resulted in serious gaps in the staffing of many institutions. Some hospitals are served only by Russian or Bulgarian doctors. Massive "crash" programs have been announced to train teachers and technicians to overcome the shortages. But the flight to the West continues, month after month. It seems at the least doubtful whether any crash program can compensate for the repudiation of the communist state by so many of its unhappy, enslaved inhabitants.

Communizing East Germany is a more difficult task than the clamping of ideological fetters on a primitive or backward country. In this highly industrialized and literate society the attempt to eliminate "bourgeois ideals" has created bitter resistance. The East Germans are proud of their

academic tradition and consider their level of civilization far above that of the "Soviet man." Furthermore, protestant christianity is strongly rooted in East Germany. Professors in the universities whose posts depend on their support of the régime find it difficult to subscribe to the dogma that "there is no co-existence possible between science and religion." Is a man who has church affiliations fit to teach physics? The Communists say no. They urge that any one who sees a teacher at church or at a religious christening must report the fact. Students are questioned by the secret police about the religious discussions of their fellows. In East Germany conflicts of conscience long stilled in Russia are still acute.

The aim of Ulbricht and his colleagues is to convert the schools and universities into instruments of the state—"smithies to forge the cadres of the workers' and peasants' power." This aim has been largely achieved. The new school law of December, 1959, anchors "socialist principles" in every stage of the schools. Higher education is more and more the privilege only of those students who "unreservedly support the cause of socialism." All students entering a university must now take an oath of loyalty to the Communist régime and pledge themselves to its defense. Ninety per cent of them are supported by government stipends and therefore subject to official intimidation.

The recent "socialist reforms" of university organization and control were first announced in 1958 at the time of the 400th anniversary celebration of the famous University of Jena. The Rector of the university was to be the star witness at an official press conference set up to give publicity to the government program. But a few days before the press conference he and his family escaped to West Berlin. His defection at that moment drew the attention of the German academic world—as Kleiber's

had that of the musical world—and amounted to a serious Communist defeat in the cold war of the mind.

The massive flight of intellectuals from East Germany in the last two years has been called a "bleeding of the intelligentsia." But the Communist officials continue to exert an inexorable ideological pressure. Professors are now on contracts which must be renewed every six months; loyalty to the régime is implicit in the renewal of the contract. University senates are packed with representatives of Communist organizations who control all decisions, and government secretariats have the last word on academic affairs. Censorship, party control of publishing permits and limitation of paper quotas, party discipline and party reprisals (including jail sentences) have combined to stifle all independent voices. As the Minister for Security put it in 1956, "It goes without saying that in the German Democratic Republic no so-called free discussion can or should be tolerated which leads to the smuggling in of foreign anti-democratic and anti-socialist ideologies."

To give an impression of the climate of opinion among intellectuals, I quote from an article in "Einheit," the official scholarly journal of the East German Communist party (S.E.D.). The author, Jurgen Kuczynski, is defending himself against a criticism by Walter Ulbricht: "Of course I have no thought of denying the leading role of the party," he cries, "because as a comrade and especially as a scientist I do not wish to ruin myself ideologically. I have no intention of throwing away the compass of my political and scientific life or committing social suicide." Nothing could be much more abject, and this is only a sample.

I recommend a systematic reading of "Einheit." Any one who believes that Communism in East Germany can be reconciled with integrity of mind and con-

science, or that the creative spirit of man can transcend party lines, should study this journal. To struggle with its double talk is a dizzying and almost nauseating experience. I quote two statements on the role of art: "When the artist renders the reality of life in the form of high art, he will arrive unconditionally at Marxism."

. "The decadent art of American monopoly-capitalism has the very real task of infecting the German people with cosmopolitanism, robbing them of all true national pride, all will to struggle for unity and sovereignty, and making them ripe for a life of slavery under American rule."

There is no doubt that the rulers of a totalitarian state are right in their stern measures against the intelligentsia,—right from their own perspective. There is no danger to a dictatorship so great as free-thinking minds. Hitler's purges of the intellectuals were based on a sure instinct. The serious disturbances in Poland and the uprising in Hungary in 1956 were both preceded by unrest and agitation in literary and academic circles. Adam Wazyk's terrible "Poem for Adults" was published in Poland in 1955, and the next year at a gathering of writers in Warsaw "socialist realism" was bitterly attacked as "political-literary blackmail."* The courageous leadership of Hungarian intellectuals in the struggle for freedom has been amply documented. Their example aroused echoes in East Germany. The young university teacher, Dr. Wolfgang Harich, who was sentenced in 1957 in East Berlin to ten years' imprisonment, was charged with planning an uprising after the Hungarian model. He advocated a "humanized socialism." As Khrushchev said in the speech already quoted, we must not forget "the lessons of events in Hun-

gary where the counter-revolution exploited various writers for its dirty purposes."

The East German government officials are endeavoring to maintain and extend their control by more of the same brutality from which so many have fled. Their thesis is: "The right is what is right for the party, and what is not right for the party is wrong." Johannes R. Becher, the late Minister of Culture, in one of his speeches added a Communist definition of freedom. He said: "Our kind of freedom is the endless freedom of humanity *which exists only on the basis of party membership.*" (Italics mine.) These statements together define accurately the harsh ideological strait-jacket in which 17,000,000 Germans have to live. The Communist police-state in East Germany shows clearly both in its theory and its practice the issues that are at stake for all of us in the cold war of the mind.

*Wazyk, a leading Communist poet, describes in harrowing terms the squalor, vice and tragedy of the great industrial center, Nowa Huta, near Cracow. He flays the betrayal of the "great aims of education":

"when students are imprisoned in textbooks without windows,
when language is reduced to thirty slogans,
when the lamp of imagination is extinguished." He continues:

"There are boys forced to lie,
there are girls forced to lie.
there are the weary, dying of tired hearts,
there are people slandered, spat upon,
there are people stripped in the streets by common bandits.
there are people who wait for a slip of paper,
there are some who wait for justice."

And he concludes:

"We make demands on this earth. . . .
for a clear truth,
for the bread of freedom,
for flaming wisdom.
We demand these every day,
we demand through the Party."

The Restoration of Tradition

STANLEY PARRY

*A guide to the paths that remain open when
"tradition falls out of existence."*

THE POSITION THIS PAPER will attempt to illustrate, if not demonstrate, is that once lost or weakened the tradition of a society can be restored only by a creative and even radical reconstruction of the tradition itself. The problem to which we address ourselves is as complex as it is profound. And clear thought about it is inhibited by the corroded vocabulary and the stylized modes of conception that distort the very formulation of the problem. In a society where the substance of tradition is already thin and

unpersuasive, the term tradition is taken to indicate habitual modes of behavior normally concerned with the periphery of life, reaching at most the dignity of a campus "tradition" when they rise above the level of etiquette. More obfuscating still is the conception of tradition as the element of sameness within a world of change, so that the changing and the traditional are viewed as antithetic. To be "progressive" is to be anti-traditional. The truth is that tradition itself changes in the sense of unfolds; it

undergoes permutations. So that the disruption of tradition is encompassed not simply by change but by certain kinds of change. Once "bad" change eviscerates tradition, it can be brought back to life only by vigorous and even radical "good" change. To make this point we must first refurbish the idea of tradition.

First, since social change constitutes history, we must advert to the consideration that there are two kinds of history. There is the history related in books, what Voegelin¹ calls pragmatic history, or in Pieper's words (*The End of Time*, p. 22) "the empirically apprehensible element of historical reality." This type is concerned with chronology. The intellectual problem it raises is that of determining the causal relations in the unfolding of events through time. This type of history is present to man in the sense that man's current condition is always the end result of a series of prior causal acts and decisions. This type of history, it is interesting to note, is not susceptible to a "break" in its continuity or an erosion of its substance. Each age is coherently related to prior ages even though the events from age to age mark the rise and fall of civilizations.

There is, however, a second type of history, spiritual history, what Voegelin calls "paradigmatic" history. It is with this type that we are concerned, for it and tradition are identical. Tradition or spiritual history also has its progressive unfolding. But this occurs in a context totally different from that of pragmatic history. For the measurement of its development is not chronology and cause but the integrity of the original compact experience of truth whose differentiation constitutes the stages of the history. In this light, let us consider the nature of tradition more closely.

For any community, tradition is nothing more than the concrete experience of truth carried distributively and in common by a

multitude whom the experience unites and structures for action in pragmatic history. Tradition, therefore, is the spiritual substance that completes the distinctively human in man and constitutes the distinctively human in society. It exists as the concrete completion of human nature in a particular society. When truth is experienced within this continuum of social existence and when the experience begets a sense of communion that truth is called tradition. For above all, tradition exists as the experience of truth, as that experience has been progressively developed during the past of a people and carried forward as true to the present, where it is really experienced as true in the soul of each individual member of the community.

It follows from this approach that between tradition and community there is a real relation of identity: the community is constituted by a multitude holding the same tradition. We define society abstractly as a multitude united in pursuit of a common good. Tradition is nothing more than the concrete historical specification of the common good which is the object of common effort.

It is essential to underscore the idea that the specification is not a single *hic et nunc* determination deriving solely from contemporary and abstract speculation. For the community, as distinct from the theorists, it is a product of the experience of the truth through time. This addendum stresses the important factor that tradition is not a static force in society; it unfolds in the course of human experience revealing ever new dimensions of the basic experience of truth on which the community rests. Newman has analyzed the general process of this development in his *Development of Christian Doctrine*. Voegelin, more relevantly, has developed the concept with regard to the historical community. His theory of the "differentiation of a compact

experience" admirably accounts for the phenomenon of continuity and identity within the process of social development. The problem proposed, therefore, is not one of man confronted with the tensions resulting from the contrariety between change and unvarying sameness. Such a dilemma is unreal. The real problem emerges when we regard it as the problem of the man confronted with spurious differentiations of tradition. What is a man's relation to tradition when the contemporary developments in his society replace the real experience of truth with unreal images of it? To put it in Platonic terms: What is a man to do when he finds his community returning to the cave, finds it beginning to dream?

We are confronted, therefore, with the task of distinguishing between "good" and "bad" changes in the paradigmatic history of a community. This is no small task for social change runs a wide spectrum. It is doubtful whether any type of change is completely unrelated to the spiritual history of a people. But we can move most easily to the center of our problem by distinguishing three types. Although not mutually exclusive in themselves, they are still identifiably different in the type of response they invoke. First there is the change characteristic of any developing society, the type of change that normally involves shifts in the area of private interests of men. In economics these are common: changes from silk to nylon, from railroads to trucks. These divide the men involved into two groups according as their interests are advanced or injured. Such changes and their response are of little theoretical interest for our problem and scarcely deserve an attempt to name the responses. A second type of change reaches more deeply into the life of the community. It can be most easily identified in terms of the response it evokes, for with regard to the change it-

self, it normally follows from an accumulation of private interest changes. This is the type of change we call revolution, as in the term "industrial revolution." The significant thing here is that unlike the private interest response evoked by the first type of change, this type evokes a direct competition for possession of political authority. A new group rooted in the emerging economic or social forces competes with the older group rooted in the prior conditions. This change, consequently, touches upon the question of the common good in circumstances where policy changes can be achieved only by changes in the ruling class. Different conceptions of common good are involved, and so in a real sense the substance of consensus or spiritual continuity is involved. In the fortunate case, this change evokes what may be called a Whig-Tory split, the essence of which is that an adjustment of views has been reached and violent discontinuity in consensus avoided. The difference between the French and the English-American revolution is precisely that the French never achieved a Whig-Tory adjustment. Rather, it left the community permanently divided into irreconcilable factions. It was this perception of difference that motivated Burke's efforts to distinguish the English from the French situation.

The second type of change does not necessarily involve a breach in tradition. As shown by the French experience, however, it can. And because of this, it is difficult to distinguish the French experience from the third type of change. This third type involves a change in the very structure of the community's experience of truth in history. It involves a diminution in the intensity of communally experienced truth—in consensus—and a falling out of the area of experience large segments of previously held truth. It is only in this third type of change that the liberal-conservative

response is evoked. For this change is not a change from one positive position to another, but a change from order and truth to disorder and negation. The liberal-conservative division, we might observe in passing, is not of itself directly involved in a private interest conflict nor even in struggle between ruling groups. Rather it is rooted in a difference of response to the threat of social disintegration. The division is not between those who wish to preserve what they have and those who want change. Rather it is a division established by two absolutely different ways of thought with regard to man's life in society. These ways are absolutely irreconcilable because they offer two different recipes for man's redemption from chaos.²

The civilizational crisis, the third type of change raises the question "what are we to do?" on the most primitive level. For the answer cannot be derived from any socially cohesive element in the disrupting community. There is no socially existential answer to the question. For the truth formerly experienced by the community no longer has existential status in the community, nor does any answer elaborated by philosophers or theoreticians. In this phase of change, no idea has social acceptance and so none has ontological status in the community. An interregnum ensues in which not men but ideas compete for existence.

If we examine the three types of change from the point of view of their internal structure we find an additional profound difference between the third and the first two, one that accounts for the notable difference between the responses they evoke. The first two types of change occur within the inward and immanent structure of the society. The first involves a simple shift of interests in the society. The second involves something deeper, but in its characteristic form focuses on a shift in policy for the

community, not in the truth on which the community rests. Thus in both types attention is focused on the community itself, and its phenomenological life. The third type, however, wrenches attention from the life of action and interests in the community and focuses it on the ground of being on which the community depends for its existence. Voegelin has analyzed this experience in the case of the stable, healthy community. There the community, faced with the need to formulate policy on the level of absolute justice, can find the answer to its problem in the absolute truth which it holds as partially experienced.³ This, however, cannot be done by a community whose very experience of truth is confused and incoherent: it has no absolute standard, and consequently cannot distinguish the absolute from the contingent. It has lost its ground of being and floats in a mist of appearances. Relativism and equality are its characteristic diseases. Precisely at the moment when it has lost its vision the mind of the community turns out from itself in a search for the ontological standard whereby it can measure itself. For paradigmatic history "breaks" rather than unfolds precisely when the movement is from order to disorder, and not from one order to a new order. The liberal-conservative split, to define it further, derives from a basic difference concerning the existential status of standard sought and about the spiritual experience that leads to its identification.

When disruptive change has penetrated to the third level of social order, the process of disruption rapidly reaches a point of no return. Indeed, it is probable that this point is reached the moment the third level of change begins. At that point we reach the "closed" historical situation: the situation in which man is no longer free to return to a *status quo ante*. At that point men become aware of the mystery of history called

variously "fate," or "destiny," or "providence," and feel themselves caught helplessly in the writhing of a disrupted society. The reasons for this experience are rooted in the metaphysical characteristics of such a change.

Of all forms of being, society, or community, has the greatest element of determinability. Its ontological status is itself most tenuous because apart from individual men, who are its "matter," tradition, the "form" of society exists only as a shared perception of truth. The ontological status of society thus is constituted by the psychological-intellectual-volitional status of society's members. The content of that psychological status determines, ultimately, the content of civilization. Those social, civilizational factors not rooted in the human spirit of the group, ultimately cease to exist. Civilization itself—tradition—falls out of existence when the human spirit itself becomes confused. Civilization is what man has made of himself. Its massive contours are rooted in the simple need of man, since he is always incomplete, to complete himself.

It is not enough for man to be an ontological *esse*. He needs existential completion, he needs, that is, to move in the direction of completion. And the direction of that movement is determined by his perception of the truth about himself. He must, consequently, exist as a self-perceived substantive, developing agent, or he does not exist as man. Thus, it is no mystical intuition, but an analyzable conception to say that man and his tradition can "fall out of existence." This happens at the moment man loses the perception of moral substance in himself, of a nature that, in Maritain's words, is perceived as a "locus of intelligible necessities."⁴ An existentialist is a man who perceives himself only as "*esse*," as existence without substance.

Thus human perception and human voli-

tion is the immanent cause of all social change and this most truly when the change reaches the civilizational level. Thus with regard to the loss of tradition, in the change from order to disorder the metaphysics of change works itself out as a disruption of the individual soul, a change in which man continues as an objective ontological existent, but no longer as a man.

Further, change is a form of motion, it occurs as the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency and has not yet reached the terminus of the change. With regard to the change we are examining, the question is, at what point does the change become irreversible? A number of considerations suggest that this occurs early in the process. Change involves the displacement of form. This means that the inception of change itself can begin only when the factors conducive to change have already become more powerful than those anchoring the existent form in being. If the existent form is to be retained new factors that reinforce it must be introduced into the situation. In the case of social decay, form is displaced simply by the process of dissolution with no form at the terminus of the process. Now in the mere fact of the beginning of such displacement we have *prima-facie* evidence of the ontological weakness of the fading form. And when we consider the tenuous hold tradition has on existence, any weakening of that hold constitutes a crisis of existence. The retention of a tradition confronted with such a crisis necessitates the introduction of new spiritual forces into the situation. However, the crisis occurs precisely as a weakening of spiritual forces. It would seem, therefore, that in a civilizational crisis man cannot save himself. The emergence of the crisis itself would seem to constitute a warranty for the victory of disorder. And

it would seem that history is a witness to this truth.

As a further characterization of the liberal conservative split we may observe that it involves differences in the formula for escaping inevitabilities in history. These differences, in turn, derive from prior differences concerning the friendly or hostile character of change.

Unanalyzed Responses

ANXIETY AND DEEP INSECURITY are the characteristic responses evoked by the crisis in tradition. To experience them, it is not necessary for a people to be actively aware of what is happening to it. The process of erosion need only undermine the tradition and a series of consequences begin unfolding within the individual, while in institutions a quiet but deep transformation of processes occurs. Within the individual the reaction has been called various names, all, however, pointing to the same basic experience. Weil identifies it as being "rootless,"⁵ Guardini as being "placeless,"⁶ Riesman as being "lonely."⁷ Others call it "alienation,"⁸ and mean by that no simple economic experience (as Marx does) but a deep spiritual sense of dislocation. Within institutions there is a marked decline of the process of persuasion and the substitution of a force-fear process which masquerades as the earlier one of persuasion.⁹ We note the use of rhetoric as a weapon, the manipulation of the masses by propaganda, the "mobilization" of effort and resources.

Within this context of spontaneous and unanalyzed responses to the experience of civilizational crisis, two basic organizations of response are observable: reaction and ideological progressivism. These responses are explicable in terms of characteristics inherent in the crisis. Both are predictably destined to fail.

The response of reaction is dominated by a concern for what is vanishing. Its essence lies in its attempt to recover previous order through the repression of disruptive forces. To this end political authority is called upon to exercise its negative and coercive powers. The implicit assumption of this response is that history is reversible. Seemingly, order is perceived as a kind of subsistent entity now covered by adventitious accretions. The problem is to remove the accretions and thereby uncover the order that was always there. Such a response, of course, misses the point that in crisis order is going out of existence. Moreover its posture of stubborn but simple resistance is doomed to failure because of the metaphysical weakness of the existent form of order, once the activation of change has reached visible proportions. The most reaction can achieve is stasis, and a stasis that can be maintained only by the expenditure of an effort which ultimately exhausts itself.

Despite the hopelessness of the response, it is explicable in terms of the crisis of tradition itself. Since a civilizational crisis involves also a crisis in private interests and in the ruling class, reaction is normally found among those who feel themselves to be among the ruling class. Their great error is to mingle the responses typical of each of the three types of change. Since civilizational change is the most difficult to perceive and analyze, it seldom is given adequate attention. And the anxiety it generates is misinterpreted as anxiety over private interest and threatened social status.

The basic truth in the reactionary response is to be found in its realistic assumption of the primacy of the real over the ideational. But this truth is distorted by its extreme application: the assumption of the separate existence of tradition. The reactionary misses the point that tradition exists ontologically only in the form of

psychological-intellectual relations. Reactionary theories, for this reason, usually assume some form of organismic theory. In its defensive formulations, the theory will attack conscious change on the grounds of the independent existence of the community. In its dynamic form, it visualizes the community as the embodiment of an ontological force—the race, for instance, which unfolds in history. In both cases the individual tends to be treated as an instrument of the organic reality.

When the reactionary response is thus bolstered by an intellectual defense, the characteristics of that defense are explicable only in terms of the basic attitudes of unanalyzed reaction. Reaction is rooted in a perception of tradition as a whole. It is a total situation that is defended: the “good old days.” There is no selectivity; even the questionable features of the past are defended. The point is that the reactionary, for whatever motive, perceives himself to have been part or a partner of something that extended beyond himself, something which, consequently, he was not able to accept or reject on the basis of subjective preference. The reactionary is confused about the existential status of a decaying tradition, but he does perceive the unity tradition had when it was healthy.

The second unanalyzed response to civilizational crisis we call ideological progressivism.¹⁰ With regard to the civilizational crisis itself, the ideological mind interprets the social disruption as a good. What the reactionary calls chaos, the ideologist calls the “open society,” interpreting it as a victory for individual freedom. What the reactionary calls loss of order, the ideologist calls the disappearance of old evils, the beginning of a new rationality. The ideological progressive connives with the erosion of tradition in the name of progress. His characteristic orientation is toward the future where he discerns a new order that man

will create for himself. The ideological progressive, therefore, proposes a conception of progress that involves an existential discontinuity; progress without organic evolution.

The fact of discontinuity is frequently overlooked because the order of the future is validated as the order men have always striven for. Yet the discontinuity is not only present but derives from the basic orientation of the ideologist toward social reality. Civilizational crisis, it must be remembered, is constituted by a unique type of change: existing form is not displaced by emerging form, but by emerging formlessness; the change is from order to disorder. Since the ideological mind, insofar as it seeks social order, looks to the present and the future, it finds only an ontological void. It is a matter of attitude rather than science that this void, constituted by the disruption of interpersonal relations among men, is interpreted as the good of freedom. But given the void and the attitude, the ideologist cannot conceive of himself as co-operating with an objective evolution of form. His commitment to the process of becoming consequently involves commitment not to reality but to ideas. The becoming central to his attention is a process whereby mind informs reality, a process that involves the movement from the abstract and the ideational to the real. The ideologist thinks in terms of creative action, informing action, not in terms of cooperation with an objectively emerging form. What “ought to be” is achieved by a break in being, not by an evolution of being.

The true discontinuity occurs, moreover, in the content of what “ought to be.” For when tradition begins to “fall out of existence,” the essence of the “fall” lies in the withdrawal of ideas from the concrete historical integration called society into the isolation of an ideational existence in the minds of unrelated individuals. Thus the

ontological disruption of society is concealed by the perdurance of ideas in the minds of men. But even here in the realm of thought there is a further discontinuity. For in their movement from the real to the ideational, the substantive ideas undergo a sea change, a metamorphosis of meaning. When the ideas had ontological status in historical society their meaning was determined by their position as part of a complex of ideas polarized into a world view. In their ideational existence they become merely the debris of the earlier tradition and their meaning changes, for the ideas lose their coherence. They become individual absolutes. Where they once were the form of the society, they now become the goals of creative action.

In pursuit of these goals, the ideologist, like the reactionary, depends on political authority in its coercive form. The end of authority, however, is not to repress change, to recover form, but to create and impose form. Government thus is conceived of as having a creative role among men. And its action is validated by the goals which in seeking to realize, it represents. The claim is that the new order is what the people want. Therefore, by the principle of consent, the government, in imposing order, represents the people who are the recipients of that order. Involved in this way of thinking is a profound confusion concerning the ontological status of ideas. The people, unformed because they need to be informed, are considered the source of the form to be imposed. This way of thinking, of course, can be sustained only by virtue of a confusion between the ideational and the real. However, once the confusion is achieved, the ideas which are the prototype of the new societal form may be imposed politically without prior debate in the democratic process. Nor need they be sustained by theoretical argumentation. For they are, as the Declaration of Independence tells us,

self evident. Those who oppose them are obviously corrupt and can be handled only by coercive repression. Thus by a curious development, the proponents of the open society become the champions of the closed idea. The chief evidence for this development may be found in the substitution of propaganda for discussion in the *conversatio civilis*. Men become the matter to be informed. It is claimed that they want to receive the form possessed by the ideological mind. Propaganda, which imposes forms in the human intellect without the process of persuasion, becomes a kind of divine *praeveniant* action whereby the ideologists enable men to act freely.

Thus the essence of the ideological progressive response is to be found in the primacy of mind over reality and in a utilitarian test of truth. Both these premises necessarily follow from the ideological conception of the problem of order. The ideologist finds himself with a set of ideas that seemingly by their very essence call for ontological existence among men. In this posture there is no *universale in re*, for social reality is "open." Nor is there a *universale post rem*, for the idea in the mind was not derived from reality but acquired by virtue of the transubstantiation of ideas during their depolarization. There is only a *universale ante rem*: the ideas that exist in the ideologists mind as the unmeasured measure of reality. From this it follows that the only standard of truth in human action can be that of the utility of the action for implementing the model ideas. If something is necessary, it is legitimate by that very fact. This standard is not applied universally. Where the central model ideas are not involved the ordinary standards of morality are retained. But when they are involved, the model in its capacity as ultimate standard becomes the source of a new morality.

Thus both unanalyzed responses come to

the same general authoritative conclusion by different routes, one by demanding submission to an ontological necessity, the other to a self-imposing ideational entity. Both, moreover, feel in a blind, groping fashion for something to assuage the deep anxiety evoked by civilizational crisis.

Analyzed Partial Responses

TWO OTHER RESPONSES to crisis can be identified: economic individualism and spiritual individualism. Here we can give only a simplified characterization of each position.¹¹ For unlike the unanalyzed responses, these are based on a conscious and thoughtful analysis of social problems. Consequently, the proponents of each position vary, and sometimes notably, in the particular development of their ideas. They all have certain features in common, however, which distinguish them from reactionary and ideological thought. Both define problems that are real in contemporary society. Both are rooted in individualistic premises. However, they also have a defect in common. In selecting problems for definition they both focus on social conditions evoked by the unanalyzed responses to disruption. Thus they are conscious responses to blind response. To be sure they rightly analyze basic consequences of reactionary and collectivistic policy. They propose remedies for these, remedies, let it be added, that must be involved in a total remedy. But, because they miss the crucial issue in the crisis, when accepted as adequate responses, they permit the crisis in paradigmatic history to gain momentum. We call them partial to stress the contention that they neither confront nor respond to the central problem of civilizational crisis.

Economic individualism is rooted in a radical call for the liberation of individual energy. Its concern is not so much for economics as it is for freedom.¹² One of its

root propositions is that economic freedom—private property and a free market—are essential prerequisites for human freedom. Following on this, its second root proposition is that social reconstruction is possible only given the intelligent and spontaneous action of vigorous individuals. The argumentation in support of these propositions is varied, erudite, and persuasive. In its most thoughtful formulations it is enhanced by a theory of social order that gives the position a positive character. Nevertheless the position is motivated by opposition to the collectivism that results from unanalyzed responses. In its essence it is ordered to breaking down the massive legal and bureaucratic controls that substitute for the missing order inherent in healthy and integrated societies. At its crucial point, however, it relies on freedom to produce basic societal order. We hold exactly the opposite to be true. Given fundamental order, freedom is the source of the variegated fullness of life that constitutes high civilization, but freedom itself is a product of a prior substantial order. A civilizational crisis is not a crisis about human freedom but about human order. The collectivism of blind response sometimes conceals this basic factor.

Therefore, despite the nobility of the appeal to liberty, to courage, the conclusion is inescapable that this position does not appreciate the nature of the spiritual crisis we face. Man cannot bear to be insecure about his own existence as man. When insecurity touches the very meaning of his existence he abandons all else in an attempt to recover the roots of that existence. If the attempt is enlightened he has hope of success, if it is unenlightened, then it becomes frantic and blind. But enlightened or not, this search takes priority over all else. Not even liberty has meaning when meaning threatens to drain out of human life entirely. Therefore, to approach the

problem of paradigmatic crisis as though it were a crisis about liberty gravely misinterprets the problem.

It is clear that a true response to crisis is less likely, and, if discovered, will be less able to win general acceptance in proportion as unanalyzed responses pre-empt social policy. Consequently, the challenge to collectivism contained in economic individualism is a necessary preliminary to the development of a total response to crisis. But of itself economic individualism offers no such total response to the threat of anxiety. If accepted as adequate, therefore, there is a danger that the truth to be found in the position may be lost. For if, in the crisis of meaning, liberty is defended on inadequate grounds, there is danger that the true defense of liberty will be compromised.

Spiritual individualism seems, at first glance, to differ radically from the position of economic individualism. The issue between the two centers around the nature of the problem of liberty. The spiritual interpretation argues that the issue of the spirit of man is prior to that of his economic condition. Between the two there is a grave division on the issue whether a human freedom rooted solely in economic freedom can solve any problems. The spiritual position insists that freedom enables problems to be solved only when the free man is also virtuous. The economic position does not say virtue is not necessary. But it does not cope directly with the issue, being satisfied to rest in the faith that men, if left alone, will solve the problem of order.

But if the position of spiritual individualism is examined closely, it becomes apparent that it formulates its problem in much the same way as economic individualism. The difference is to be found on the objective situation on which each focuses its attention. Spiritual individualism is preoccupied with the "objectification" of so-

ciety. By that is meant, the position is acutely aware of the increasingly non-human character of the relations among men, of the predominance of things in human relations including economic things. Now this awareness is precisely a critical awareness of the substitution of legal for human relations, and the displacement of a government of men by an administration of things. And this awareness of the social fact is dramatically intensified by the realization that the most influential policy preferences tend to increase the "dehumanization of societal relations." By doing so, they further reduce the distinctly human element in man, contribute to his "falling out of existence." This in turn reduces man's capacity for freedom. In response to these insights, the spiritual individualist formulates his solutions in terms of the defense of freedom against the objectification of society. In this defense of freedom he rejects the contemporary society, because of its ontological inadequacy as a human system. Along with this, however, he frequently rejects also the idea that society is a necessary context for human life. Consequently, the spiritual individualist neglects the problem of right social order and in doing so, neglects the central problem of civilizational crisis. The spiritual individualist tends to suspect society as the villain of the piece. And solutions are sought finally in the realm of the individual's return to truth by paths sometimes solitary and stern.

Both analyzed partial responses follow the same method in formulating the problem of crisis: an examination of the objective condition of man, followed by the defense of some aspect of man from the dehumanizing processes emerging from the loss of societal coherence. This sameness of method leads us to the ultimate similarity in both positions, their individualism. Neither position will commit itself, as a

position, on questions of substantive truth. Neither, consequently, will commit themselves to the restoration of tradition. Both defend only process truth about man, his need for freedom. For both fear that an assertion of substantive truth would become the occasion for further political control over man in the name of that truth. This fear, seemingly, arises from the policy oriented point of view from which both positions develop. While neglecting the problem of society as an ordered whole, both positions seek to discover the policies society should adopt to solve its problems. Since the objective societal situation is characterized by a progressive loss of truth, these policies can only be identified as procedures, and the basic value can only be liberty which is the mode of action, not its substance. The consequences of this preoccupation with policy suggests that the real issue in a civilizational crisis is not political at all but meta-political. We can learn from these positions their explicit teaching, that state action can only hinder problem solving. For totalitarian rule inevitably follows when a disrupted society attempts to reconstruct itself by political means. It follows, that is, if the crisis occurs on the level of substantive meaning itself.

The refusal to consider the issue of substantive truth, then, follows from a difference of interpretation on the issue of the nature of the crisis. But this difference in turn, is rooted, (at least in the two positions now under discussion) in an ultimate premise common to both, individualism. Let us immediately specify that neither position is rooted in philosophical individualism. Both of them have taken their positions in response to the collectivism that follows upon the blind attempt of an evading society to pull itself together. Nevertheless, this response makes it inevitable that the problem of civilizational crisis as described in our opening pages will be re-

jected as the basis of a search for solutions. For as the interpretation offered there implicitly suggests that the real problem in the restoration of tradition is precisely that of recovering the social experience of truth. Freedom follows on this, it does not precede it.

The Prophetic Response

THE TRUE RESPONSE to the civilizational crisis of our day has not yet been elaborated. The work of identifying the substantive elements in a restoration of tradition has only just begun. And this work cannot be completed in a short essay. My purpose is simply to point a finger toward the truth in this matter. Fortunately the crisis in our age is not unique in Western history, at least as regards its form. At least twice before in that history the unfolding of tradition has reached periods of crisis. And the crisis in each case has evoked a response that seemed to be adequate: the response of Plato to the collapse of the Greek City State, and the response of Augustine to the collapse of the Roman Empire. Behind both these responses there stands as a model and paradigm, the response of the Israelitic Prophets to the crises of Jewish life under God. Therefore, we borrow from Voegelin the term, and we hope the meaning, "Prophetic Response." From these precedents we cannot, it is true, discover the substantive content of an adequate response to our own crisis. But we can, by studying previous crises and responses discover the nature and form of both crisis and response. For in each crisis the form of the response is dictated by the general nature of the problem while the substantive content is dictated by the content of the threatened tradition and the experience of losing that tradition.

Since the erosion of tradition consists in its "falling out" of social existence, the true

and adequate response to the crisis must be found in the attempt to restore tradition to its ontological status as the form of society. From our opening analysis of crisis, it is clear that such restoration can be achieved only through a corporate re-experience of the tradition, a re-experiencing, that is, which begets that agreement which turns a multitude into a society. The defects of the reactionary response makes it clear that this cannot be achieved by a return to a *status quo ante*. The excesses of ideology stress the need for a reintegration of truth within the context of social experience. For the restoration of tradition involves the reconstruction of community, but this can be achieved only by the communal experience of truth. In this context, the essence of the prophetic response lies in its attempt to evoke a common awareness of a truth that had been lost. In a real sense the prophet calls truth from the limbo of memory back into the dynamism of knowledge and re-establishes it as the form of interpersonal union.

This return of truth to social existence is complicated by one basic factor. The truth to which men return cannot be the identical truth that was lost. As innocence once lost cannot be regained but must be replaced by virtue, so truth once lost can only be regained in a new and more sophisticated version. The newness in this case will be found in the character of the polarization, the integration, through which individual truths are experienced as the truth about man. When paradigmatic history breaks down all that is left socially is the experience of the breakdown itself. The social reconstruction must begin with this experience, and, under the guidance of the prophet, build up again its experience of truth. The prophet is that man or men in whose souls the order of the society has survived, but survived in a critically puri-

fied manner due to the challenge of its social decay.

The first stage in the re-integration of truth shattered by civilizational crisis demands criticism. Two stages of critical thought can be identified. The first centers upon an examination of the unacceptable responses described earlier. From this we learn that the proper response must be meta-political, for truth cannot be given ontological status in society by sheer command. We learn also, from the partial responses, that the problem is social rather than individual, and so cannot be solved by withdrawal from society. The second critical stage centers upon a totally different object: the distorted society itself in its condition of decay. What was wrong with that society? What weakness or imbalance in its integration was responsible for its disruption. No society is perfect. Every one has the seeds of its own destruction planted in its way of life. When these grow to the point where they cause disruption, thoughtful men become aware of them. Such awareness is not easy to achieve because it involves not only self-awareness but in addition, a grasp of the relation of the defective principle to the general integration of the socially held truth. The problem here is to level the profoundest sort of criticism against the corrupting principle without rejecting the rest of the tradition. For the principle in which dissolution originates is itself part of the tradition.

Granted the critical operation, one finds himself at that stage faced, at least intellectually, with a completely dismantled tradition. The ontological collapse of the tradition leaves its component ideas scattered through the multitude without social existence. The intellectual critique results in a further theoretical disturbance of the integration. For the polarization of ideas into a coherent unity is destroyed by the subtraction of even one basic element. And at

this point the prophetic response is confronted with the task of discovering the new principle on the basis of which the old truths may once again come together to give a coherent and persuasive account of the order proper to man.

The order sought at this point is not the order of politics, but the order of society. Between this order and the order appropriate to the inner life of each individual there can be no difference. For the order of society comes into existence precisely when a multitude agrees about the hierarchic structure of the goods proper to human life. Social order is nothing more than the extension into the area of interpersonal relations of the order present to or desired by the individual members of a multitude. The attempt to reconstruct a community, therefore, necessarily involves the attempt to reconstruct man.

This relation between inner and social life determines the strategy of reconstruction. The new order, derived from a new integration of a truth must above all be persuasive. The basis for its persuasive quality must be found in its appeal to the truths still recognized by the individual although no longer enjoying social status due to their depolarization. What is sought is the description of a new way of life that presents itself to the multitude as a way superior to the old, but a way that achieves its superiority through reform and critical purification rather than through creative innovation.

The idea of reform leads us to the final characteristic of the prophetic response. Reform is a temporal concept: it involves the idea of good change within a continuum of historical experience. And this is precisely what is sought objectively once a break in paradigmatic history occurs. The experience of a break must be experienced ultimately as an enlightenment if the break is to be repaired. But since the break is

basically irreparable, the prophetic response must ultimately express itself as a new interpretation of history itself in which the break, the dissolution, becomes part of a larger pattern of purpose. All human order is essentially the organization of purpose in human life. Imperfect man is cursed with an ontological inability to rest and enjoy himself in his earthly existence, for whatever the goods a man may possess, the good is not yet his.¹³ Life in time, therefore, has meaning only when man experiences an ordering of action which promises movement toward this good. Every socially persuasive way of life, therefore, must express itself as a philosophy of history in which each individual in the society is ordered to the achievement of a good in which he can rest. The theories of progress so characteristic of ideological thought are rooted in a basic hopelessness with regard to this ultimate good. To each generation they offer, not personal achievement, but submission to a collectivity. And they find their response in man's desperate need to achieve significance through union, if not union with the ultimate good, at least union with destiny. And they call upon man to empty himself since he cannot achieve fulfillment. Against this, the truly prophetic response must see the loss and recovery of meaning in life to be part of the historical experience through which men perceive new and more brilliant facets of that good which is the good for man.

¹³Those familiar with Eric Voegelin's work will recognize that my indebtedness to him is so pervasive that, to avoid a clutter of footnotes, I simply note the fact at this first explicit citation. I have drawn chiefly on his *New Science of Politics*, (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952), and his three volumes, *Order and History*, (Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1956-57).

²The liberal-conservative division according to this interpretation has occurred not more than four and most probably three times in Western history; at the collapse of Greek City State order, at the collapse of the Roman order, and in contemporary times. Whether or not the 16th-17th century saw the same division is debatable.

³E. Voegelin, *Order and History*, vol. II, "The World of the Polis," pp. 243-253.

⁴J. Maritain, *Man and the State*, (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 86.

⁵S. Weil, *The Need For Roots* (1952).

⁶R. Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, (1956).

⁷D. Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (1953).

⁸J. Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (1932).

⁹Richard Weaver in *The Ethics of Rhetoric* studies this phenomenon. Cf. also Voegelin's

analysis of the Gorgias, *Order and History*, Vol. III, 24 ff.

¹⁰In this analysis, in addition to Voegelin, I owe a debt to a brilliant essay by William Oliver Martin, *Metaphysics and Ideology*. (Marquette Univ. Press, 1959). The vast majority of books on "policy" are examples of this position.

¹¹The writings in these responses, because reflective, vary a good deal from man to man. Since I treat the position selectively here, I would not care to identify particular writers.

¹²Therefore I include here only those writers with a philosophical concern for the problem. The pure economist of the classical tradition is concerned with a different problem.

¹³I have restricted the discussion to the restoration of tradition to its world immanent aspects. One must at least note that there are other aspects equally important.

The low estate of the "common man" in the philosophy of the left.

On Equality and Inequality

LUDWIG VON MISES

THE DOCTRINE OF natural law that inspired the 18th century declarations of the rights of man did not imply the obviously fallacious proposition that all men are biologically equal. It proclaimed that all men are born equal in rights and that this equality cannot be abrogated by any man-made law, that it is inalienable or, more precisely, imprescriptible. Only the deadly foes of individual liberty and self-determination, the champions of totalitarianism,

interpreted the principle of equality before the law as derived from an alleged psychical and physiological equality of all men. The French declaration of the rights of the man and the citizen of November 3, 1789, had pronounced that all men are born and remain equal in rights. But, on the eve of the inauguration of the régime of terror, the new declaration that preceded the Constitution of June 24, 1793, proclaimed that all men are equal "*par la*

nature." From then on this thesis, although manifestly contradicting biological experience, remained one of the dogmas of "leftism." Thus we read in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* that "at birth human infants, regardless of their heredity, are as equal as Fords."¹

However, the fact that men are born unequal in regard to physical and mental capacities cannot be argued away. Some surpass their fellow men in health and vigor, in brain and aptitudes, in energy and resolution and are therefore better fitted for the pursuit of earthly affairs than the rest of mankind—a fact that has also been admitted by Marx. He spoke of "the inequality of individual endowment and therefore productive capacity (*Leistungsfähigkeit*)" as "natural privileges" and of "the unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal)."² In terms of popular psychological teaching we can say that some have the ability to adjust themselves better than others to the conditions of the struggle for survival. We may therefore—without indulging in any judgment of value—distinguish from this point of view between superior men and inferior men.

History shows that from time immemorial superior men took advantage of their superiority by seizing power and subjugating the masses of inferior men. In the status society there is a hierarchy of castes. On the one hand are the lords who have appropriated to themselves all the land and on the other hand their servants, the liegemen, serfs, and slaves, landless and penniless underlings. The inferiors' duty is to drudge for their masters. The institutions of the society aim at the sole benefit of the ruling minority, the princes, and their retinue, the aristocrats.

Such was by and large the state of affairs in all parts of the world before, as both Marxians and conservatives tell us,

"the acquisitiveness of the bourgeoisie," in a process that went on for centuries and is still going on in many parts of the world, undermined the political, social, and economic system of the "good old days." The market economy—capitalism—radically transformed the economic and political organization of mankind.

Permit me to recapitulate some well-known facts. While under precapitalistic conditions superior men were the masters on whom the masses of the inferior had to attend, under capitalism the more gifted and more able have no means to profit from their superiority other than to serve to the best of their abilities the wishes of the majority of the less gifted. In the market economic power is vested in the consumers. They ultimately determine, by their buying or abstention from buying, what should be produced, by whom and how, of what quality and in what quantity. The entrepreneurs, capitalists, and landowners who fail to satisfy in the best possible and cheapest way the most urgent of the not yet satisfied wishes of the consumers are forced to go out of business and forfeit their preferred position. In business offices and in laboratories the keenest minds are busy fructifying the most complex achievements of scientific research for the production of ever better implements and gadgets for people who have no inkling of the theories that make the fabrication of such things possible. The bigger an enterprise is, the more is it forced to adjust its production to the changing whims and fancies of the masses, its masters. The fundamental principle of capitalism is mass production to supply the masses. It is the patronage of the masses that make enterprises grow big. The common man is supreme in the market economy. He is the customer who "is always right."

In the political sphere, representative

government is the corollary of the supremacy of the consumers in the market. Officeholders depend on the voters as entrepreneurs and investors depend on the consumers. The same historical process that substituted the capitalistic mode of production for precapitalistic methods substituted popular government—democracy—for royal absolutism and other forms of government by the few. And wherever the market economy is superseded by socialism, autocracy makes a comeback. It does not matter whether the socialist or communist despotism is camouflaged by the use of aliases like “dictatorship of the proletariat” or “people’s democracy” or “Führer principle.” It always amounts to a subjection of the many to the few.

It is hardly possible to misconstrue more thoroughly the state of affairs prevailing in capitalistic society than by calling the capitalists and entrepreneurs a “ruling” class intent upon “exploiting” the masses of decent men. We will not raise the question of how the men who under capitalism are in business would have tried to take advantage of their superior talents in any other thinkable organization of production. Under capitalism they are vying with one another in serving the masses of less gifted man. All their thoughts aim at perfecting the methods of supplying the consumers. Every year, every month, every week something unheard of before appears on the market and is soon made accessible to the many.

What has multiplied the “productivity of labor” is not some degree of effort on the part of manual workers, but the accumulation of capital by the savers and its reasonable employment by the entrepreneurs. Technological inventions would have remained useless trivia if the capital required for their utilization had not been previously accumulated by thrift. Man could not survive as a human being without manual

labor. However, what elevates him above the beasts is not manual labor and the performance of routine jobs, but speculation, foresight that provides for the needs of the—always uncertain—future. The characteristic mark of production is that it is behavior directed by the mind. This fact cannot be conjured away by a semantics for which the word “labor” signifies only manual labor.

II

TO ACQUIESCE in a philosophy stressing the inborn inequality of men runs counter to many people’s feelings. More or less reluctantly, people admit that they do not equal the celebrities of art, literature, and science, at least in their specialties, and that they are no match for athletic champions. But they are not prepared to concede their own inferiority in other human matters and concerns. As they see it, those who outstripped them in the market, the successful entrepreneurs and businessmen, owe their ascendancy exclusively to villainy. They themselves are, thank God, too honest and conscientious to resort to those dishonest methods of conduct that, as they say, alone make a man prosper in a capitalistic environment.

Yet, there is a daily growing branch of literature that blatantly depicts the common man as an inferior type: the books on the behavior of consumers and the alleged evils of advertising. Of course, neither the authors nor the public that acclaims their writings openly state or believe that that is the real meaning of the facts they report.

As these books tell us, the typical American is constitutionally unfit for the performance of the simplest tasks of a householder’s daily life. He or she does not buy what is needed for the appropriate conduct of the family’s affairs. In their inwrought stupidity they are easily induced by the

tricks and wiles of business to buy useless or quite worthless things. For the main concern of business is not to profit by providing the customers with the goods they need, but by unloading on them merchandise they would never take if they could resist the psychological artifices of "Madison Avenue." The innate incurable weakness of the average man's will and intellect makes the shoppers behave like "babes."³ They are easy prey to the knavery of the hucksters.

Neither the authors nor the readers of these passionate diatribes are aware that their doctrine implies that the majority of the nation are morons, unfit to take care of their own affairs and badly in need of a paternal guardian. They are preoccupied to such an extent with their envy and hatred of successful businessmen that they fail to see how their description of consumers' behavior contradicts all that the "classical" socialist literature used to say about the eminence of the proletarians. These older socialists ascribed to the "people," to the "working and toiling masses," to the "manual workers" all the perfections of intellect and character. In their eyes, the people were not "babes" but the originators of what is great and good in the world, and the builders of a better future for mankind.

It is certainly true that the average common man is in many regards inferior to the average businessman. But this inferiority manifests itself first of all in his limited ability to think, to work, and thereby to contribute more to the joint productive effort of mankind. Most people who satisfactorily operate in routine jobs would be found wanting in any performance requiring a modicum of initiative and reflection. But they are not too dull to manage their family affairs properly. The husbands who are sent by their wives to the supermarket "for a loaf of bread and depart

with their arms loaded with their favorite snack items"⁴ are certainly not typical. Neither is the housewife who buys regardless of content, because she "likes the package."⁵

It is generally admitted that the average man displays poor taste. Consequently business, entirely dependent on the patronage of the masses of such men, is forced to bring to the market inferior literature and art. (One of the great problems of capitalistic civilization is how to make high-quality achievements possible in a social environment in which the "regular fellow" is supreme.) It is furthermore well known that many people indulge in habits that result in undesired effects. As the instigators of the great anticapitalistic campaign see it, the bad taste and the unsafe consumption habits of people and the other evils of our age are simply generated by the public relations or sales activities of the various branches of "capital"—wars are made by the munitions industries, the "merchants of death;" dipsomania by alcohol capital, the fabulous "whisky trust," and the breweries.

This philosophy is not only based on the doctrine depicting the common people as guileless suckers who can easily be taken in by the ruses of a race of crafty hucksters. It implies in addition the nonsensical theorem that the sale of articles which the consumer really needs and would buy if not hypnotized by the wiles of the sellers is unprofitable for business and that on the other hand only the sale of articles which are of little or no use for the buyer or are even downright detrimental to him yields large profits. For if one were not to assume this, there would be no reason to conclude that in the competition of the market the sellers of bad articles outstrip those of better articles. The same sophisticated tricks by means of which slick traders are said to convince the buying public can

also be used by those offering good and valuable merchandise on the market. But then good and poor articles compete under equal conditions and there is no reason to make a pessimistic judgment on the chances of the better merchandise. While both articles—the good and the bad—would be equally aided by the alleged trickery of the sellers, only the better one enjoys the advantage of being better.

We need not consider all the problems raised by the ample literature on the alleged stupidity of the consumers and their need for protection by a paternal government. What is important here is the fact that, notwithstanding the popular dogma of the equality of all men, the thesis that the common man is unfit to handle the ordinary affairs of his daily life is supported by a great part of popular "leftist" literature.

III

THE DOCTRINE of the inborn physiological and mental equality of men logically explains differences between human beings as caused by postnatal influences. It emphasizes especially the role played by education. In the capitalistic society, it is said, higher education is a privilege accessible only to the children of the "bourgeoisie." What is needed is to grant every child access to every school and thus educate everyone.

Guided by this principle, the United States embarked upon the noble experiment of making every boy and girl an educated person. All young men and women were to spend the years from six to eighteen in school, and as many as possible of them were to enter college. Then the intellectual and social division between an educated minority and a majority of people whose education was insufficient was to disappear.

Education would no longer be a privilege; it would be the heritage of every citizen.

Statistics show that this program has been put into practice. The number of high schools, of teachers and students multiplied. If the present trend goes on for a few years more, the goal of the reform will be fully attained; every American will graduate from high school.

But the success of this plan is merely apparent. It was made possible only by a policy that, while retaining the name "high school," has entirely destroyed its scholarly and scientific value. The old high school conferred its diplomas only on students who had at least acquired a definite minimum of knowledge in some disciplines considered as basic. It eliminated in the lower grades those who lacked the abilities and the disposition to comply with these requirements. But in the new régime of the high school the opportunity to choose the subjects he wished to study was badly misused by stupid or lazy pupils. Not only are fundamental subjects such as elementary arithmetic, geometry, physics, history, and foreign languages avoided by the majority of high school students, but every year boys and girls receive high school diplomas who are deficient in reading and spelling English. It is a very characteristic fact that some universities found it necessary to provide special courses to improve the reading skill of their students. The often passionate debates concerning the high school curriculum that have now been going on for several years prove clearly that only a limited number of teenagers are intellectually and morally fit to profit from school attendance. For the rest of the high school population the years spent in classrooms are simply wasted. If one lowers the scholastic standard of high schools and colleges in order to make it possible for the majority of less gifted and less industrious youths to get diplomas, one merely hurts

the minority of those who have the capacity to make use of the teaching.

The experience of the last decades in American education bears out the fact that there are inborn differences in man's intellectual capacities that cannot be eradicated by any effort of education.

IV

THE DESPERATE, BUT HOPELESS ATTEMPTS to salvage, in spite of indisputable proofs to the contrary, the thesis of the inborn equality of all men are motivated by a faulty and untenable doctrine concerning popular government and majority rule.

This doctrine tries to justify popular government by referring to the supposed natural equality of all men. Since all men are equal, every individual participates in the genius that enlightened and stimulated the greatest heroes of mankind's intellectual, artistic, and political history. Only adverse postnatal influences prevented the proletarians from equaling the brilliance and the exploits of the greatest men. Therefore, as Trotsky told us,⁶ once this abominable system of capitalism will have given way to socialism, "the average human being will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a Marx." The voice of the people is the voice of God, it is always right. If dissent arises among men, one must, of course, assume that some of them are mistaken. It is difficult to avoid the inference that it is more likely that the minority errs than the majority. The majority is right, because it is the majority and as such is borne by the "wave of the future."

The supporters of this doctrine must consider any doubt of the intellectual and

moral eminence of the masses as an attempt to substitute despotism for representative government.

However, the arguments advanced in favor of representative government by the liberals of the 19th century—the much maligned Manchester men and champions of *laissez faire*—have nothing in common with the doctrines of the natural inborn equality of men and the superhuman inspiration of majorities. They are based upon the fact, most lucidly exposed by David Hume, that those at the helm are always a small minority as against the vast majority of those subject to their orders. In this sense every system of government is minority rule and as such can last only as long as it is supported by the belief of those ruled that it is better for themselves to be loyal to the men in office than to try to supplant them by others ready to apply different methods of administration. If this opinion vanishes, the many will rise in rebellion and replace by force the unpopular office-holders and their system by other men and another system. But the complicated industrial apparatus of modern society could not be preserved under a state of affairs in which the majority's only means of enforcing its will is revolution. The objective of representative government is to avoid the reappearance of such a violent disturbance of the peace and its detrimental effects upon morale, culture, and material well-being. Government by the people, i.e., by elected representatives, makes peaceful change possible. It warrants the agreement of public opinion and the principles according to which the affairs of state are conducted. Majority rule is for those who believe in liberty not a metaphysical principle, derived from an untenable distortion of biological facts, but a means of securing the uninterrupted peaceful development of mankind's civilizing effort.

V

THE DOCTRINE OF THE INBORN BIOLOGICAL EQUALITY of all men begot in the nineteenth century a quasi-religious mysticism of the "people" that finally converted it into the dogma of the "common man's" superiority. All men are born equal. But the members of the upper classes have unfortunately been corrupted by the temptation of power and by indulgence in the luxuries they secured for themselves. The evils plaguing mankind are caused by the misdeeds of this foul minority. Once these mischief-makers are dispossessed, the inbred nobility of the common man will control human affairs. It will be a delight to live in a world in which the infinite goodness and the congenital genius of the people will be supreme. Never-dreamt-of happiness for everyone is in store for mankind.

For the Russian Social-Revolutionaries this mystique was a substitute for the devotional practices of Russian Orthodoxy. The Marxians felt uneasy about the enthusiastic vagaries of their most dangerous rivals. But Marx's own description of the blissful conditions of the "higher phase of Communist Society"⁷ was even more sanguine. After the extermination of the Social-Revolutionaries the Bolsheviks themselves adopted the cult of the common man as the main ideological disguise of their unlimited despotism of a small clique of party bosses.

The characteristic difference between socialism (communism, planning, state capitalism, or whatever other synonym one may prefer) and the market economy (capitalism, private enterprise system, economic freedom) is this: in the market

economy the individuals *qua* consumers are supreme and determine by their buying or not-buying what should be produced, while in the socialist economy these matters are fixed by the government. Under capitalism the customer is the man for whose patronage the suppliers are striving and to whom after the sale they say "thank you" and "please come again." Under socialism the "comrade" gets what "big brother" deigns to give him and he is to be thankful for whatever he got. In the capitalistic West the average standard of living is incomparably higher than in the communistic East. But it is a fact that a daily increasing number of people in the capitalistic countries—among them also most of the so-called intellectuals—long for the alleged blessings of government control.

It is vain to explain to these men what the condition of the common man both in his capacity as a producer and in that of a consumer is under a socialist system. An intellectual inferiority of the masses would manifest itself most evidently in their aiming at the abolition of the system in which they themselves are supreme and are served by the elite of the most talented men and in their yearning for the return to a system in which the elite would tread them down.

Let us not fool ourselves. It is not the progress of socialism among the backward nations, those that never surpassed the stage of primitive barbarism and those whose civilizations were arrested many centuries ago, that shows the triumphant advance of the totalitarian creed. It is in our Western circuit that socialism makes the greatest strides. Every project to narrow down what is called the "private sector" of the economic organization is considered as highly beneficial, as progress, and is, if at all, only timidly and bashfully opposed for a short time. We are marching "forward" to the realization of socialism.

VI

THE CLASSICAL LIBERALS of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries based their optimistic appreciation of mankind's future upon the assumption that the minority of eminent and honest men would always be able to guide by persuasion the majority of inferior people along the way leading to peace and prosperity. They were confident that the elite would always be in a position to prevent the masses from following the pied pipers and demagogues and adopting policies that must end in disaster. We may leave it undecided whether the error of these optimists consisted in overrating the elite or the masses or both. At any rate it is a fact that the immense majority of our contemporaries is fanatically committed to policies that ultimately aim at abolishing the social order in which the most ingenious citizens are impelled to serve the masses in the best possible way. The masses—including those called the intellectuals—passionately advocate a system in which they no longer will be the customers who give the orders but wards of an omnipotent authority. It does not matter that this economic system is sold to the common man under the label "to each according to his needs" and its political and constitutional corollary, unlimited autocracy of self-appointed office-holders, under the label "people's democracy."

In the past, the fanatical propaganda of the socialists and their abettors, the interventionists of all shades of opinion, was still opposed by a few economists, statesmen and businessmen. But even this often lame and inept defense of the market economy has almost petered out. The strong-

holds of American snobbism and "patricianship," fashionable, lavishly endowed universities and rich foundations, are today nurseries of "social" radicalism. Millionaires, not "proletarians," were the most efficient instigators of the New Deal and the "progressive" policies it engendered. It is well known that the Russian dictator was welcomed on his first visit to the United States with more cordiality by bankers and presidents of big corporations than by other Americans.

The tenor of the arguments of such "progressive" businessmen runs this way: "I owe the eminent position I occupy in my branch of business to my own efficiency and application. My innate talents, my ardor in acquiring the knowledge needed for the conduct of a big enterprise, my diligence raised me to the top. These personal merits would have secured a leading position for me under any economic system. As the head of an important branch of production I would also have enjoyed an enviable position in a socialist commonwealth. But my daily job under socialism would be much less exhausting and irritating. I would no longer have to live under the fear that a competitor can supersede me by offering something better or cheaper on the market. I would no longer be forced to comply with the whimsical and unreasonable wishes of the consumers. I would give them what I—the expert—think they ought to get. I would exchange the hectic and nerve-wracking job of a business man for the dignified and smooth functioning of a public servant. The style of my life and work would resemble much more the seigniorial deportment of a grandee of the past than that of an ulcer-plagued executive of a modern corporation. Let philosophers bother about the true or alleged defects of socialism. I, from my personal point of view, cannot see any reason why I should oppose it. Administrators of na-

tionalized enterprises in all parts of the world and visiting Russian officials fully agree with my point of view."

There is, of course, no more sense in the self-deception of these capitalists and entrepreneurs than in the daydreams of the socialists and communists of all varieties.

VII

AS IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS are today, one has to expect that in a few decades, perhaps even before the ominous year 1984, every country will have adopted the socialist system. The common man will be freed from the tedious job of directing the course of his own life. He will be told by the authorities what to do and what not to do, he will be fed, housed, clothed, educated and entertained by them. But, first of all, they will release him from the necessity of using his own brains. Everybody will receive "according to his needs." But what

the needs of an individual are, will be determined by the authority. As was the case in earlier periods, the superior men will no longer serve the masses, but dominate and rule them.

Yet, this outcome is not inevitable. It is the goal to which the prevailing trends in our contemporary world are leading. But trends can change and hitherto they always have changed. The trend toward socialism too may be replaced by a different one. To accomplish such a change is the task of the rising generation.

¹H. Kallen, "Behaviorism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. II, p. 498.

²Critique of the Social Democratic Program of Gotha (Letter to Bracke, May 5, 1875.)

³V. Packard, "Babes in Consumerland," *The Hidden Persuaders* (Cardinal Editions, 1957) pp. 90-97.

⁴Packard, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁵Packard, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁶L. Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution*, tr. by R. Strunsky (London, 1925) p. 256.

⁷Letter to Bracke, May 5, 1875, as referred to above.

Isaiah 9:6

By way of the usual door he came
Into the animal house while the clock
On the jack-straw rafters was striking infinity,
Neither the negative nor the positive hour—
Came then in a spiral of mercy,
Crusoe'd to creature, to the island where
The footprints on the wave were not yet Friday;
Beast-encircled, in the cage of the winds, Odysseus
Of the nine-months' waters, lonely for Ithaca.
In the cave of the four beasts he waited,
While the criss-cross shadow of the rafters
Bloodied the eclipse. At cock-crow morning
He wept for the sky's shadow, for the pillow of a rock,
For all beasts thorned and lost, dove-sought, armed
By love, having no other. Phoenix-fire
Of his fingers burned like Prometheus;
He remembered eagles. Slept after manna, dreaming
Bread like stones, and Lazarus dead. Woke to rain-
Bow gold, a hard fire. Night, and a rolling stone,
And the ball like a burning coal for his hands to hold.

CLARA LAIDLAW

A program of alternatives to the general's state.

The New Conservatives in Spain

FRANCIS G. WILSON

THE TERM "NEW CONSERVATIVE" seems to have been invented in England just after World War II when the Conservative Party was pulling itself together to resist, if possible, the triumph of socialism. It was immediately fashionable to speak of "new conservatives" in the United States, no doubt because the term itself symbolized the effort of a new generation to interpret our national tradition. A traumatic shock seems necessary to produce the eternal recurrence of young, eager, and militantly conservative minds. The American trauma was the general withering of New Deal ideology and the recurrence of disappointment in war; it became difficult indeed to persuade young intellectuals that a given reform proposal would do much to reshape the political cosmos. In England the onset of socialism after the Labor victory in 1945 had the same effect, just as the fail-

ures of France—defeat in war, colonial disturbance, the overshadowing danger of communism, and the perceptible disintegration of the Fourth Republic—made a conservative revival a political necessity. Or, in Germany the betrayal of national tradition by the Nazis, defeat in war, and a general sourness on war and planned economies helped produce the sobriety of the Federal Republic. In truth, wherever one turns there are in the West "new conservatives," produced by twentieth-century debacle and the sheer necessity of salvaging the possibility of existence in a national tradition.

I am not aware that Spanish conservatives today have called themselves "new conservatives," but they might well do so. A new generation of Spanish conservatives has become active since the *Alzamiento*, the uprising against the Second Republic

on July 18, 1936. In the horrors of one of the world's great civil wars a consciousness of what a new Spain might be seems to have been born. On the other hand, when the twenty-fifth anniversary year of the uprising came in 1960 none could say that the Spanish political scene had become any simpler because of the passage of time. Across international boundaries Spain may look simple, very simple to those who make it merely a country of a fascist dictatorship, or one which is a formidable strategic and spiritual bulwark against the passion of communist mythology. The conservative intellectuals say they are devoted to tradition, for they wish to build a new Spain on a combination of the great traditions of the past and the newer demands of technological advance. They are not Falangists, they are seldom admirers of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, and they are quite likely defenders of the restoration of the monarchy. It is a point of fact that many former Falangists have become liberals, and many conservatives accept the National Movement and *Accion Espanola* for their contributions in the past.

My own observation was that as one got away from Madrid, that artificial, but nevertheless real capital of Spain, there was greater appreciation of the Chief of State, and less certainty about the value of the restoration of Don Juan, the Count of Barcelona. In other words, the Falange might be stronger away from Madrid than in some circles closer to the national government. But there is one thing on which there seems to be agreement—the Second Republic was a disaster; it represents disorder still, anarchy, the destruction of property, the burning of churches, and the desecration of the graves of those who labored for the Church. As José Calvo Sotelo, one of the heroes of the National Movement whose murder may have produced the *Alzamiento*, charged, the Re-

public had retreated from legality in its elections, in the protection of property, and in its respect for the rights of man. It is recorded that on the day when Calvo Sotelo was dragged to his death by the police themselves, Dolores Ibarruri, the noted female communist in the Cortes who came to be known internationally as *La Pasionaria*, already had declared that Calvo Sotelo had said his last words.

II

THERE ARE at least four propositions which the conservative Spaniard will accept as background of his thought about Spain today. First, he will say that the Republic's violent conduct and the disintegration of order it permitted, made a revolt, or further revolution inevitable. Second, once the communists began taking over the Republican government, as George Orwell describes, for example, in *Homage to Catalonia*, the Nationalists had to win in the name of Western tradition, of Christianity, and the sheer possibility of liberty in the future. Third, a restoration of the Republic is quite out of the question under any reading of the times. Any new régime which succeeds that of the Generalissimo must come out of the present political situation. The conservatives hope it will be a restoration of the monarchy, a monarchy modeled on those in northern Europe where liberty and monarchy have remained together in the post-war years. Fourth, to say that the Nationalists had to win the war—they had 70 per cent volunteers in their armies and half the people of Spain openly for them—does not mean that a conservative today is a supporter of General Franco.

III

WHEN I ASKED Spanish conservatives just how they defined their position, several answers were given. The Civil War is not regarded as a contemporary issue, for the conservative like everyone else must live in the present. In Spain today the conservative is first of all a Catholic, and in his own life he may be very devout, as among those who adhere to the daily practices of the *Opus Dei*. The conservative is a Catholic in the sense that he proposes to take Catholic social teaching seriously; the *Rerum Novarum*, the *Quadragesimo Anno*, and many other Papal statements from Leo XIII down to the present Pontiff are to be taken as guides in the formulation of social policy. In detail, this means that Spain must be a progressive country in social legislation and in the protection of the worker and his family, but it also means that Spain must be progressive in the advancement of industry, in the improvement of agriculture, in investment for increased productivity, and in public works such as housing, roads, and government buildings. Finally, it must be progressive in the effort to establish an international order in which the freedom of the Church to carry forward its mission will not be questioned by any political régime. Still, it is recognized that many prudential judgments have to be made about any set of public policies, and what might be best for Spain might not be best for other countries.

A second answer emerged: the conservative in Spain today is a lover and restorer of tradition. He defends the Spanish tradition in the footsteps of the great Don Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, who in the last century almost single-handed was able to

reverse the judgment that Spain had nothing of which an intellectual could be proud. Spain has not only a great tradition of learning, language, literature, and discovery in the human sciences (such as the foundation of international law by Vitoria and Suárez in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), but it has been Catholic and monarchist in its tradition.

The men who are recognized as the creators of a tradition reveal much. José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the young Falangist chief who was executed at Alicante in November, 1936, is now seldom mentioned; Juan Donoso Cortés is given increasing attention as a prophet of traditionalism, while Ramiro de Maeztu and Vázquez de Mella are often discussed as restorers of tradition and the creators of Hispanidad. In government circles today Calvo Sotelo is commemorated as a figure of increasing importance in modern Spanish history. On the twenty-fifth anniversary year of Calvo Sotelo's death in July, 1936, Franco dedicated a monument to him and claimed him as a prophet of the National Movement. Even José Antonio, the fascist leader, had praised Calvo Sotelo in 1934, when he was a leading monarchist in the Cortes. *A B C*, the Madrid newspaper, in May, 1960, spoke of *Accion Espanola* as a contemporary cultural movement which has summarized Spanish tradition in its program. It has favored from the Spanish past a spiritual Thomism, a generous Hispanidad, and an orthodox, baroque intellectualism.* Bearing in mind that it is a liberal newspaper, one which has separated its religion from its political program, these remarks certainly would not sound like the revolutionary passion of José Antonio.

The richness of its regional traditions is a support for the Spain of the future. Because of its Catholic tradition in doctrine, law, philosophy, and social theory, Spain could not offer a generous welcome to the

revolutionaries spreading out in Europe from the garrets, cafés, and salons of Paris. Spain could not come to terms with the secular and atheistic philosophy of the Enlightenment, though it was seen later that agreement on scientific advance was quite possible, if one could persuade scientists to let metaphysics alone. It is a symbol of the victory of tradition that along with great investment in industrial progress, every historic monument, each mosque, each ancient synagogue and church and each city wall and *barrio*, has been declared a national monument that may be not be changed in a single stone without the consent of the proper governmental officials.

A third answer is a profound concern with political régime, and the insistence that Spain is a monarchy, as indeed the law says, having declared the Chief of State to be Regent. It has been said that the actuality of sovereignty is the right to interpret the national tradition. What can be said, I think, is something like this: during the years since the end of the war there has been a slow evolution of conservative opinion toward consensus on what kind of political order should succeed the present Chief of State. Likewise, there has been a growing impatience with the unwillingness of the General to use the last years of his life in establishing and stabilizing such a régime of restored monarchy. Spanish intellectuals are well-informed, if reading the *New York Times*, the *London Times*, and a variety of other notable journals is a basis for being well-informed. Spanish newspapers are almost entirely free in foreign news, though, of course, the censorship operates on news within Spain itself, though nothing ever seems to be said about it. The Spanish conservative knows what is going on in the world, and he studies régimes abroad and in Spain in the light of what he knows. He knows, for example, that the two-party system seems to work only in

Anglo-Saxon countries, and the parliamentary system in only a few others, especially in northern Europe where it has been associated with the institution of kingship.

Now Spanish experience, through both Republics and revolutions, through the failure of political parties and elections to work in an orderly manner, suggests that a doctrinaire re-introduction of parliamentarism would court another political disaster. While the Falangists have said political parties must disappear as well as their always unfulfilled programs, the conservative has countered saying there is nothing permanent about the Spanish experience and nothing that a suitable political evolution toward order and freedom cannot cure. Exiled Republicans, like Prieto recently, have insisted on saying the monarchists want only an absolute monarchy with no authority in the Cortes and a régime of absolute centralization characteristic of the great days of Spanish power. Nothing that the conservatives say or write may be used to support such a thesis, not even gossip in a proper sense of the word—and there is always much gossip in a régime of personal power. Today as in generations past, the reason for the success of British political institutions remains an absorbing question. But the success of the North American republican system demands likewise the careful attention of the Spanish conservative who looks forward to a time when there will be greater political liberty in a Spain of order and stability. In the last century Juan Donoso Cortés, the great Spanish mid-century conservative looked with awe or envy at British political success, and at times with hate because it was that very domestic political success which enabled Britain to exercise such influence on the Continent. And it was political instability and internal strife that had reduced Spanish influence to a nullity in the generation immediately after Napoleon.

Just as liberals and non-revolutionary socialists believed the parliamentary system to be a suitable means of attaining the destruction of private property, so the conservatives then, as now, approve of the monarchy and the parliament, and the relatively normal operation of two parties in British elections.

Admiration for British institutions has been joined by conservative admiration for ours, just as in the past some Englishmen, like Sir Henry Sumner Maine, regarded our balanced and slow-moving Constitution as our greatest contribution to progress. One of the leading Spanish intellectuals and conservatives of today, Professor Rafael Calvo Serer, has insisted that in a Spanish manner and within the Spanish tradition, democratic liberties, such as are enjoyed in America under a republican constitution, should be assured to Spaniards under a traditional and social monarchy. One of our founding fathers had said that what we must attain is a Republic as much like a monarchy as possible. So now it can be said that Spanish conservatives advocate a traditional monarchy that will be as much as possible like the great North American Republic. They speak of a popular, social monarchy, as in the writings of Ramiro de Maeztu who saw the monarchy as the protector of the people. Such a monarchy would work toward the end of classes and class conflict between the proletariat and the owners of great capital. It should make possible the restoration of a purified middle class, which would sustain equality of opportunity and an increase in the ownership of property that functions in support of the family.

Spaniards realize more clearly than we that we live in an age of great political experimentation and the trial and error method of testing new forms of government. It is a time for the testing of democracy and the creation of new forms of political and

economic liberty. We forget, for example, that the British have exported more than one form of government, that we have generally failed to export our system successfully (as in Latin America), or we have not tried, for in Japan we imported the British parliamentary system. And surely in the political uproar of Asia and Africa the theory and practice of European democracy is hardly applicable. One may remember that the Philippines are an exception, and German constitutional monarchy (with its similarities to the American presidential system) took firm root in Japan before World War II. It is said that England has three systems of government to export. First, there is the Westminster parliamentary system, which has worked well in the Dominions, in India and in a few other colonial areas. Second, there is the University system of the trained civil service which may govern a peaceful area quite well with recessive parliamentary or democratic devices. Third, the Sandhurst or military system, used in times past in the Sudan and Egypt. Even the *London Times* has spoken of the present day as a good time for generals, who though they may not be trained at Sandhurst or in the Pentagon-West Point axis, stand as models for those who feel that a strong man is necessary to preserve order. Of course, it goes without saying that around the world where democracy is not feasible, the Sandhurst system will be imitated, while the Pentagon system will be regarded as a kind of colonial imitation. If to the Spanish conservative democracy of an extreme or Jacobinical kind is not inevitable, he will insist that alternatives do exist under which liberty and the security of rights is possible. In the course of political evolution, there will be transitions between the three British export systems, and little notice will be taken when there is a passage from one régime to another. One thing is clear: there

do not seem to be authoritative explanations as to why parliamentary democracy works with a two-party system and free elections in the English-speaking countries, and why it does not work in others.

The Spanish conservative seems to have little explanation for the disillusioning political history of Spain since the decline of imperial power after Philip II. Northern Europeans like to discuss southern European illiteracy or Latin emotionalism. Protestants like to point to the existence of Catholicism, and blame it for almost everything. I heard an English woman say in Spain that, of course, one had a servant class in Catholic countries. Obviously, these explanations do not explain, especially since the rise of the Nazis in Germany, and the spread of the communist dictatorship over parts of Europe previously dedicated to the life of reason and liberty. But even northern European Latins, as in Belgium, will blame political disorder in southern Europe on occasion on the emotional propensities of the "Latins." Some Spanish conservatives say there is no chance of a restoration of the monarchy, and there will be another "strong man" when the Generalissimo moves to his better life. Perhaps this is a common opinion among present-day Carlists, who do not favor the contemplated restoration.

However, the realities are granted, and the conservative tries to look with clear eyes and head at Spanish politics. It seems impossible to introduce the more extreme form of parliamentary democracy into Spain, but to the conservative, on the contrary, the totalitarianism of the Falange is equally unsuited for a long-run political order. The Falangist and totalitarian effort to transcend all groups and parties through the National Movement is bound to fail. Likewise, syndicalism as the primary means of representation and the chief

means of communication between society and the government can hardly be regarded as an authentic democracy. Equally unreal are statements by the Chief of State that the Spanish democracy is an authentic union of people and government. When a delegation of members of the British Parliament visited Madrid in 1960 a member of the Cortes told them that Spain practiced "democracy" in its own mode which was admittedly different from Westminster's. Spanish "democracy" would, thus, exemplify neither political liberalism, that is a majoritarian and parliamentary system, nor the economic liberalism of the free market economy.

In search of example, the conservative notes that the British have made the transition from a moderate monarchy to a monarchy associated with an unrestricted democracy, and that the same transition has taken place in the United States from a moderate republicanism in the early days of the Constitution to a radical, urbanized, and minority system of democratic life. Thus, one of the conservative queries is this: would not a pre-1832, pre-Reform Bill monarchy-parliamentary system work in Spain? Would not stability be possible under such a system? When experience under this system has resulted in educating and re-assuring the Spanish people, then one might begin taking steps toward a post-Reform Bill system in Spain. Carl Schmitt once remarked that the modern state and modern dynastic politics were invented by the Spanish kings in the Escorial, that vast somber monastery and palace, but it is clear that the parliamentary monarchy, with a broad suffrage and two major parties was invented in Westminster. Some Spanish conservatives would say that the Spanish future belongs to a blending of the politics of the Escorial and of Westminster.

IV

THE EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY and the agitation of the socialist and economic revolutionary has taught the masses throughout the world that all men should have the good things of life. Poverty is unnecessary; it is a product of economic and political evil that a new régime will change. These are some of the ideas that are found in the discussion of industrialism in Toynbee's *Study of History*. And this is the situation the conservative faces. What about the economic order of the future? One might say to the masses in rebellion that in a poor country, one lacking in the basis of technological advance, not everyone can be made rich by government policy; or, one might say that a division of the dividable wealth would give only a few pesetas to each Spaniard; or, one might say that the payment for social welfare services cannot be imposed on the rich alone, because not even confiscatory income taxes will pay for it. Such services will be paid for in measure by those who receive them because of the shifting incidence of taxation.

Spain's problem of economic régime is not markedly different from that of other countries, except that all recognize Spain is a "poor" nation. Though remarkable economic development has taken place since the Nationalist victory—the indices of production have doubled in twenty years—and much of it surely without any "foreign" aid, the productivity of Spanish labor is low in both agriculture and industry. This means that personal income cannot advance to the envied level of wages in America, where productivity based on immense capital investment is indeed the

marvel of the world. The Spanish government is undertaking to accelerate the training of every kind of worker and professional man in order to provide the manpower for the forthcoming industrial order. The Spanish economist is busy with inquiring into how Spain can attain a higher level in the production of industrial and agricultural wealth, and how it can become steadily more integrated with the European and world economy. If the progress of more than twenty years since the end of the war is continued, one may begin to speak soberly of the rebuilding of Spain, through housing, roads, dams for irrigation, resettlement, and for electrical energy, new manufacturing establishments, and the export of an immense variety of Spanish products.

But what kind of an economic régime is it? It has not been liberal, as the Europeans speak of it, that is, a free-market or laissez-faire economy. The Spanish conservative is not a free-market thinker. His view seems to be that there are three kinds of economic order—the free market, the welfare state, and the planned economy. European liberals want a free market system (while American "liberals" have become secular-minded socialists), and the communist-governed lands are committed to the principle of the planned economy. The traditional economic desire of the European conservative is the institution of the welfare state, in which there is a great development of responsible and practical social legislation, while at the same time there are free-market areas and significant systems of government competition, direction, and control. It is said that all European conservatives, including the Spaniards of course, are for the welfare state, while socialists and communists favor the planned system, and the liberals look hopefully to the theory of Adam Smith and the nineteenth-century Manchester system.

In these distinctions we have one of the most difficult of the issues for the American thinker to comprehend. Our American conservative judgment leads us to advocate the free market against the economic and fiscal irresponsibility of government. Our conservatives have moved toward the acceptance of economic liberalism (the free market system), while our so-called liberals have been trying with success to infiltrate the European socialist attack on private property and economic liberty into the respectabilities of "liberalism" in America. However, there is an explanation, and it is that we have not had in our history any extensive experience with the aristocratic theory of social reform. This theory has shaped the European conservative's attitude toward economic liberalism, and made him from the outset of industrialism a critic of laissez-faire and a person of anti-capitalist and anti-bourgeois mentality. The European conservative theory of reform, monarchic and aristocratic as it is, has always been tilted toward the welfare state, if by this we mean the legal protection of the weaker members of society against the impact of technology. European conservatives have generally been a little anti-bourgeois, a little anti-capitalist, a little pro-proletarian, but they have been bitter critics of the socialist revolution which would destroy private property—often regarded as the opposite of capitalism—and establish the republic of the atheists.

While the formulation of the conservative theory of welfare moved forward rapidly in the nineteenth century, it was erected on a series of different foundations. It reached back into the Christian theory of charity as a social solution, the most dramatic expression of which is probably the magnificent letter on charity written by Donoso Cortés to Queen Maria Cristina in her exile. It extended into the demands

of aristocrats early in the nineteenth century for legislation to correct the abuses of industry. It extended back into the Christian theory of the natural law of the family and of the rights of the worker to have a family, to support it, perhaps in frugality but surely not in destitution, as Charles Péguy once stated with great force. It rested on that principle of aristocracy which republicans can hardly comprehend: responsibility for others less fortunate as a means of preserving the social order. For a Catholic conservative, like the Spanish new conservatives, it has culminated in the affirmation of the social theory of Catholicism, which has been enunciated in numerous encyclicals beginning with the *Rerum Novarum* in 1891.

V

AS EVENTS POINTING clearly to revolution continued to occur in the mid-thirties, there was an impressive shift of Rightists from the traditional Right parties toward the Falange. Traditionalists were charged by the revolutionary movement with being reactionary capitalist exploiters and defenders of the evils of landlordism. They were denounced as being plutocratic and unconcerned both with the plight of the city worker and the peasant. The Falange or the *frente nacional* was, admittedly in the speeches of José Antonio, a fascist, authoritarian, and if necessary revolutionary organization; it was, he said, neither of the Right nor the Left, and in the election of 1936 it presented no candidates. It was unsuccessfully charged in the Cortes with organizing an uprising, and after the war it was on this basis that José Antonio was condemned to death in November, 1936. The supporters of tradition, the

Rightists, were, indeed, in conflict with both the Falange and with the Republicans, who in part were liberals, in part socialists, in part anarchists, and in part communists who engineered the infiltration of Russian leadership. There was some agreement, however, for all Rightists or Falangists declared themselves against the class war, against socialism and communism, they affirmed their love of Spain, of the Catholic Faith of Spaniards, and they both rejected the liberal philosophy of the French Enlightenment, which came to be symbolized in the ideas of Rousseau.

But the differences were very sharp as well. The Falange (*La Falange Espanola de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista*—*F. E. de las J.O.N.S.*, founded in 1933 and 1934) attempted to be a revolutionary mass movement, modeled on the movements in Italy and Germany. Falangists wore "blue shirts" and adopted the slogan of "Arriba Espana." No doubt the F. E. shared in precipitating the *Alzamiento*, though it is conceded now that the death of Calvo Sotelo was the most important single factor. In effect the F. E. tried to claim a monopoly of the Spanish nationalist revolution; therefore, it claimed a right to a monopoly of bureaucratic power, the right to dominate the universities and the syndicates organized as alternative to the left-wing trade unions. It was against capitalism and all forms of economic liberalism. It repudiated political parties and the traditional system of parliamentary or constitutional government. It claimed to observe Catholic teaching, but this was a fiercely contested point from the very outset. The conservative asserts that a fascist movement—such as the F. E.—cannot be Catholic. If a movement is truly Catholic, it cannot be fascist. Against these positions, those who revitalized the principles of political conservatism de-

fended the monarchy, they deplored its overthrow on April 14, 1931, and they defended the historic Spanish Cortes. Some of the opponents of the Falange were Christian democrats, supporters of Catholic Action; some were regionalists and decentralists; the ranks of the Carlists, swollen by the persecution of the Church, were against the Falange (though the *Requetés*, the Carlist militia, fought with the Falangists in the Nationalist cause); some were agrarians in political position; and in an over-all sense the opponents of the Falange were legalists and constitutionalists in their defense of the Spanish tradition. The emergent conservatives rejected racialism, for, as Maeztu insisted, Spain was a religious community and not a racial one, while the F. E. was undisturbed by German anti-semitic policy. With the war won, all of the latent differences in ideology were bound to appear, and to the conservative the F. E. in its fundamental meaning was an attack on Spanish tradition.

One of the continuing criticisms of the Falange is that it has tried to create a monolithic society, a society in which there is no autonomous and pluralistic expression of the family, the municipality, the region, the functioning corporation of the economy, and the culture. José Antonio as leader and ideologist of the Falange spoke often of authority, hierarchy and order, of the defense of the Church, and the protection of the country against offense and attack. But the critics of the F. E. contend that the program in practice destroyed the very things in Spanish tradition for which it stood.

Now the defense of the corporate order, an order in which corporations have freedom from the government, reaches back into the middle ages, and into the early modern criticism of bourgeois and capitalistic society. A corporate or functional

order has become a part of the general Catholic statement of the kind of economy that may come nearest to the expression of Christian ideals in economic life. But if the Falange, now become an institutional set-up like Tammany Hall, especially in its regional expression, has in effect supported an order in which syndicates and functional groups are dominated by the bureaucracy, the new conservative would say that taking Catholic thought seriously means autonomous corporations, syndicates, trade unions, or other groups such as universities, cities, regions, and cultural associations. The new conservative would contend there should be freedom for Catholic universities, which they do not have in Spain to nearly the same degree as in the United States. The government, speaking through the Generalissimo, has demanded that the universities share in the National Movement; their liberty must be attained in the context of unity, authority, discipline, and order. Only in this way will they be able to form properly the young intellectuals of Spain. But a Spanish conservative may well point to the United States as a pluralistic, corporate society, with autonomous corporations, cities with home rule, universities operated as they wish, and a federal system in which some autonomy of the states is left. American liberty may seem, indeed, to a Spaniard like a noble example of corporative liberty which is in accordance with Catholic principles of the organization of free society and a new economy. And in Spain it is the groups that assert in effect their liberty, like intellectuals, professional men, and publishers, who are now providing ideas for the government, rather than the more stiff and unimaginative institutions that are dominated by a bureaucratic tradition that evolved from the liberal centralization of the last century.

VI

IN THE SPANISH SYSTEM where there are no elections in a free sense (it is said Navarra has some autonomy dating back to the Carlist wars), the government itself has been very skillful in using and balancing various potential and actual political forces. This has, indeed, been one of the achievements of the Generalissimo. As new forces have appeared, like the *Opus Dei* which identifies in many respects the new conservative, Catholic intellectuals of Spain, they have been used in the government, and censorship has operated only on particular individuals who may have got too far out of line for governmental comfort. While political parties do not exist in our sense, for they do not have a representative function, and as groups their only function is criticism or censure of public policy, the formal groups that might be parties under happier circumstances do exist, and they are included in various governmental agencies. Through the examination system, many *Opus Dei* people have attained university posts. In other words, the Falange become formalistic and institutionalized, has resented the encroachment of *Opus Dei* in all of the institutions of society where intellectuals and trained minds are used. Many critics of *Opus Dei* charge that it is a kind of Catholic Masonry, with secret and conspiratorial purposes. It is charged with having too much power because of the approval of the Church. All this denied by *Opus Dei* people, who assert in return that many Spanish intellectuals are really liberals, because they believe that social science, technology, government policy, and research can be neutral in regard to the

Christian Faith. Furthermore, while the Falange may insist it is Catholic, it has made its accommodations with power and has ceased to be a force for the attainment of a Catholic social order.

Now these new conservatives, many of whom are part of *Opus Dei* and many others who are in full sympathy with them, say they are seeking to combine Catholic ideas with Anglo-Saxon traditions in both economic and political behavior. The Catholic countries of Europe, they say, have not had the deeper sense of *Beruf* (as Max Weber spoke of it) or of the profession as a religious vocation or a Christian labor. To *Opus Dei* thinkers, one's life work is sacred; the Catholic has been too individualistic; he needs the Protestant sense of organicity in his work which has made capitalism possible. Capitalism has rested on the moral sense of belonging to an organization, a *Beruf*, a profession, or exercising the skill of a vocation. But just as the Protestant has regarded his work as sacred, he has also urged as a religious or moral duty obedience to the law. The Catholic countries need both; their people need to regard their work as an expression of moral personality, and they need to develop the Protestant respect for the law. And combining these two qualities from Protestantism with the Catholic Faith will enable the Latin countries to march ahead as an expression of conservative progress. If these Protestant principles can be regrouped with the Catholic Faith and its philosophical defense of natural law, which Walter Lippmann has called "The Public Philosophy," the foundations of public order in a state of moderate power will be laid.

Not the least startling aspect of the new conservatism on the Continent generally has been the willingness to effect some reconciliation with the ideas of the Enlightenment, which in truth in the eighteenth

century was more of a cultural movement, a cultural atmosphere, than a system of philosophy or even an ideology. The natural rights of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, being founded on the conception of a natural moral order, should be acceptable to Catholics if the break between Catholic natural law and rationalistic natural law theory is mended, as indeed it can be and should be.

However, for Spain nothing is simple, and ideas and movements tend to go to excess as Donoso Cortés said over a hundred years ago. But there is among Spanish conservatives a renewed discussion of the issue of French ideas. The French impact on Spain was great in the eighteenth century, but the sense of the issue was enormously sharpened by the French invasion and the war against the French for Spanish Independence, the attempt of the Francophiles, *los afrancesados*, to destroy the Church and to defend Napoleon Bonaparte's puppet on the Spanish throne, and by the memories of Spaniards when they contemplate the damage wrought by French soldiers in Spain, for old bullet marks and historical monuments that no longer stand can speak an eloquent language. Obviously, it is not easy for a Spanish conservative and believer in his tradition to turn to France for inspiration, even with the resurgence of French Catholic and conservative ideas in recent times. The central trouble is, of course, that the French political tradition resembles the Spanish too much. For a new start the conservative can turn to the Anglo-Saxon political experience.

If the Spaniard turns to the Anglo-American political proposition, he discovers much that is similar to what a Spanish conservative would hold. On the level of political philosophy the Anglo-Americans have held to natural law and

rights, the principle of popular consent to a form of government, and to the rule of law symbolized either in the British monarchy after 1688 or in the American Republic of moderation and constitutionalism. In Spain the tradition of natural law and rights and the principle of the consent of the governed was expressed in Catholic terms by the Spanish jurist-theologians of the golden age, in Vitoria, Suárez, Molina, and others. In the light of much recent revision, it is quite possible to build a bridge between the Catholic natural law doctrines of Spain and the rewritten protestant and Whig political tradition of natural law and constitutionalism. May not one suggest that the conservatism of Burke, which sought out its historical roots, has much in common with a Catholic conservatism of the twentieth century?

The Spaniards who tried to use French ideas in the eighteenth century were yet Catholics, though not Catholics in the same sense as today. The eighteenth-century governors of Spain were competent people trying to do a difficult job. They knew there had been no Protestant Reformation in Spain and they wanted none, but they saw that much of the liberalism of the French Revolutions consisted in the advocacy of the use of science in government, and in attempting to bring about the economic advance of the nation. Now as then, it is the scientific spirit of the Enlightenment that Spain can use in making its own type of progress. The eighteenth-century saw in Spain the beginning of a long industrial revolution that has not yet reached an end, though today it may be accelerated with American foreign aid in the guise of counterpart funds.

VII

THE CONSERVATIVES OF LATIN MIND, whether new or old, should be of profound interest to American Catholics and conservatives. This is true not only because there is an increasing interest among Latins in the Anglo-American tradition, but because of the contrasts that may be observed. The commitments of the Latin mind seem to us more profound, and its conflicts seem generally more demanding than those among Anglo-Americans. In consequence, its conservatism may be more real, more lucid in philosophical commitment, even if it remains pragmatic and prudential in the selection of immediate public policies. The Latin conservative, or let us say, the Spanish new conservative, demands that a man live by the truth that is in him. The thread running through everything is the religious question, and on this the conservative may not remain neutral, though he may employ the economic, technical, and scientific means available generally in Europe for the ends of Spain.

*For the Spanish traditionalist, the baroque, beginning in the late sixteenth century, (in the Spanish "golden century," 1519-1665) is not regarded as decadent. Though there was bad taste in the arts at times, it was a period of tremendous political importance, as well as the golden time of Spanish letters. It is associated with the Counter-Reformation, the spirit of the Council of Trent, and it is considered simply as a change of style in Renaissance creativeness. Emilio Orozco Díaz declared before the Spanish Athanaeum in Madrid that baroque culture was the last common effort in Europe in art and literature, in the search for God under the guidance of Spain; the lasting wisdom of the baroque is the validity of thinking deeply of the eternal salvation of the individual and the temporal salvation of European culture. See Emilio Orozco Díaz, *Lección Permanente del Barroco Español* (2nd ed., Ateneo, Madrid, 1956), pp. 57-59, and the literature cited in this monograph.

Unity and division behind the Iron Curtain.

Relations within the Soviet Bloc: A Note on 1960 Developments

ANDREW GYORGY

THE PICTURESQUE PHRASE "a sick man makes more noise than a corpse" can rightfully be applied to the East European political scene of 1960. After years of silence following the great popular rebellions of 1956, it is invigorating to hear new political sounds of any kind from that much-tortured area. The curtain is not iron in terms of the lively and continuous exchanges of people, ideas, publications and services flowing across the boundaries of the satellite countries. Thus the drab impression of a Stalinist monolith has given way to the image of a political mosaic, variegated in color and texture from coun-

try to country, and only thinly camouflaged toward the outside world by a layer of post-Stalinist Communism. Since the "variations on the theme" are so many from Poland to Bulgaria and from Albania to Rumania, it is not easy to discern too many common denominators for the entire region. This brief survey will focus upon three of these: the legacy of the recent revolutions, certain economic and political problems of leadership and the effect of the "peaceful coexistence" debate on Eastern Europe, including the political posturing of non-satellite Yugoslavia.

Revolutions "From Below"

THESE ARE INDEED post-heroic times for the area wracked only four years ago by the convolutions and crises of Poznan and Budapest. The magic moment for popular uprisings has passed, the freedom fighters have fled long ago or have been languishing in jail—leaders and followers both have had time to cool down and have been forced to view the cataclysmic events of 1956 with a minimal amount of historic detachment, if not with objectivity. Since elaborate police precautions have been taken in the critical urban areas of the most restive satellites, there seems to be plenty of time for a reappraisal of the violent past and for any hopeful views that may be possible, of new popular waves—whether above ground or of the underground variety.

In retrospect the most striking single feature of the East European rebellions is the clearcut causal connection between the explosion itself and a genuine, nationwide political and economic spirit of relaxation. These revolutions were not born in the midst of the misery of a concentration camp atmosphere,¹ on the contrary—they seem to have alternated with and were closely linked to periods of psychological and physical improvement. The complaints made at the time appeared more as recriminations or demands aimed at future improvements than as concerning unbearable conditions related to the immediate moment of the uprising. The East Berlin revolt occurred three months after Stalin's death in the midst of a visible relaxation of secret police operations and political tensions, while the Polish and Hungarian revolutions came in the wake of a *New Course* reform period introducing more congenial economic and political measures and a betterment of living standards in

both countries. The revolts have thus been a curious reaction to some degree of improvement coupled with short-term irritants, incidents which proved immediately explosive and beyond party—or government—control, in a generally volatile and inflammable situation. These revolutions were not primarily the result of physical hardship and momentary suffering, but were prototypes of what Professor Alexander Rüstow picturesquely described as the "*freiheitliche Revolution*" or freedom-aspiring revolt. Thus they have been primarily motivated by the desire to sweep aside, or at least minimize, the rigors of their highly oppressive régimes. They should have carried "Freedom and Bread" on their banners—in that order of priorities—as more accurate guiding slogans, instead of economic demands being placed ahead of the more fundamental yearning for political liberty.

Such revolutions "from below" are seldom successful. The achievement of their sweeping popular objectives is clearly dependent on a series of miracles—so many conditioning factors have to materialize simultaneously and assert themselves serially, that the ultimate chances of such a complex process of political catalysis are indeed remote. Two types of forces are required to produce this revolutionary explosion:

First, certain long-term preconditions, basic and environmental, will play an essential role. These are a deepseated intellectual ferment among the population, the ever-present physical and psychological threat of police terror, an obvious and continuing dissatisfaction with the economy despite the short-term improvements of certain New Course policies, and—last but not least—a truly unpopular government ruling by arbitrary and irrational means, including a flagrantly inconsistent application of the laws.

Second, superimposed on this stark background picture, certain short-term forces must crystallize in order to set in motion the revolutionary sequence of events. A primary factor is a widespread hope among the population that the country's condition can drastically improve in the near future. Such a streak of sudden optimism, the optical illusion of a silver lining against the clouds of totalitarianism, is an essential precursor to the revolution itself. Utter discouragement and despair have seldom generated momentous political forces—only the hope in peoples' hearts that a miracle can be performed, can produce the spirit of abandon and recklessness which leads to revolt. But at this point popular excitement and hopeful anticipation must be strengthened by an equally important factor: the suddenly materialized miracle of charismatic revolutionary leadership. Here is the absolute imperative of the "Right hero at the right place!", of the sudden emergence of a dynamic and shrewd political leader, a persuasive speaker, a responsible party man, and withal a popular personality of exceptional courage and a good sense of timing, too.

This aspect of the revolutionary catalysis clearly demands the impossible. Few magic moments in history can produce the superman of such unlimited and strategic virtues. Even if other preconditions have been met, the absence of such charismatic leadership may yet defeat a national revolution. Often revolt seems to be propelled by the imaginary virtues or semi-fictitious popularity of the leader, as was Gomulka's case in Poland. When the true picture materializes in such instances, the illusion fades and the hero is seen to have feet of clay. Thus Gomulka's momentum was dissipated after seven or eight months at most. In Budapest there was no miracle of leadership at all, as Imre Nagy could not live up to the heroic demands of October,

1956. The East German revolt of June, 1953, seemed to be utterly leaderless and collapsed after a little more than twenty-four hours.

The unmistakable conclusion to be drawn from our survey is that successful revolution must be the product of a magic confluence of at least six historical factors, some of short-term, others of long-term significance. In view of the miraculous synchronization necessary to bring all these forces to bear at the split-second moment of the ideological and political catalysis, any prognosis for revolutionary successes from below, occurring within a given satellite social system, must be gloomy indeed.

New Problems For Old Leadership

THE EXPECTATIONS of a "Brave New World" for new types of political leadership, so characteristic of the de-Stalinization period, have vanished by now from the Eastern European political scene. Although it is true that some of the ugliest Stalinists, like Mátyás Rákosi of Hungary, have disappeared, the cycle that was initiated after Stalin's death in 1953 has recently been completed. Its three phases were marked first, by the removal of leading Stalinists in each of the satellite countries and replacement of these discredited architects of the original Communist takeover by groups of less clearly identifiable leaders in the spirit of "collective leadership." This government-by-clique period lasted approximately five years. By 1958 the latest turnabout in Soviet politics was to be seen in the satellite countries: just about the time when Khrushchev managed to dismiss Premier Bulganin, the dominant figures of the various collective leadership groups also began to emerge. By removing most of their colleagues they gradually reverted to the familiar Stalinist pattern of monolithic single-man leadership. It is in-

teresting to note that a mere two years after Khrushchev's violent excoriation of the excesses of Stalinist tyranny the institution of the "cult of personality" re-entered through a back door and silently returned to the center of the political stage.

While some of these recently enthroned leaders presented new faces on the satellite horizon, a majority were clearly the same old Soviet agents of post-World War II vintage who had for years terrorized their captive peoples. Here and there the aura of Khrushchevism (a touch of ribald buffoonery covering up the familiar ruthlessness and iron determination of yore) allowed for certain minor variations on the leadership theme and for a refurbishing of the former attitudes and patterns of behavior. Thus the *Stalinoid* rather than Stalinist type of elite has recently moved into the foreground, a Kádár instead of Rákosi, a Yugov instead of Chervenkov, possibly a Grotewohl instead of the late Wilhelm Pieck.²

The personnel changes have generally not been advantageous to the local populations. Khrushchev's crew is almost as unsavory as Stalin's was. The dead leaders have not been followed by better, more lenient or flexible people. Gottwald's successors have not been an improvement for the Czechs, indeed the tight-lipped and fanatical Novotny is an implacable Stalinist of the worst possible stripe. Not only do the same old agents and Bolshevik operators creep slowly back into power (like Bulgaria's Chervenkov), but as the technique of Khrushchevism gradually becomes more rigorous, even the more promising or relaxed leaders undergo a metamorphosis in the direction of toughness and truculence. Gomulka's story and the ominous process of the tightening of ideological screws in the Polish party are not isolated case studies in accidental post-revolutionary deterioration—they are rath-

er clear indications of the inevitable process of reversion to pre-1953 patterns of leadership. The ring is closing: the concept of "cult of personality," officially excoriated in 1956, is back in triumphant practical action if it is not yet fully restored in the preachings of Communist ideology.

New Course—1960 Style

THE NOW CLASSIC DEFINITION of the original New Course era (the period from Stalin's death in 1953 to the Hungarian revolution of 1956) stresses the combination of two essential characteristics: political relaxation and economic improvements. For the past year or so a curiously re-tailored and grotesquely distorted set of New Course policies has been observable in the satellite scene. Again, this "Newest New Course" can be broken down into political and economic components. This time, however, the economic operation has complete primacy over the political—in effect, the economic means are used and exploited to gain political ends. A clearcut Soviet-directed economic operation is going full blast in Eastern Europe based on the familiar twin principles of bribe and blackmail, and directed toward the political silencing or containment of its restive peoples.

The region today is a liability to the U. S. S. R. No longer are the strategic resources, food products and industrial goods syphoned off to the Soviet Union in a continuous flow toward the East—the trend is actually reversed with sizeable Soviet shipments and economic aid moving toward the satellites. As an economist, Victor Winston, pointed out in *Problems of Communism*, the Polish and Hungarian revolts had been the turning point in the overall balance of economic relations between the U. S. S. R. and the European members of

the Soviet bloc. The economic developments which followed the two revolutions have contributed to a reduction of overall Soviet gains and even to a reversal of the balance with the satellite area as a whole. The economic trump cards, which for the previous decade of uninterrupted Stalinism had been earmarked for the U. S. S. R. and reserved by her for ideological and possibly strategic considerations, have been yielded to individual states in Eastern Europe. The economic dividends which had accrued to the Soviet Union from a closed-off satellite system have now been plowed back into the system itself. The dramatic results of the October, 1956, upheavals make it possible to draw certain economic inferences and talk about "pre-October forms of exploitation" as against "post-October concessions," rewards and incentive measures. Recent economic surveys have also stressed the impossibility of generalizing accurately for the entire region. It would be more appropriate to divide the satellite zone into two logical groupings: one composed of East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Albania as the group of net liability regions, the other including Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria as the group of net contributors to the economic strength of the U. S. S. R.

As a result of this Soviet-initiated Marshall plan in reverse, it is obvious to the traveller and student of the Eastern European scene that economic conditions have signally improved in the past four years. Wages have increased, prices have been cut or kept stationary, shops are well stocked, restaurants and hotels are filled with more-or-less satisfied customers. This conscious and cleverly conducted campaign is perhaps the most notable single short-term after-effect of that convulsive year of 1956. The satellite peoples are obviously being bribed into a politically passive posture of co-operation, or at least of silence,

by a fairly sharp improvement in their standard of living.

The 1960 pattern of the New Course, however, has not reflected the spirit of relaxation so typical of earlier New Course years. Countries like Hungary and Czechoslovakia have amazed the recent visitor by their display of such contradictory features as political oppression and relative economic prosperity. In the course of the last four years, of the two insistent demands of the Poznan workers (June, 1956, style), one has been granted, the other withheld. "We give you your bread," suggests the colonial power in charge, "but in exchange we keep your freedom."

Is War or Peace Inevitable?

THE ACADEMIC as well as the practical implications of the great Sino-Soviet dialogue on war and peace have had profound repercussions in Eastern Europe. The issue is debated daily in the press, on the radio, and in endless statements of political leaders who regularly manage to take a stand on alternating sides of the central question. On the whole, the satellite governments of Eastern Europe clearly reflect the Khrushchev-initiated and controlled Soviet viewpoint with the single exception of Albania who (for reasons of her own) mouthes the Communist Chinese line. It is also generally understood, and the position is even endorsed by the Kremlin, that the DDR, Ulbricht's East German People's Republic, stands by herself on the war-peace issue—her posture to be determined by the daily fluctuations of the tense battlefield requirements of East Berlin. Thus, the satellite spectrum, while not too broad, displays some interesting variations on the theme.

The fundamental feature of the Soviet position is that (hot) war is no longer fatally inevitable and that, for the time being, capitalism and communism are ca-

pable of peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev himself has repeated this concept *ad nauseam*. He obviously is inordinately proud of his doctrinal rewriting of a long-term Stalinist truism, and defends the "peace is inevitable" principle with seemingly genuine fervor. To the delegates of the Twenty-first Party Congress (in January-February, 1959) he gave the forceful impression that he considered this piece of doctrinal re-writing his own unique and significant contribution to the edifice of Marxism-Leninism. Since the dictator's infallibility is at stake, it is most unlikely that he will deviate from his line or modify it even under pressure.

Two major qualifications must be linked to the overall thesis that war between the two systems is no longer inevitable. First of all, it is based on a temporary assumption justified in such ways as: "for the time being," or "assuming the continuation of present conditions." It is thus a tactical *modus operandi* of world communism and does not necessarily involve truly long-term strategic considerations stretching, for example, beyond 1970 or 1975. Tactical flexibility is as much part of a protracted conflict as are strategically crystallized and enshrined doctrines.

Beyond the consideration of time, the Western observer must also keep in mind that this cold-war line expresses a deep conviction of Communist leadership: war is not necessary because the camp of "peace and socialism" becomes stronger every day while the opposing imperialist camp becomes weaker and no longer has the initiative to conduct adequately either a general or local war. Therefore, the long-run goals of world communism can be accomplished by non-military means, piecemeal and relatively peacefully.

How peaceful is peaceful coexistence? Its most recent conceptual restatement, in connection with the Moscow "summit"

meeting of the leaders of eighty-one Communist parties in November, 1960, offers a militant and positive definition. The emphasis is not on peace itself ("our foreign policy . . . does not mean an armistice of the social and bourgeois ideologies . . .") but rather on three related and equally aggressive (typically cold-war) phenomena: first, economic competition; second, a policy of global mass-mobilization coupled with the launching of vigorous action against "the enemies of peace and for disarmament"; and third, an intensification of the struggle of all Communist parties "for the triumph of socialist ideas."

The second and third prongs of this triple-pincer operation could be more appropriately characterized as cultural and political types of warfare, and thus major and permanent ingredients of the East-West struggle. This broad spectrum then has only one negative limiting factor, and that is the firmly restated Soviet view (apparently now endorsed by Peiping as well) that hot war must be avoided at all cost. Hot war in this context would not include local brush-fire type incidents or other limited military conflicts which might be most useful for Communist bloc purposes—only the "prevention of *global thermonuclear disaster*" is the "primary task," and only a struggle in which "atom and hydrogen bombs would begin to fall" must be prevented by the traditionally "democratic and peace forces."³

This most recent affirmation of the "peace is inevitable" doctrine has sharper teeth in it than Khrushchev's previous formulations of the 1956-1959 period. It calls for peace only to the extent of the exclusion of total thermonuclear war, and in effect it unfurls the flag for a worldwide diplomatic offensive, to be conducted with renewed vigor along the parallel lines of

economic, psychological and political patterns of cold (or not-so-cold) warfare.

This ideologically "united front" has been somewhat complicated by the attitude of Albanian Communists and by the special position of East Germany. Even while the summit meeting was in progress, the Chinese (but not the Soviet) party press kept publishing remarks by various members of the Albanian delegation expressing their fundamental dissatisfaction with Soviet policy. They accused the latter of "begging for peace from imperialism," of "prettifying the policy of the West," and in general, of "relaxing Communist vigilance." Thus Albania recorded its position as favoring the tough Chinese line against the West as compared to the mellower co-existence-perspective of the Soviet leadership.

One of the principal targets of the Communist statement is West German militarism. It is in this context that the DDR (the East Germany régime) is supposed to perform a "very special role" as the bloc-outpost against the menace of the Federal Republic. At this point the ambiguity of this latest of all Communist manifestos quickly yields to an emphatic pronouncement, presumably endorsed by both protagonists of the world Communist movement: "the whole socialist camp has the duty to safeguard the DDR!" This adamant reaffirmation of the bloc's deep involvement with the Berlin issue projects the uncompromising Chinese Communist approach to international affairs squarely into the heart of Central Europe and bodes ill for a satisfactory settlement of the Berlin issue itself, let alone the more long-term problem of the peaceful reunification of Germany.

As a result of the DDR's "special role," every effort has been made by the bloc leadership to bolster the Ulbricht régime by according it ceremonial as well as military-political assistance. A photograph of

the "summit" conference participants in the December 2, 1960, issue of *Pravda* displays a phenomenal upgrading for Ulbricht himself. The seating of the delegates reflects not so much the present distribution of forces in the world communist movement as the prestige—and special recognition-status of individual parties, movements, and their leaders. At the center of the group are Khrushchev and Liu Shao-Chi who represented Mao Tse-Tung throughout the conference. They occupy completely equal positions in relation to each other and to the other delegates, thus emphasizing a tactical resurrection of the "collective leadership" principle. On either side of these two world-leaders are Maurice Thorez, boss of the French Communist party, and Walter Ulbricht in his capacity of First Secretary of the East German SED. Other satellite leaders are seated beyond these two; the careful ranking of the hierarchy finally concludes with heads of Communist parties in the "hostile" capitalist states.

Albania and East Germany serve, however, primarily as exceptions illustrating by indirection the generally shared conviction that the Eastern European satellites have underwritten Khrushchev's thesis that war today is not inevitable. They have done so not because of their firm individual or collective beliefs that the "camp of peace and socialism" is bound to get stronger every day while the capitalist camp is doomed to fall apart. It is more a matter of instinctive human reactions: they prefer Khrushchev's more restrained thesis to that of Mao's which reeks of blood, vengeance, and aggressive malevolence. Starkly stated, the alternatives loom as "War at any price!" (the Chinese view) against "Peace at our price!" (the Soviet view). The unhappy concomitant fact is a universal wonderment and the anxiously raised question: is peaceful coexistence

merely a tactical "gimmick," a brief and vanishing phase in the life cycle of twentieth-century Communism, or is it a newly formulated strategic doctrine with some claim of permanence? The average East European is willing to accept the latter alternative since inevitable atomic war is too dreadful a choice to contemplate.⁴

Basically, while the Iron Curtain area is an exceptionally important barometer for the measurement of high-and low-pressure zones in world politics, in this particular dispute it is not the locus of key ideological and power struggles. As Paul Zinner of Columbia University recently remarked: "Attention has shifted elsewhere in the Communist bloc, to the adjustment of relations between Communist China and Russia, and outside the bloc, to the rekindling of East-West frictions."

Titoism—The Unpredictable Pseudo-Heresy

ALTHOUGH THE ENTIRE HISTORY of the "War-Peace" controversy only covers the modest span of a five-year period, dating back at most to the Twentieth Party Congress of February, 1956, its effect on both East and West cannot be underestimated or taken lightly. Starting with a gentle theoretical dialogue and friendly public musings on whether the earlier Marxist-Stalinist concept of an inevitable war was correct or not, it gradually deepened into a fundamental disagreement within the bloc requiring each nation to stand up and be counted on one side or the other. As the debate continued and took on overtones of true belligerence, it created a peculiar bipolarity within the Communist bloc itself: on the one hand there has been a Chinese viewpoint, and on the other a Soviet perspective. The satellites were compelled to choose, and the firm insistence of the two super-powers of Communism

forced a showdown of black versus white, an "either-or" proposition clearly embarrassing (and eventually silencing) the habitual advocates of in-between or gray-zone solutions. In an already split world, the "war-peace" question tended to create a further abyss—this one confined entirely to Communist countries or Marxist parties and movements throughout the world.

One of the most challenging questions of the past year has been the Titoist reaction to the debate, and to what extent the Sino-Soviet controversy was bound to affect the Yugoslav position. The dilemma presents the following ramifications: how does the semi-heretical ideology of Titoism react to the war-peace debate, and what sort of a shadow does the bipolarity of Red China and the U. S. S. R. within the bloc cast on the semi-independent foreign policy of Yugoslavia? Since both issues are closely related in chronological terms and are of recent vintage, the answers must be based on short-term trends and frequently hypothetical assumptions.

The years 1959 and 1960 produced a new ideological low in the doctrinal stance of Titoism. While in the previous decade Tito's emancipation from Moscow and spirited resistance to Stalinism, coupled with an honorable and full-fledged recognition by the West, have immensely raised his prestige in the eyes of the uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa, more recently the flaws and vacuous negativism of his ideas have cooled off many of his actual or potential admirers. His extended diplomatic visits to Burma, Ceylon, India, Ethiopia, the Sudan and the United Arab Republic have created nothing so far but a generally favorable climate. "Blocless neutrality," his latest slogan, is a pale replica indeed of the classic patterns of Swiss or Swedish types of neutrality. Even such qualifying addenda as pro-Western or pro-Eastern trends of neutralism are devoid of

true, ringing appeals as far as the newly emerging countries of Africa or Asia are concerned. Although neutrality and a jealously guarded national independence are useful slogans for world propaganda consumption, they are not operationally attractive enough to arouse the admiration of the ninety-nine state clientèle of the United Nations. This was Tito's experience when he personally addressed the General Assembly at its fall 1960 session.

This ideological flatness of national Communism is not dispelled, in turn, by the Yugoslav leaders' ringing denunciation of the West, and specifically of the United States. Their apparent conviction is that these essentially rhetorical fireworks are going to help in lining them up with a group of firmly anti-colonial countries without identifying them, however, with the equally anti-western and anti-colonial posture of the Soviet Union. These expectations have so far misfired as neither African or Asian nations have rallied to a presumably Tito-Nehru-Nasser-Sokarno "third force" in international politics based on merely violently anti-Western sentiments.

In the meantime the anti-Western stand is bound to impair the economic and political fortunes of Tito's Yugoslavia. The West German Federal Republic is understandably upset by his denunciations, by his strong anti-West Berlin stand, his recognition and moral support of the German Democratic Republic whose existence he publicly described as a matter of the utmost "good luck" in world politics. Tito also endorsed a permanent "Two Germanies" solution and underwrote the Oder-Neisse line as a lasting frontier. His strongest attack yet came in a highly publicized statement made at a special session of the Yugoslav Parliament on December 26, 1960. Without actually singling out the United States for mention, Tito declared that the present "aggravation" of the in-

ternational atmosphere was the fault of "certain bellicose people, especially in the West, who still adhere to the position of power policy in the settlement of international problems and are therefore against the easing of international tension."⁵

Navigating between East and West in his policy of "blocless neutrality," Tito also insists on steering a middle course between the Soviet Scylla and Chinese Communist Charybdis. This feat has often proven to be extremely difficult and, in view of the size and world political importance of Yugoslavia, outright dangerous. By 1960 the Titoist leadership settled on a qualified acceptance of the Soviet view of the non-inevitability of war. In a major essay on *Socialism and War* ("Remarks On The Chinese Criticism of Co-existence"), the foreign policy specialist Edvard Kardelj officially approved the thesis that war was not inevitable in today's world and that peaceful coexistence can and should be pursued by bloc-nations and uncommitted countries alike. Kardelj also added in a meaningful aside that "just wars" should be excepted from the no-war rule, and that "socialist states, according to their basic character, can wage only just wars," which again leaves the Yugoslav viewpoint in an ambiguous position. This qualification may well go back to the Stalinist thought that since all wars were going to start in the capitalist camp, the Communist countries will usually be confined to defensive, and therefore ever-justified, military actions. One may thus sense in this Yugoslav concept a basic endorsement of the Khrushchev thesis with a Stalinist footnote added—fully in keeping with emphasis on national independence of a Titoist type of Communism.

There is no doubt that Tito is more inclined toward the Soviet than the Chinese view in the continuing "dialogue-cum-de-

bate" of the two Communist giants. In his December 26, 1960, speech to Parliament he firmly declared that Belgrade and Moscow had identical views on "the most important issues of the day." He also stated that the main initiators of certain recent charges (of revisionism) against Yugoslavia this time "were the Chinese delegates" who had circulated "a series of the harshest untruths" and false accusations against his country. This support of the Soviet position combined with an angry denunciation of Red China for once at least seems to dispel the haze surrounding the Titoist stand on the most controversial issues of contemporary politics.

Unilateralism—Not Coexistence

OF ALL PROBLEM AREAS and recent trends here considered, the "peace-war" conflict is the most serious question. Unhappily for the Free World, even the friendliest and relatively most acceptable version of the "peaceful coexistence" theory is based on a fallacious and signally dangerous tactical assumption of international Communist leaders.⁶ This notion could most accurately be described as *Unilateral Cold War* implying a violent conflict, a head-on collision between the two "peaceful coexistents" concerning the very nature of the political atmosphere which they are supposed to share. Tersely stated, the Eastern (Communist) world equates coexistence with aggressive action while the West is advised to link this useful camouflage-concept with purely defensive considerations.

It could be stated even more forcefully. Walter Lippmann has understood Khrushchev to say that coexistence meant that while the Soviet Union may work to bring about Communism in under-developed areas, the West could do nothing about it! It could also be stretched to the point where

it would sanction limited Soviet military interventions in localized revolutionary situations or civil wars,⁷ while it produced a self-imposed, inter-allied paralysis in the West. Unilateralism at this point is a highway-traffic concept. All traffic signals are set for the green light on one side of a busy boulevard, while the other side is rigidly kept in line by a series of artfully placed red lights. The timing and selection of signals as well as the training and posting of traffic policemen would all be left to the green (or uninhibited) traffic while red (priding itself on self-restraint) would cheerfully accept the rules of the game as laid down and flexibly interpreted by its energetic partner. The West remains peaceful while the East "coexists"!

Thus the tactical unilateralism of contemporary Communism clearly and forcefully urges for itself an almost unlimited area of foreign political freedom of action. Indeed this interpretation of the cold war obviates the need for an ultimate all-out hot war: the means, aggressively designed and skilfully carried out, will inevitably devour the end. If the Communist bloc is able and willing to pursue its economic, cultural, political and psychological cold war patterns long enough and shrewdly enough, the goals will be attained peacefully and the need for war will be dissipated, since no antagonist will have survived to extend into an uncertain future the precarious principle of peaceful (or even of competitive) coexistence. "*Trouvez la formule!*" was a battle cry of nineteenth century diplomacy and Communism has successfully searched for, found, and unhesitatingly exploited the right diplomatic formula for the twentieth. In the long run, "peaceful coexistence" is bound to still even the noisy debate on war or peace; it will render obsolete the former by achieving the latter—on Soviet and Eastern European Communist terms.

²⁴"Amidst terror ideas are silent. But the veil of silence conceals a dormant life. When terror relents, or when circumstances prevent its full use, those ideas may spring into insurgent action." See Erich Goldhagen's excellent article on "The Glorious Future — Realities and Chimeras," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1960, pp. 10-18.

²⁵Satellite politics show one minor local deviation from the presently prevailing Soviet pattern. Although Krushchev as Chairman of the Council of Ministry and First Secretary of the Party in effect combines both top positions, in the Eastern European countries these two posts are generally separated. Of the two men occupying them the First Secretary is by far the more powerful and overshadows his colleague, the Premier of the national cabinet. This is the case, for example, of First Secretary János Kádár vis-à-vis Premier Ferenc Münnich in Hungary.

²⁶Italics mine. All quotes are from the statement by "Leaders of 81 Communist Parties," released by Moscow in late November, 1960. For interpretation of this significant statement, the author found valuable references in *An Analysis of the Statement* prepared by the Central Research Department, Radio Liberty (Munich), December, 1960, and several articles by Joseph C. Harsch on "Moscow Adjusts the Line," *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston) November-December, 1960.

²⁷A thoughtful student of Eastern European politics recently offered a more hopeful and realistic formulation of the same dilemma. Whether international coexistence with Communism is impossible, cannot be "explicitly stated. Perhaps in an atomic age there is no other alternative. Perhaps coexistence is a necessity. Perhaps a dy-

namic offensive of democracy in the emulation of social systems may moderate Communist confidence in victory, and even assist in the erosion of many repellent features of Communism." See H. Gordon Skilling in *The American Slavic and East European Review*, October, 1960, p. 454.

²⁸Tito's accusation that the West today is the principal source of discord in the contemporary world is unwarranted for many reasons. It blatantly ignores the facts of economic life, namely that the West, and not the East, has been supporting Yugoslavia's economy at least since the 1948 break with Stalin. Of the total volume of present-day Yugoslav foreign trade only one-tenth is carried on with uncommitted nations—despite lavish tributes to these countries by the Marshal and his government—while one-fourth of the total is with the East and two-thirds with the West. A similar ratio applies even to current tourism in Yugoslavia. For an interesting and up-to-date analysis, see Johannes Maass, "Häresie auf Zeit, Tücken des Titoismus," *Die Politische Meinung*, Oktober, 1960, pp. 84-86.

²⁹It is particularly important to clarify this point in connection with a general review of East European problems since without fail all satellite leaders (and Tito as well) are in complete agreement on it. For a belligerent recent restatement of it, see Walter Ulbricht's speech to the "diplomatic corps" of the DDR delivered on September 26, 1960, under the title "Disarmament, Peaceful Coexistence and Friendship with All Peoples" (printed in East Berlin, October, 1960).

³⁰The classic prototypes of this cold-war pattern are Communist interventions in Laos, the Congo, and Hungary, but on this basis a military flareup in Berlin could also be justified by our opponents at any moment favorable to them and of their free choice.

Actaeon

His muscular hounds chorused
beneath his owned vowed sun,
running his mountain passes,
running before him proudly,
as if their being possessed
had made them more than hounds.

They thought him beautiful
in the hunt, and more than man.
Belling, they marveled how
he bent his bow, leashed
his arrow matched for the mark
they fell eagerly on.

He should have stood blindly
where waters silvering
his feet astonished him,
touching argosies
spilled from an archer's longing
he was a boy unschooled in.

O hounds, tensed and keen,
bracing the swell of his horn,
his breathing music, morning
of kingdoms, suddenly silent,
you turn to face your master,
your wrinkled muzzles gleaming.

JOHN KNOEPFLE

Insights into the mind of the poet from his long correspondence.

Ezra Pound and the Sense of Responsibility

NOEL STOCK

IT WOULD BE a pity, in all the tangled web of relevant and irrelevant motives and opinions that still surround the work of Ezra Pound, to lose the lessons available in the positive segments of a life devoted to the testing of accepted values and preservation of values considered worth preserving. The term "sense of responsibility" is, I admit, a dangerous one; different artists have different ways of being responsible: E. E. Cummings, for instance, by saying his piece in verse and refusing to enter arguments, "both sides" being for him but sides of the one coin. Remy de Gourmont, I think it was, believed that the artist's (or perhaps the gentleman's) first duty was to keep himself out of the hands of the law. Ezra Pound's method of being responsible was to enter directly into a world where "business is business," where the participants are not always ready to listen to a distinc-

tion, no matter how nicely drawn, between politics and the "science" of economics; he entered this world, with results well known. What I suggest is that Pound's method, despite errors or unfortunate emphases, still has its uses as a guide line in a world of continuing economic encroachment on the life of the individual.

During the past year I have been examining the Ezra Pound papers and files which are stored at Schloss Brunnenburg in Northern Italy. These papers and files, a monument to his sense of responsibility if not to his sense of the possible, are impressive testimony of his efforts to keep clean the channels of communication; to get answers from people in a position to know and to communicate these answers to literary colleagues, senators—to anyone, in fact, who might be likely to pass such information around or act on it. Pound's

sense of responsibility in a more or less literary context is clear, I think, from D. D. Paige's excellent collection of letters. In the following pages I will quote extracts from letters as yet unpublished, in order to show the poet's *rectitudo* in a wider field.

The early poems and prose, including *The Spirit of Romance*, indicate clearly the calculated aim of Pound the young American aesthete: to construct a perfect verse technique. The next stage, manifest in *Make It New* and the *Literary Essays*, was to apply the lessons of Dante's *De Vulgari Eloquentia*; to weed out, to sharpen criteria, to make clear the major "elements" in the art of communication. What I am concerned with here is a further development which took place as a result of close and unavoidable observation of the impact of finance and economics on the art of his time, especially on living artists. The development was from brilliant young poet and aesthete to a wiser man groping towards the organic unity binding the arts to society generally. Pound remembers during his early London years walking to the bank with Yeats so that the latter could withdraw his last five pounds. He saw Wyndham Lewis and T. S. Eliot seriously short of money, he had a long and painful correspondence with Joyce over Joyce's money troubles, and knew others disturbed in their work for want of a few pounds. On March 31, 1925, after Pound had settled in Rapallo, he wrote a twenty-five page letter to Henry Allen Moe of the Guggenheim Foundation in an attempt to get funds for four practicing artists: Wyndham Lewis, T. S. Eliot, George Antheil, and Marianne Moore. Pound goes into detail regarding the difficulties financial and personal of both Lewis and Eliot, and in one sense at least the letter is, I believe, an important document in the history of twentieth century literature. It would be interesting to know whether poverty in other ages was ever as

bad as the economic hammering received by some leading artists in this century.

Also he [Eliot] has had frequent breakdowns himself [Pound wrote to the Foundation] AND he has had the spectacle of me and Yeats and various other people at their wits ends and living on far less than would keep him and an invalid wife.

Pound lived in England through World War I; he saw some of the best men of England go out and get slaughtered; he saw the hopes of the people, the broken promises, and the national collapse after the war was over. Through all this he was becoming aware of a unity in society which makes bad economics dangerous, as bad drainage can be dangerous, so that he spent a good deal of his time during the twenties studying the economic background to war. He looked into Vickers, Krupp, and the "armaments king" Sir Basil Zaharoff long before such study became popular among "pacifist" and other intellectuals. His article "Peace" in *The Exile* (No. 4 Autumn, 1928) repeats the core of a letter composed in June of that year by Pound and Count Albert Mensdorff and sent by Count Mensdorff, then an agent for the Carnegie Foundation in Europe, to Nicholas Murray Butler, chairman of the executive committee of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace.* Pound firmly believed that a number of European values were worth preserving, and his efforts to prevent further war in Europe were unceasing. In 1934 he wrote to Butler:

The men directly profiting from international murder have sometimes the merit of frankness, but those that cry peace and do nothing practical to secure it are

*The full text of the Mensdorff letter, together with the reply, is given in a new collection I have made of uncollected Pound essays under the title *Impact*.

not worthy of pity. (Carbon copy in the file is undated.)

On October 24, 1939, Pound wrote to Congressman J. Voorhis:

European sanity meant a four power pact and no more war west of the Vistula.

He believed, rightly or wrongly, that the diplomatic aim at that time should have been a four-power pact between Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, with the former powers warning Germany that she must not move to the west. On November 1, (1939?) he told Monro, a British newspaper correspondent in Rome:

Eden and co/ seem to have won the war for Russia without winning it for England.

The danger of "blank check" terminology like "fascism" and "communism" is especially obvious when dealing with an individual like Pound. He wrote for communist newspapers, communist magazines, "left wing" publications, fascist papers, "right wing" journals, Italian technical reviews like *Rassegna Monetaria*, and any number of other publications belonging to various "sects," such as the *Delphian Quarterly*, *The Aryan Path*, and *Biosophical Review*. Seeking always, or almost always, the positive rather than the negative, he tried to "educate" communists, fascists, the Japanese, the democracies, the American Negro, social creditors, or anybody else who looked as if he, she, or they might perform some useful function. In the middle and late twenties, Pound wrote for the communist *New Masses*; in the early thirties he was instructing expatriate America via Putnam's *New Review*; and about the same time he was attempting to explain to communist intellectuals that there was a difference between Russia and the United States, as in his "Open Letter to Tretya-

kow" in *Front* (February, 1931). In *Symposium* (April, 1933) Pound reviewed three books having to do with the causes of war:

An honest mind will admit that an economic system which pays you more to blow your fellow man to hell than to perform useful labour is less civilized than a system by which men are properly paid.

One of Pound's most significant warnings on the state of his country's intellectual life was delivered in an article called "History and Ignorance" in the *New English Weekly* (July 25, 1935) wherein he asked whether American education should be allowed to degenerate into "the manufacture of robots and tame rabbits." Above all else he seems to have wanted to educate America, to start a cultural "vortex" there; and he was willing to negotiate with anyone and everyone in this task: Mrs. Roosevelt, members of the Roosevelt cabinet, bankers like James Paul Warburg. He wrote to poets, novelists, professors, and any number of "crank" groups. His files through the thirties bulge not only with letters but cuttings from all over the world, U.S. Treasury reports, Treasury statements on U.S. gold assets, etc. During 1934 his curiosity was aroused when he was informed officially that circulars being sent to bankers by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee were not available for public distribution. He finally obtained a copy through one of his regular correspondents, W. E. Woodward, who was a member of the Roosevelt administration.

Many of the letters in the Pound files are of little or no importance, except perhaps as indications of his zeal. Many were "opening shots," written obviously with the intention of getting into correspondence with people in a position to know the answers. We shall concern ourselves here only with

those letters written in the hope of moving fellow beings into sane action. During the early years of the Roosevelt administration he devoted something like half his correspondence to the various monetary reform groups, in attempts to educate them in history, to get them to see that often the things they proclaimed with such fury had been thought of before and in some cases had been put into practice. He tried to make them see that study of the idea in action in the past might be of assistance to the present. However, as he wrote to Archibald MacLeish in 1938, "I take no responsibility for vagaries of the cranks in various 'movements.' Butchart's *Money* the first solid publication of the new econ/ in English." Butchart's book was not the split product of a sect but a serious and balanced work.

Probably the thing he hammered at most in his correspondence with the reform groups was the importance of terminology. Writing to C. H. Douglas on the possibility of improving the *New English Weekly*, he said:

you could assist me there by suggesting that they get onto the campaign for CLEAR TERMINOLOGY, distinction between meanings of different words.

capital not the same as property. paraggio, not the same as usura. money not the same as credit. (July 22, 1936)

Pound seldom or never lost sight of the need for real justice in dealing with other people or other nations.

Justice for us [he wrote to T. C. Wilson] and the right to be unjust to others will rot any system, even Lenin's. The only trouble with communism is lack of intelligence in living communists. Note that they refuse to define their beliefs, apart from Dictatorship by the dregs. (December 16, 1934)

In early 1938 he wrote to a wide selection of American authors, including Archi-

bald MacLeish, Van Wyck Brooks, and Claude Bowers, in an attempt to enliven the work of the National Institute of Arts and Letters, of which Pound himself was a member. He urged MacLeish to

. . . recognise the Inst AS an organization and communicate inside it . . . Institute should lead in a demand for making better stuff available. First need is reprint at say \$1.00 of the best of the writings of the american founders/ Jefferson, J. Adams, Van Buren . . . Inst should criticize the sabotage of endowments, I. E. utter failure of these mechanisms to do what they are endowed for. . . . (Carbon undated, but belongs to 1938)

To Henry Seidel Canby, secretary of the Institute, he suggested again that

A job, and I think the first job for a serious institute is the publication in convenient form of the thought of John Adams, Jefferson and Van Buren. That kind of thing is particularly the sort of thing an institute could and should do. Creative genius can not be made obligatory of members, but intellectual responsibility can . . . (February 14, 1938)

Years before, Pound had fought to clarify the mind of Harriet Monroe with regard to literature; during the thirties we find him trying to clear clichés from the mind of Mary W. Burd, editor of the *Delphian Quarterly*:

In trying to understand me, for god's sake don't try to mix Italy and Germany. They are not the same . . . My economic knowledge is independent of ANY political view. (November 22, 1938)

Pound never lost an opportunity to praise the wisdom of the American founders and to urge the publication of their important writings in accessible editions. Thus, when Christina Foyle of the Book Club (London) wrote for his advice in 1939, Pound

suggested a selection from the writings of the early presidents.

There is also need for, and as much interest in selections from the men who created the American system as for those who made the bolshevik revolution. (October 28, 1939)

One thing I have become very much aware of, while examining the files, is Pound's ability, or the ability of one part of him, as it were, to stand aloof and weigh justly and carefully, even while another part is engaged in violent disputation. It has been assumed, I think, that the two attitudes are incompatible, that they cannot be contemporaneous, that Ezra Pound angry cannot at the same time or on the same day be Ezra Pound the painfully slow digester of data and weigher of evidence. And yet after the start of the European war in 1939 one finds him engaged simultaneously in a campaign to keep the U.S. out of the war and another campaign to assist English agriculture. If he was "anti-English" in one sense, he was certainly not "anti-English" in the sense of proposing what he thought to be against the interests of the English people. He was hostile to England as a force attempting to drag America into the war; but at the same time he saw local English agriculture as important to England in time of war and was repeatedly offering advice towards getting it onto a sound footing. This indicates, I believe, a real allegiance to humanity, possibly not perfect but based in the concrete, something more than idle sentiment. On November 1, 1939, he wrote to Jorian Jenks, a British writer on agriculture:

Russia at the moment seems to have won the war. . . . Has anyone printed my remarks on the use of farmers and farm products as national defence?

On February 28, 1940, he told Henry Swabey:

Your job is to get English land back under the plow.

On May 9, the same year, he told Jorian Jenks:

No tithes before harvest, the farmer must have tickets for exchange while the crop grows.

A little later on he was writing to T. S. Eliot on the importance of the farmer in the historic process:

Roman empire flopped for not protecting purchasing power of labour i.e. they let in cheap grain from Egypt and ruin'd Eyetalian farmer. Better read Brooks Adams (omittin the perlite despair) . . . I gotta chew and digest, bit abaht silver mines now concurrin wiff Erigena's Omnia quae sunt, lumina sunt. (June 1, 1940)

But always he returned to the state of America, its health, economic and intellectual:

Waal as to ole Ez his rightness [he wrote to E. E. Cummings on June 8, 1940]. Do we perceive a tenDENcy to perceive that the choice is between a republican (in the old sense) with strong executive form of govt. (at least as strong exec. as Tommy Jeff) WITH an organic insides wherein every bloke is represented by a bloke of his own trade or profession.

AND on the other an bloody 'and, a dictatorship by and for usura, run by figureheads . . . ? Also a bit of classy curiosity re/ purchase of gold by the gummymment seems to me timely.

Pound's ability in the midst of turmoil to think, and to urge others to think, on fundamentals rather than on lines suggested by propaganda is clear in this letter to William Carlos Williams, dated July 14, 1941:

What no one seems to remember is the damage done to England during the

Napoleonic wars by simply being cut off from ALL contemporary thought. Same goes for the U.S. now. I note it in *Hika* and other magazines. Not only gross ignorance of thought on the Axis side of the line, . . . BUT gross ignorance of Irish thought and of English thought . . . They have heard of Douglas because I told 'em 23 years ago or 21 years or 20 or whenever/ BUT they are bone ignorant of 20 years English thought on guilds that preceded it . . . whole masses of geo-political thought ignored . . . the capitalists did not open their papers to serious analysis of communism . . . The whole occident wants homesteads or an equivalent, plus de-

fence of purchasing power of labour, especially agricultural.

What Pound sought throughout the thirties was some form of serious communication among writers, some form of expert and condensed communication having the same validity and precision as one might find in a technical journal for engineers. A group of writers working together through some such form of communication and in contact with serious thought in other fields would be better equipped, in one sense at least, to protect the channels of communication than a lone man working alone.

Pasternak

I

His journey began with the trains and stations he went in and out of;
Someone in search of the lost heartbeat
And parting glimpse of his fate
Changing, reassuring as the stone buttresses along the way
And the lamps hung heavily over the platforms.

Out of the window the beech trees recede in the distance
And the caps of the firs
Sparkle like the lake of water.
Wizened sound of wind whips into the drafty car and men hide
Themselves in a knuckle of fur caps behind parcels
Like hulks of unnamed merchandise,
And he listening attuned to the rails
When wheels burn into the tracks and steel grooves.

II

Having something to say, testing the portion of time to say it;
Silent like a candle that does not gutter out
But spills wax
On the embroidered cloth that will not rub out completely
Though the white linen be washed and forgotten about
Until another setting.

Knowing women, their passion to live
To be rescued by life itself and the pain that sorrows them.
Love following them to their grave,
An interlude from the haunting flake.

III

Hoarfrost creeps over the sill, cold extends
Into the very will,
In the misery of the grey dawn
Snow a blinding, whirling world revealing contours of the graves.
Bonds of those he loved, like interlaced trees
Cut off and broken.

He coming back under lamplight, opening his copy book
Writing through the long interval of a catastrophic night, unsheltered
From the storm, survives by the sorrowings that bruise him
And reverse the self.

Light crossing a single, shimmering point
Searching all journeys like the passage of time.

He, knowing where the rowanberry grows wild and filled with bitter fruit,
Where the Caucauses grip the Black Sea
At a horizontal line and the pines come full into view,
Recedes through the chaos of the station, moves
Unencumbered through the crowd
Makes his way alone on another train understanding his fate.

IRENE DAYTON

The Halls of Ivy

A short story

ROBERT M. DAVIES

DR. FRANK BASSETT wearily put the report he was reading down upon the step table at his side. It was the annual report to the Board, and this year it made even more discouraging reading than it had last year and the year before: inadequate facilities, mediocre student body, discontented faculty. Even so, a whopping deficit—sixty-seven thousand dollars!

Sadly Dr. Bassett looked at the report, and the corners of his mouth fell sharply down in discouragement and weariness. It was a discouraging report indeed. Perhaps to Dr. Bassett the most discouraging part of it all was the fact that he had written it. There it was, "Annual Report to the Board of Trustees of Crestwood College. Dr. Frank Bassett, President."

But he had tried. Day after day with all the routine of warring faculty members, discontented alumni, library book shortages, delayed reports, etc., etc., etc., *ad nauseam*, he had still found time to write, to phone, to visit, to explain, to request, to solicit, to beseech, to beg, and yet mostly to fail . . . Still, five hundred thousand dollars in four years was not really insignificant! What did those damn trustees want, blood?

Tomorrow he would find out. They had made their displeasure painfully clear last year when the deficit was only thirty-five thousand. Would the doubling of the deficit double their anger? He wondered. It was an interesting hypothetical question. If it did, that dentist from Wilkes-Barre—Dr.

Bassett never could remember his name—would certainly pop his eyes right out of his head. Double their anger? Impossible. Only about a tenth more than last year he calculated, and Dr. Bassett's head itself would pop on the table before them, neatly decapitated by his fellow educators.

"Oh, well," muttered Dr. Bassett to himself, "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." Idly he picked up the *New York Times* and opened it to the financial section. What bad news would he see there? Why had he ever bought that Smith-Parkington? It had gone down steadily day after day until he thought it could go no lower. But it always did: $9\frac{1}{2}$ — $8\frac{7}{8}$ — $8\frac{1}{4}$ — $7\frac{1}{8}$ — $6\frac{1}{2}$ — $6\frac{1}{4}$ — $5\frac{3}{8}$ — $4\frac{5}{8}$. What would it be today? With the press of his annual report occupying his mind night and day, he had not checked his personal stock holdings—meager as they were—for ten days. Still, how much lower could they go?

When his eye finally focused toward the bottom of the S's, he thought he must be looking at a misprint. But there it was: Smith-Parkington . . . Sales 63,000 . . . Open $8\frac{1}{8}$. . . Low $7\frac{7}{8}$. . . High $9\frac{3}{8}$. . . Close $9\frac{3}{8}$. . . Net Change + $1\frac{1}{4}$. It was incredible. His 200 shares had zoomed up \$250 in one day. What in the world was going on?

Reading rapidly through the day's market write-up he found what he was seeking: "Recent market strength in Smith-Parkington is said to stem from the large tax-loss carry-over of the past five years, which market analysts figure to amount to approximately \$20 per share."

Dr. Bassett's brow furrowed as he puzzled through this statement. Then slowly his eyes brightened and a smile almost beatific played over his features. "So that's it," he muttered. "Worth more dead than alive. After all, somebody's bound to pick up a valuable loss like that." And in Dr.

Bassett's mind the merger was already completed.

Well, if they fired him tomorrow he might still salvage a few of his personal investments. "Tax-loss carry-over," he muttered again. "That's rich."

Slowly he folded the paper on his lap and settled back deep in thought. Then finally, after about twenty minutes, he began laughing softly to himself. He laughed somewhat because his money was not lost. But he laughed mostly because he was already shaping in his mind the plan that within ten years was to revolutionize higher education in America.

AS SOON AS Dr. Bassett could free himself of the photographers and reporters, he hurried over to the edge of the crowd to shake hands delightedly with his old friend Dr. George White, President of Chatterton College.

"George," he boomed, "it's good to see you!" He was about to add, "You certainly are looking well," but didn't when he saw how clearly unwell George looked.

"It's good to see you, Frank," and the voice of his friend was warm, cordial, but it was also a tired, an exhausted voice.

"That's all for now, fellows," and Dr. Bassett peremptorily brushed the reporters and photographers away from his elbow.

Taking his friend by the arm, Dr. Bassett walked briskly with Dr. White down the path toward the new administration building. Only twice did they slow up, once to avoid some bricks that were piled in the walk beside the mammoth new physical education building still under construction and once for Dr. White to look longingly at the Gothic Chapel which Dr. Bassett had insisted be the first new building to mark the financial renaissance of Crestwood College.

"Certainly is everything they've ever said about it," finally observed Dr. White.

"My, how this place has changed in the last five years! You've done a job here, Frank."

"Nice of you to say it," his friend murmured, "but you know of course it wasn't really my work at all," and Dr. Bassett seemed a trifle embarrassed.

"Oh, I guess everybody in education knows you did it," White replied. "Still, I really can't say that I understand how. Something about taxes was all I ever heard—or at least all I could make out of what I heard."

"Well, yes, it did have something to do with taxes, but the crucial decision, I always thought, came before that."

"And what was that?" asked White after a brief pause when he sensed some reluctance on Dr. Bassett's part to continue.

"I've always been convinced," said Dr. Bassett, "that the real change occurred when we incorporated as a profit-making organization."

"Yes, I heard that, but I always thought it must have been a joke. Didn't you have a deficit of seventy thousand back in '55? That's what I heard anyhow."

"To be exact, it was only sixty-seven thousand, but seventy is close enough."

Plainly Dr. White was puzzled. Five years earlier Frank Bassett at Crestwood was on the skids. Everybody knew it. "Trouble with the Board," people muttered, and everyone knew that "trouble with the Board" always went back to money. Dr. White couldn't recall ever having heard of any college president's having trouble with his board when he was raising as much money as they thought he should. So when word went out that Crestwood had a deficit and that Bassett was "having trouble with the Board" those who knew recognized it as the two sides of the same problem.

The next thing Dr. White had heard was

the—to him—amazing fact that Crestwood College had incorporated as a profit-making organization. He wondered then whether his old friend Bassett under the pressure that beset him had lost his rationality. Or was Crestwood's plight so desperate it would try anything to remain open?

When Dr. White first heard the reports, he knew in his heart that Bassett would be out of Crestwood in six months. Yet within those six months wherever he had gone he had already begun to hear the stories that thereafter had increasingly dominated every educational convention from that day till this: "New Gothic Chapel . . . money-making organization . . . U.S. Steel . . . ten-year contract for Bassett . . . tax-loss carry-over . . . five hundred new students . . . Presidential candidate Murphy . . . new gymnasium . . . new dormitory . . . new science building . . . plenty of money, plenty! . . ."

To Dr. White the whole thing just didn't make sense. How could a deficit of seventy-thousand dollars lead to all this? Dr. White simply didn't believe it. But here was his old friend calmly repeating in effect: "We incorporated as a profit-making organization because we had such a big deficit." Moreover, the buildings were here, and not even as a sophomore had Dr. Bassett seemed so ebullient. Success seemed to be written in dollar signs over every inch of the campus, and Dr. Bassett's face glowed with a fiscal radiance that only another college president could understand and hate.

Finally, because they had been friends and because he had once been in Dr. White's position himself, Dr. Bassett sensed the questions Dr. White would ask if he might. After all, he as well as any man in America knew that no college president cared to show his ignorance of high finance before a fellow college president.

Dr. Bassett thought he would better begin at the beginning. "It really isn't difficult at all," he said, "if you concentrate on our tax-loss carry-over. The trouble with Crestwood College five years ago wasn't the fact we were losing money. Our big problem was that we weren't losing enough. That seventy thousand was only a drop in the bucket. Oh, it was a start, of course, but last year we lost five hundred thousand, and next year I think we can lose a million."

Plainly Dr. White's bewilderment was merely increasing. "Oh, yes. . . . yes . . .," he said, "I see, but . . . uh . . ." and his voice trailed off. It was apparent he couldn't clear his thoughts sufficiently even to ask an intelligent question.

Obligingly, Dr. Bassett continued:

"As soon as I saw that a seventy-thousand deficit was a complete loss tax-wise"—and he lapsed into jargon—"I knew that we simply had to incorporate as a profit-making organization. Then somebody would begin to find us interesting."

"And I take it they did," ventured Dr. White.

"Oh, yes, as soon as they saw the picture clearly, any number of corporations became fascinated by Crestwood. Actually, within two weeks after we changed our charter, we received seventeen merger propositions. One or two of them were even somewhat better than that of U. S. Steel, but in view of what's happened since, I'm pleased we finally accepted their offer."

"You mean then you really are a part of U. S. Steel? I heard it, of course, but somehow I just never thought it could be true," and Dr. White looked quizzically out across the campus at the co-eds playing tennis. Somehow they didn't appear to be a part of U. S. Steel or any other corporation for that matter.

"As a matter of fact," said Bassett, "I'm actually vice-president of U. S. Steel in charge of the Crestwood Division. It's a

title I don't often use in professional meetings though," he hurriedly added.

At long last Dr. White got up courage to confess his ignorance. "I simply don't understand," he said quietly and succinctly.

"What it finally boils down to is this," slowly rejoined Dr. Bassett. "As long as we were a nonprofit organization, our loss wasn't worth anything to anybody. Then, just as soon as we changed our charter, every dollar we lost was worth fifty-two cents to somebody else."

"I still don't see what you're talking about," confessed Dr. White after a moment of painful silence.

"Well, you see it's like this. Suppose U. S. Steel makes a profit of \$100,000 in their other operations. Because of the excess profits tax, they must pay to the government \$52,000 of the profit. Now, if they can balance the profit with a loss of say \$50,000, then their tax bill is cut in two."

"I see that," said Dr. White, "but their profit is cut in two also, isn't it?"

"Yes, it would be, but sometimes they can get the loss at a discount, and then it may be of value to them. Last year, for example, our \$500,000 loss was worth \$260,000 to U. S. Steel. Since they subsidized us for only \$200,000, they made a gain of \$60,000 on our loss. I figure that when we finally lose a million they can make \$100,000 a year out of this division and we'll still have \$400,000 a year for our building program."

"Oh, Frank, don't talk nonsense. Anybody knows you can't make money by losing a million and getting back \$400,000."

"Oh, yes, in general, of course, that's perfectly true. But this tax loss business is something else again. We would have been out of business three years ago, I guess, when we first lost \$350,000 if it had been a real loss. Since it was only a paper loss, we made out all right." Dr. Bassett was the

perfect picture of a man who was "making out."

"In fact," he continued, "until we got this program really working here at Crestwood I don't think anyone had even begun to imagine the fantastic paper losses a college can build up. After all, if we had a loss of seventy thousand when we were trying to keep it down, you have some idea of what we could do when we really put our mind to it."

"That may be true enough here," said Dr. White, "but at Chatterton College our losses seem real enough. At least the banks seem to think so. . . ." and his voice trailed off. Then after a moment, almost desperately, he asked, "Won't you explain this whole business just once more, Frank? The fact is we're in real trouble out there at Chatterton, and unless I come up with something pretty good, I'll be on my way out next August. I thought maybe when I came down here, I'd get some idea, but this is quite a bit different from what I'd expected."

"In its simplest form," answered Frank slowly, "it's very easy to understand. Each year we try to produce as great a paper loss as we can create. By applying this paper loss to its consolidated statement, U. S. Steel saves 52% of the loss by a lower excess profits tax. By paying us, say, 40% of the face value of the loss, U. S. Steel actually makes 12%."

Dr. White still looked confused; so Dr. Bassett hurried on. "For example, next year if we report a paper loss of a million dollars, Steel will be able to cut its federal tax \$520,000. So even if they pay us \$400,000, they're still ahead \$120,000. Actually the simplest way of stating it is that they pay us \$400,000 for a tax loss worth \$520,000 to them."

"I see," said Dr. White. At last and clearly enough he did see. "But you had to be a

part of U. S. Steel so that in theory they as well as you were losing the million?"

"That's it in a nutshell. They own 90% of our stock, and so we have a consolidated balance sheet. We give them a tax loss and they give us a subsidy."

"But tell me, Frank, how in the world you can have a paper loss of a million dollars. I don't see how you do that."

"You know that's what almost everyone asks me," chuckled Dr. Bassett. "Actually it's the easiest part of the whole thing."

"When we first began, we tried to do almost everything with depreciation. We still do find it extremely profitable—almost like digging gold out of some of these old brick buildings. Nowadays, though, the heart of our whole program is our bad debt formula. I don't see anything to curtail it, but sometimes I think our dry-hole program will ultimately be the most profitable. . . . It's a term I borrowed from the oil industry," he hastily added when he saw the quizzical look on Dr. White's face.

The two men walked on in thoughtful silence for several minutes. Their thoughts were interrupted by the approach of an extremely attractive young woman dressed in what appeared to be a size 34 sweater on a perfectly obvious 36 bust, and the shortest shorts Dr. White had even seen. In fact, her clothing seemed principally designed to deter trespassers without in any significant way shutting off the view.

"Good afternoon, Dr. Bassett," she flashed in passing.

"Oh, hello, Miss Forrest," Dr. Bassett rejoined. "Lovely day, isn't it!" Then turning to Dr. White he added, "One of our biology teachers. Very good, too, I'm told."

"One of your teachers? I thought she must be a sophomore—or possibly a visitor," Dr. White murmured. He was obviously perturbed. "Do all of your teachers wear such . . . er . . . uh . . . informal clothing?"

"Oh, my goodness, George, of course not."

I guess she's on her way back from one of her private research projects. She is . . . uh . . ." Dr. Bassett groped for the word . . . "noticeable, though, isn't she? Sometimes I do wish they'd wear a few more clothes. But the younger faculty members pretty much insist on certain innovations, and so many of the older faculty members have resigned, it's pretty hard to stop the younger ones when they make up their mind to something.

"I've sometimes thought of speaking to Miss Forrest about her attire," continued Bassett, "but you know these biologists never think of sex—er . . . except professionally, that is, of course—so it might be a delicate matter."

"I suppose it would," agreed Dr. White, "but I'll tell you right now, Frank, if I had that young woman on my faculty I'd have to lock the other ones up at night. At Chatterton they aren't all biologists!"

Dr. Bassett headed back to the shelter of his corporate status. "Speaking of depreciation, I think our old gym is the most valuable asset on the campus. You see when we changed our charter we naturally had to list our assets. Frankly, we were amazed at how many we had. You see this old school had been here so long it had lots and lots of buildings and nobody had any idea how much they were worth. They were all paid for years ago, and we couldn't very well take their actual construction cost. There's been so much inflation and such a change in building processes, there just isn't any way to use the values out of the past.

"So we just figured how much it would cost to replace them now, and we came up with a colossal figure. We set them up at eight million. Even depreciating them out over as long as twenty years, we still have \$400,000 annual depreciation. It took us quite a while to figure this all out, and next year will be the first time we claim full depreciation.

"Some of these old buildings are more valuable than we ever thought they'd be," laughed Bassett. "Sometimes I call that my 'transfer of value' program. There's all sorts of depreciable value buried in these old buildings—more than you'd ever think. After all, it took a century to build this place. The whole problem is in getting the value out."

"I was curious about the bad debts," interrupted his friend White. "We always have a good many of them, and we don't seem able to collect even by holding up the diploma."

Dr. Bassett calculated a minute and then said with pride, "Last year alone our bad debts were worth \$50,000 to us."

"Then you must have had a much bigger loss than that," said White. "That is, on paper," he hastily added.

"My goodness, yes," answered Bassett. "Almost every senior who leaves Crestwood leaves at least a small bad debt. For years it was one of our biggest headaches, but now we don't worry too much about it.

"Oh, naturally we still have to expel students when they don't pay part of their bill, but we try to make it easy on them. In reality, it isn't so much that we let them pay less to attend Crestwood—it's more a matter of being honest with ourselves.

"When we used to charge a student fifteen hundred a year, everybody knew he actually cost us seventeen hundred. So we simply raised our rates to keep them realistic. We didn't expect everybody to pay the seventeen hundred, but we figured that they should pay the fifteen hundred. Of course, some of them pay the whole thing, but we don't worry too much about that final two hundred. After all, that way, a thousand students produce two hundred thousand in bad debts each year. Since we really only raised the tuition for this purpose, it's a very clear paper loss."

"But you can't do that, can you?" inter-

rupted Dr. White. "Doesn't the government . . .?"

"Oh, no, never have any trouble there. You see we don't write it off until the student finally graduates or leaves the college. That way we have no hold on him, and of course we've pretty well convinced the government it would be bad public relations for U. S. Steel to keep suing lots of young college graduates."

"I didn't think the government was that easily convinced."

Dr. Bassett laughed somewhat nervously. "Well, I guess maybe they do listen to us with some attention. We try to make our students particularly conscious of their responsibilities as good citizens. So the ones who are old enough vote, and the others pretty much pass out campaign literature or start a parade or something. Maybe we do too much of it, but there's a kind of feeling around here neither party can get very far in this congressional district if it fights Crestwood.

"Anyhow, we don't have much trouble in writing off those bad debts. Sometimes I wonder how many other colleges can say their graduating class is worth four hundred dollars each in net tax loss the day after they graduate. Believe me, they're a credit to education and in a really tangible way too . . ." Dr. Bassett did not realize that he had again lapsed into jargon.

"Speaking of politics," mused White, "I was a little surprised to read about Senator Murphy's visit to your campus last month. Made one of his campaign speeches here, didn't he?"

"Yes, as a matter of fact, he kicked off his campaign here in Pennsylvania with that speech. Lots of people think he has a good chance for the presidency."

"Yes, I know," resumed White, "that's what surprised me. How did a liberal like that ever get mixed up with big business? When I first heard about his visit here, I

was quite surprised. Now that I know what's really going on, I'm amazed he didn't come in with both arms swinging."

Dr. Bassett laughed heartily. "Quite the contrary. He was cooing all over the place."

"But wasn't he upset about U. S. Steel? You know? Big business and all that?"

"Well, to be honest," answered Bassett, "I don't think Senator Murphy is much interested in discussions of business, and I'm not at all sure he ever did know exactly what's going on here."

"Yes, but wasn't he horrified to think that you were making money out of education?"

"Actually, I don't really know what he thought. You see I told him every person in Pennsylvania who wanted an education at Crestwood could have it . . . even if we had a deficit of a million dollars! That was the part that really got him."

"Of course," answered White, "if you talked to him of deficit financing he would naturally be pleased."

"Pleased," chuckled Bassett. "He was positively delighted. 'Do you know,' he said, 'I think you're the only college in the country that is actually putting people ahead of money!'"

"A while back," continued White, "you were saying something about your 'dry-hole' project."

"Oh, that," said Bassett. "Yes, that's the pet project of the science division. Whenever they want some extra money over there, we simply set up some kind of research project. We give all the science faculty members a part in it and maybe cut down on their teaching by three or six hours. Of course we pad out their freshman sections so that they're teaching almost the same number of students. But on the books, of course, maybe a quarter of their salary and a proportionate part of the science division budget is going into this dry-hole project. Then after a year or two we

close out the project as a failure—you know, as the oil drillers say, we hit a dry hole. So we add the paper cost of the project to our deficit and then maybe even give some of the tax loss back to the division. At present we think the dry-hole program is going to be immensely profitable. Right now we have seven scientists engaged in a dry-hole Student Resources Survey and twelve others in a dry-hole Total College Life Appraisal.”

“I begin to see,” said Dr. White, “that you’ve only tapped the beginning . . . only the beginning.” There was a glint approaching cupidity in White’s eye, but two decades of wrestling with the golden mean apparently prevailed. The gleam faded.

They resumed their walk in silence. Their thoughts were finally broken when a senior co-ed overtook them and proceeded to walk ahead of them at a slightly faster pace. The short shorts that Dr. White had previously seen on Miss Forrest were no longer the shortest shorts he had ever seen. With scientific exactitude the shorts that were now undulating before him had been exactly fitted to the slight upward curve where the leg merged with the body. Dr. White found himself looking at a completely naked woman’s leg. The gleam returned.

Dr. Bassett and Dr. White walked on in thoughtful silence, their eyes to the fore. Finally, Dr. White stumbled over a rather large stone which, for some reason, he had not seen lying in the walk ahead of him, and he grasped his friend’s arm.

“Really, Frank,” he gasped, “don’t you think your co-eds carry this matter a trifle too far. Why, that woman is practically . . .”

“Yes, she is,” said Bassett. “Indeed, she is. But I don’t know. Of course, I guess we’re a little bit free in some of our conventions, but in many ways this school is completely new. There are all sorts of new ideas floating around this campus, and you

just have to realize that some of the old standards must go.

“Sometimes I do think that only here at Crestwood are we really educating for the future. Naturally we have to give our students a good deal of leeway. Oh, of course, some of these girls unexpectedly drop out of school, and some of them get married in quite a hurry. But I don’t know that that’s too serious.

“You see there’s a kind of a fermentation going on here. You and I came out of such a stable world, Frank, I don’t think we quite understand the world these students will face. But *they* do, or think they do, anyhow, all over this campus there’s all kinds of activity. You know that statement about the power of a new idea to stretch the mind? Well, we have all sorts of new ideas here, and in that kind of intellectual ferment, I suppose it’s inevitable that once in a while one of these co-eds drops out of school to get married.”

“I guess I had kind of forgotten,” observed White drily, “that that was the result of intellectual ferment.”

Dr. Bassett smiled, and looked away reflectively, “Oh, I know, this must seem funny to you. It certainly isn’t the kind of future we talked about twenty-five years ago. To be perfectly honest, George, when this thing started five years ago here at Crestwood, I thought the whole idea was absolutely whacky.

“But we were in desperate straits, and the longer we looked into this new program the less there seemed to be to stop it. I couldn’t see anything wrong with it financially. It was certainly legal. But I guess for the first two years I sort of had my tongue in my cheek waiting for the bubble to burst.

“But then one day I said to myself, ‘This isn’t so crazy as it seems. If a corporation can go on year after year operating at a deficit and still use its cash flow to build

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up its equity, why can't a college do the same thing? If the government can pay farmers for not raising wheat, maybe it's not so foolish to pay college scientists for not working.' And, of course, nobody seriously worries any longer about deficit financing. Sometimes I say to myself, 'The America of the future is going to be built on the creative ideas that are fermenting here at Crestwood. It is the creative use of non-value to provide human value that is the pattern of the future.'

"I tell you, George, that pattern of the future is right here at Crestwood, and I'm mighty glad to be a part of it."

It was apparent that Dr. Bassett was about to plunge into a lengthy speech, but just at that moment his secretary emerged from behind the bell tower and cried, "Oh, Dr. Bassett, I've been looking all over for you. The architects from Weber and Dunn are here. They want to see exactly where the new library is to be built."

"Oh, yes," he replied, "I must see them before they begin. I've decided to make the stack area quite a bit smaller and add the money to the student lounge. Why, even our present library is almost a total loss tax-wise. I hope they haven't already spent too much time on the plans." Cordially he stuck out his hand. "So nice to see you again, George. Do come back next year and see what we've been able to do with our student activities program. We expect to build up a colossal loss there." And he hurried away with his secretary beside him.

Dr. White sauntered slowly down to the imposing arches that marked the entrance to Crestwood College. He was puzzled as he walked along surveying the landscape. The sculptured lawns and landscape, the shadowing trees, the gracious buildings, the encircling ivy—all this was what he had seen on dozens of other campuses like Crestwood. But something was different. Perhaps, after all, it was intellectual ferment.

Maybe the world *was* changing more than he realized.

As he neared the gate, Dr. White cast one last look at the row of sororities across the street. He was considerably surprised to see a co-ed sunning herself in the back lawn of the Beta house wearing apparently no shorts at all. He thought he must surely be wrong even though continued and intensive study of the evidence failed to indicate how he had been mistaken. "Well, it must be my eyes," he finally muttered to himself, "I guess I just don't see as clearly as I used to."

Then he turned out from under the arches onto the adjacent street. There, ahead of him, clearly enough this time, he saw coming toward him a young man and a young woman, holding hands. Very young they were and, to the eyes of Dr. White, very beautiful. Shyly, the girl dis-

engaged her hand. She could carry her love in her heart for a few paces: it would be untarnished there by the corrosive public view. The boy fingered his tie self-consciously. For her sake it would be well to measure up to the appraisal even a stranger might direct his way.

And looking upon them, Dr. White loved them intuitively with the strength of his heart. Then he watched them as they slowly entered the arch into Crestwood. As they disappeared, Dr. White's face grew grave and troubled. What would happen to them, he wondered, when his old friend Dr. Bassett prepared them for the future? How might they suffer from those who knew so much and understood so little? Dr. White hoped—how successfully, he would never know—that there was more value built into those old buildings of Crestwood College than Dr. Bassett even remotely understood.

San Marco Square

Mann knew. The death he saw dwelled
Like a still canal within his heart;
And there on the steps where the Doges swam,
 he smelled
The stagnant stones. It wasn't plague that weighed
Upon the hero's life, but feeling the cement
Pumped into the city's veins, to preserve
The sinking corpse.

 And here is this square of wings,
There is no flight for God or man—
Only the patient quicksand of the sea.

LARRY RUBIN

REVIEWS

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Those Incurrigible Germans

FELIX MORLEY

The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, by William L. Shirer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960.

IN HIS FOREWORD to this massive volume (1,250 pages) Mr. Shirer confronts the question of whether or not its laborious birth was premature. "Some may think," he admits, "that it is much too early to try to write a history of the Third Reich. . . ." He concludes, however, that the availability of captured German documentation justifies his "attempt." And he draws additional support by quoting the famous observation of Thucydides: "I lived through the whole [Peloponnesian] war, being of an age to comprehend events and giving my attention to them in order to know the exact truth about them."

Mr. Shirer, however, is no Thucydides. For "the exact truth" about Nazi Germany we shall have to wait longer, despite the publisher's optimistic surmise that now we have "what may well be the definitive history of one of the greatest and most frightening chapters in the history of mankind."

Certainly Mr. Shirer has made effective use of the truckloads of material assembled at Nuremberg to prove the war guilt and abominations of the Nazi leaders. There is no question of their horrible and damning accuracy. But the history of any murder, whether of an individual or a civilization, requires more insight than is either needed or provided by the attorneys for the prosecution.

This is not to minimize the provisional value of Mr. Shirer's monumental study. No scholar, it is safe to assert, will in future probe into the murky history of the Third Reich without having this book at hand. It pulls together within single covers much that was heretofore available only in many separate volumes. And, as its immediately acquired best-seller status suggests, Mr. Shirer's work is easy reading. There is, indeed, an almost morbid fascination in this extensive background to events seared into the memory of most of us. Praise is also due for a skill in narration that frequently recaptures all the inherent drama in sensational events.

There are many such illustrations of

highly competent writing. The complicated story of the almost successful attempt to assassinate Hitler, on July 20, 1944, is particularly well told. But here, as elsewhere, a curious animus towards Germans as such, Nazi or anti-Nazi, finds foothold. Mr. Shirer speaks disdainfully of "the handful of conspirators" only a few pages after noting that 7,000 of them were arrested by the Gestapo and the majority executed. Throughout there is disparagement of those patriotic Germans who, even before the outbreak of war, were trying to secure some Anglo-American support for their plots against Hitler. It is not their courage but their uncertainty, indecision, and frustration that is emphasized, with small consideration of the enormous difficulties, eventually made all but insuperable by the "unconditional surrender" policy. To this reviewer, who knew some of the executed anti-Nazis personally, this seeming bias on Mr. Shirer's part is incomprehensible.

It crops up frequently, sometimes in rather silly form, as where Mr. Shirer asserts that the Italians "unlike the Germans, were too civilized, too sophisticated, too down to earth to be attracted by" dreams of national glory. Elsewhere the attack is bitter, as when it is charged—without any supporting evidence—that some of "Hitler's accomplices," under accusation of mass murders, "quickly found employment in the Bonn government." By contrast there is an apparent reluctance to condemn the Communists, whether German or Russian. "It must be set down here," says Mr. Shirer, "that the Soviet dictator, his subsequent claims to the contrary notwithstanding, now accepted Hitler's offer to join the fascist camp . . ." The author tells us that "I detest totalitarian dictatorship in principle. . . ." But there certainly seem to be degrees in the measure of his dislike. A very revealing sentence says that: "In the end even the strenuous efforts of German free enterprise, using the best material and providing faultless workmanship, proved inadequate for burning the corpses."

With more careful editing the pro-Com-

munist suggestiveness in this book could have been eliminated, its inordinate length contracted and the more glaring contradictions at least softened. It is certainly confusing to be told on page 1,062 that Goebbels was "a stupid man" and on page 1,066 to read graphic evidence of his "quick thinking." Editorial supervision would also have informed Mr. Shirer that it is not imperative to split infinitives; would have dispensed with slang like "bumping off" and "snafu"; would have deleted such wisecracks as the surmise that in listening to Hitler's tirades "the generals must have winced, perhaps prying their monocles loose." A reporter who compares himself with Thucydides should also have a better command of his language than the following illustration suggests: "The strain of leading an army which could not always win under a Supreme Commander who insisted that it always do had brought about renewed heart attacks for Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, and by the time Zhukov's counteroffensive began he was determined to step down as Commander in Chief."

Not only the careless writing, but even more the plan of organization, deny this book its claim to rank as definitive history. It is, more accurately, a lengthy and lively biography of Hitler, which throughout relates and seldom seeks to explain. A seemingly exceptional chapter, on "Roots of the Third Reich," actually proves the rule. Here is a wholly superficial attempt to show that since the days of Martin Luther, "this savage anti-Semite and hater of Rome," the Germans as a whole have been unassimilated to western civilization, and the implication is that they will remain so. "They [the dominant cultural leaders] succeeded in establishing a spiritual break with the West; the breach has not been healed to this day."

So it is not surprising to find that Mr. Shirer gives scant consideration to the effect of the disastrous Versailles Treaty in paving the way for Hitler. "What was so intolerable about it?" the author asks rhetorically, and then proceeds to demon-

strate an ignorance of economics at least as profound as that for which he blames the Fuehrer. Mr. Shirer attributes the German failure to meet the 1921 reparations bill of 136 billion gold marks to intentional sabotage, later emphasizing (on the strength of "a study by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey" [!]) that during the second war "Germany extracted in tribute from the conquered nations a total of 104 billion marks." Seemingly it never occurs to Mr. Shirer that international deliveries in kind and in cash are wholly different problems, and that it was the currency transfer problem which in 1923 led to the total collapse of the mark, the liquidation of the German middle class by inflation and the consequent social vacuum into which Hitler's pluguglies poured.

While Mr. Shirer has compiled an exhaustive and sickening catalogue of Nazi atrocities, he has contributed little information not previously available in the many specialized studies of the Third Reich.

Even the closing chapter, including its title, is a mere condensation of Trevor-Roper's brilliant study of *The Last Days of Hitler*. Nowhere does the current rewrite job get beneath the sordid surface to grapple with the stupendous problem posed for all mankind by the ease with which a ruthless fanatic was able to bend to his iron will the many processes that mankind has slowly evolved to make such tyranny impossible. Mr. Shirer is satisfied with the explanation that Germans as such have a near monopoly on original sin.

If there were truth in this pernicious thesis it would be wise to stop immediately all re-arming of the Federal Republic and to hand West Berlin over to Communist control. It may not have been Mr. Shirer's intention to promote such outcome, but it is certainly the conclusion promoted by his book, not less so because this lurid and horrible story requires no historical background, no knowledge of Germany and no intellectual effort in the reading.

Reform without Principle

FRANK S. MEYER

Lament for a Generation, by Ralph de Toledano, with a Foreword by Vice President Richard Nixon. *New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1960.*

THE HISTORY of the West in the twentieth century has been a history of disorder—disorder in the soul, disorder in the intellect, disorder in those delicate relationships between men and men that constitute the warp and woof of civil society. The decay of the ordering principles of religion, philosophy, and politics upon which our civilization and our country grew great, created anarchic vacuums in every area of life. But these, when hardly come into being, were occupied—as, by the nature of being, the vacuums of anarchy always are—by hideous and powerful tyrannies.

The emptiness left by the corrosion of religious belief has been filled by a hun-

dred superstitions. The positivist destruction of the claims of reason has left the intellectual world prey to the dictatorship of scientism and *expertise*. And, in the political sphere, the wrenching asunder of the established principles of civil society opened the gate to Communism, Fascism, and the coercive welfare state. This is the grim reality which must perforce serve as background for anyone who has lived through these years when he sets out to write about his life. This all of us have seen; of this all but the wisest and most fortunate of us have been a part.

Ralph de Toledano never plumbed the depths of the twentieth century, but he was deeply enough ensnared in it to make *Lament for a Generation* a poignant document of witness to the *Zeitgeist*. As an intellectual and spiritual autobiography, its earlier pages all reflect the disintegrating impact of a disordered civilization upon the developing personality of a sensitive and intelligent child, boy, young man.

It is not that Mr. Toledano places responsibility for the disorientation of the first thirty years of his life upon external factors. As becomes one who has for the last two decades been seeking to recover the great tradition of the West, he places responsibility for his actions on no one but himself. But the story of his youth, as he tells it, presents its own moral: a father personally noble and morally just, but philosophically agnostic; education at Fieldston School and Columbia University, both centers in the 'Twenties and 'Thirties of the relativist attack upon the ancient dogmas of the West; the bland and featureless pap of the Ethical Culture Society; Left-liberal New York in the 'Thirties, which condoned Communist terror and struck with all its might against the enemies of Communism.

Ralph de Toledano never actually became a Communist, and when the Hitler-Stalin Pact shook him out of the fascination with Communism that held him, he did not, like many others in the "liberal" milieu, hold himself suspended for a year or two and then return to the same *mystique* of the Left. The shock started him on a road of self-examination and examination of the shibboleths by which he had lived. That road led him through the *New Leader* and its circle; through open and unprejudiced reception and assessment of his experience in the army during the war; through public and most meritorious championship of Whittaker Chambers in the darkest days of the Hiss-Chambers confrontation, to the position he holds today: that of a leading spirit in the ranks of the political journalists who are arrayed against the prevailing forces of the age.

THE DISORDER OF THE AGE in which he grew to maturity is magnificently portrayed in Mr. Toledano's book. It is clear, furthermore, that he has rescued his soul from the disorder into which his upbringing plunged it. His last chapter, "The Experience of God," is moving personal testimony to this. But when he comes to considering

the disorder in the body politic, his analysis and his prescriptions seem to this reviewer highly questionable. It is as though he had cured the disorder of instinct and belief which was his twentieth-century heritage, but had failed to overcome an element of the relativism which is its intellectual heritage.

He disposes of the leaders of contemporary American conservatism as the victims of "rootlessness, alienation and lack of intuition"; and, in the spirit of Hartz and Boorstin, he denies the existence of any serious conservative tradition in our past. The deep and far-reaching efforts conservatives are making today, against every pressure of the intellectual atmosphere, to re-establish in contemporary circumstances an understanding of ancient and eternal truths, he regards as irrelevant under the conditions of modern technology. To the titanic achievement of the makers of the Constitution, and of those who after them fought for the American concept of divided and balanced powers, he pays passing lip service, only to return again to his insistence on "the paucity of conservative thought and action in the chronicles of the Republic." He finds in the American tradition no conservative "core of principle"—only a "state of mind, a stirring of sensibility."

Communism, socialism, "liberalism" rejected, he seems to have been unable to make a sharp break with the prevailing relativism that bases its philosophy and its politics upon existing modes and attitudes. Everyone of the Right he mentions, from Frank Chodorov through John Chamberlain and William Buckley to Russell Kirk—all the shades and emphases of principled opposition to the spirit of the age, he finds irrelevant, "ideological," prejudiced or impractical. Only in Richard Nixon, whom he sees as Benjamin Disraeli *redivivus*, does he find a hope. Indeed, Nixon is to him much more than a hope; he is a program, a living representation of the principles of conservatism, a *mystique*.

I do not wish to mock. Despite the grotesquerie of the personal comparison be-

tween Nixon and Disraeli, Toledano has grasped an essential similarity; and, grasping it, he has illuminated the shallow ineffectiveness against the onrush of revolution that the great Earl of Beaconsfield shares with the little man from Whittier. Neither Disraeli nor Nixon ever stood firmly upon principle. Disraeli did, and perhaps Nixon could have, delayed for a moment of history the destructive forces roaring down upon the venerable fortresses of Western civilization. But that is all; for their attitude to the political process in the modern age is similar. Disraeli "dished the Whigs" and maintained Tory political power for a few years by going beyond the Whigs themselves in their attack upon the English constitutional structure. Nixon vies with the heirs of the New Deal in egalitarian and welfarist offerings to the electorate.

Disraeli refused to stand, and Nixon refuses to stand, solidly on principle, firm against the wave of the present which is engulfing the standards, the beliefs, the very form of our civilization. This could perhaps be excused in a Disraeli at a time when the shape of the monstrous behemoth of modern tyranny was as yet but dimly discernible. Even to a degree it can be excused in a Nixon when he is understood

for what he is, an undistinguished practical politician, limited in his vision by the requirements of his vocation. But it cannot be excused in Toledano, or in anyone else who proposes to survey our society and to prescribe for it. For ours is a society in a critical illness; and no diagnosis that fails to identify the roots of that illness, and no measures that fall short of extirpating those roots, will do more than extend for a brief period the span of the patient's life.

At the head of one of his chapters, Mr. Toledano quotes Disraeli: "A sound conservative government? I understand: Tory men and Whig measures"—or, as we might say today, "men of the Right with a program of the Left." The implication presumably is that sound men of conservative instinct can administer a collectivist and statist program with less damage to the values of civilization and the integrity of individual persons than would the men of the Left. Indeed, Toledano says just about this in his own text. But it is the principles, the measures, that are wrong, and that lead by a process of geometric progression to the apotheosis of the total state. That apotheosis will be averted, if it is averted, not by well-meaning men administering collectivist measures, but by enemies of collectivism firmly and openly devoted to the extirpation of collectivism.

An Apologist for Folly

GEORGE MORGENSTERN

Between War and Peace, by Herbert Feis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

FOR MORE THAN A DOZEN YEARS Mr. Feis has made a career of picking over the desiccated carcass of the Roosevelt-Truman wartime diplomacy. His preoccupation is as unrewarding to the reader as the contributions of these dilettantes were unrewarding to their country.

Feis labors under the difficulty that nobody needs to read his narratives to know how affairs turned out. The horrible condition of today's world and the visible initiative of Communism provide the verdict.

Suspense is necessarily lacking and Feis is obliged to cultivate an invincible appetite for the unhappy ending in plugging his way through a series of calamities. Beginning with Pearl Harbor, he has meandered through another inquest over Teheran and Yalta, dealt with the impending loss of China to Communism in still a third, and reaches the unhappy Potsdam conference in the present volume.

Not for him the harsh and uncharitable judgment of sentence passed from the bench. Imagine an Agatha Christie entertainment, with corpses strewn all over the country house. Clews of villainy and malignancy abound. But Hercule Poirot is unable to bring a single culprit to book because he is obliged to concede that everybody acted from the best of motives under the circumstances. That is about where you come out at the end of a Feis production.

Thus the savage Potsdam edict which condemned 14,000,000 Germans or persons of German origin to expulsion from their ancestral homes and brought harassment and death to many of them on the long trail west is recognized as, "in a way, just." You may object: Why have pity? What of Hitler's charnel houses? Well, we seem to have heard that guilt is individual, and not collective. We seem also to have heard something about an Atlantic charter, to which all the Allies, even the Soviet Union, subscribed in the Declaration of the United Nations January 1, 1942. And something about Four (4) Freedoms. There was a pledge that "all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." We never heard that the war aim of the Allies was to emulate Hitler.

Again, it is Feis' judgment that "the Potsdam accords were not, in intention or effect, unjust or cruel to the Germans." All they did was to despoil Germany of its territory for the aggrandizement of Communism; leave undisturbed the Yalta provision for human reparations in the form of German slave labor while piously announcing that "it is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people"; re-embody the destructionist Morgenthau doctrine that remnants of the shattered German industrial plant deemed "excess" be looted by the victors or otherwise destroyed; and seal a war fought to eradicate Hitlerism with every indorsement of a Hitlerian peace.

Mr. Feis' misgivings are admirably restrained: "Reviewing what has happened since, the mind is impelled to seek other possible courses that might have served the world better." The ludicrous assumption is that Potsdam served anything other than the Communist world. In every deal with Stalin, in every concession from the original extension of lend-lease to Russia through Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, the traffic was wholly one-way. Assuming, as they were not, that the realization of the Atlantic charter and the quadruple Freedoms, along with defense of the integrity of

China, were the real goals for which the United States was taken to war, every single article of these proclaimed objectives was falsified in the event—casually, and with no regret or apology. Mr. Feis does not even mention them, so wholly have they been relegated to the rubbish heap of propaganda which has served its purpose and now may be ignored.

For 14 years, until 1944, Mr. Feis was adviser to the State Department on international economic affairs. He was no mere detached onlooker as American policy was building up to disaster. He was an agent of the policy and contributed to it. The circumstances explain why he has enjoyed ready access to the secret files of the State Department and to other sources denied less favored appraisers. He can be trusted not to embarrass or to indulge in humiliating judgments.

His method, decked in all the trappings of "objectivity," enables Mr. Feis to lose whole forests (among them the Katyn forest) in the trees. He has found the safety of documentation and tireless, if tiring, detail. If wars were fought in a vacuum, without regard to principle, to political or strategic purpose, or to national self-interest, and if the political leaders concerned were deprived of any necessity for sensible motives, his narratives might have the equivalent intrinsic interest of some chronicle of a witless excursion into the farther reaches of Oz.

But, as Mr. Feis glancingly acknowledges, Stalin knew what he wanted and how to get it: "he was a most able, though short-sighted, proponent of the traditional Russian instinct to expand and absorb." Short-sighted, that is, in the Feis sense that he refused to be obsessed with millennial notions of international holiness. "For survival itself," Feis prayerfully intones, "the nations must now transcend the usual run of history . . . Each can and must henceforth, by word and act, make up for the failure at Potsdam to turn victory over Germany into unfearing peace among

themselves." At least, we have agreement that there was a failure.

Statements of this sort betray an incurable ignorance of the nature and strategy of Communism. There were times when even Roosevelt had a glimmering of the truth. After the Soviet Union invaded Finland on November 30, 1939, he called Russia "a dictatorship as absolute as any dictatorship in the world," asserting that it had "allied itself with another dictatorship (Nazi Germany), and . . . invaded a neighbor . . . infinitesimally small."

Nor was Truman, who undertook to speak for the United States at Potsdam, entirely devoid of understanding that between these dictatorships there was nothing to choose, and that one was as great a menace to America as the other. On June 24, 1941, when Hitler and Stalin set upon each other after the collapse of their original partnership to attack and partition Poland, Truman, then a Senator, said, "If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia. If Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany. In that way let them kill as many as possible."

By the Potsdam conference, July 17 to August 2, 1945, Truman had recovered from this sudden seizure of good sense. He was, in any event, the captive of Roosevelt's

previous commitments to Stalin, but he was also beyond his depth. Even Feis diagnoses "an inner lack of assurance" and lets loose with a padded sock: "Having little knowledge of some of the issues he was suddenly called to face, he tried to substitute a presumed deep insight into the lessons of history."

Potsdam, Feis laments, did not produce "the same warm, personal association in a common cause as at the two wartime meetings at Teheran and Yalta." The heads of government "were not at ease with one another . . . May it have been in part because Roosevelt, with his air of geniality, was not there? . . . Or because the Martini (Roosevelt), the Vodka (Stalin), and the Whiskey (Churchill) were less in evidence as promoters of mutual friendship?"

A judgment more fatuous can hardly be conceived. It takes more than booze and charm to produce a viable peace and a decent world. It is wholly naive to suggest, as Feis did previously in *Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin*, that Stalin during the wartime years of the disparate coalition was a faithful and constructive partner and that the trouble crept in when he "reverted" to world revolutionary designs. If gentlemen cannot read the record of history to better effect, there is little point in their essaying to write it.

The Christ of Unamuno

El Cristo de Unamuno, by Vicente Marrero. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S. A., 1960.

NOTHING ATTESTS more strikingly the greatness of the figure of Christ than the degree to which he has been the object of the preoccupation even of those thinkers who have rejected the traditional belief in his divinity. Vicente Marrero's *El Cristo de Unamuno* is the study of one such preoccupation and constitutes an important contribution to our understanding of the best known writer of Spain's "Generation of '98," the group of writers called forth by the military catastrophe which stripped Spain of the last vestiges of her vast overseas empire. When the present reviewer was visiting Spain several years ago, he was told that upon the arrival of the news of the full extent of Spain's disaster, the crowd in Barcelona pelted the local statue of Columbus with vegetables, apparently sharing the view that the great discoverer was responsible for diverting Spanish interest from Morocco and Africa, where—by reason of the facts of race and history—Spain's destiny really lay. (Even on the occasion of this visit in 1957, Spain was in the process of losing Morocco, one of these "neglected" areas in Africa.) Whether this statement about the treatment of Columbus' statue was factual or merely anecdotal, it serves to call attention to the shock that stunned the country and to the subsequent soul searchings of the Spanish intellectuals, who in their various ways recognized and preached the need of their country's spiritual regeneration. While this activity was

then chiefly of local national importance and interest, it may now properly command wide attention in the light of the experience of the western world with the intellectual and spiritual confusion that has followed in the wake of sterile victories in two world wars. Marrero's study of Unamuno not only is that of a very remarkable personality of the time, but brings into high relief some of the problems that have been extended into our immediate present.

Marrero introduces his main theme of the Christ of Unamuno with an essay previously published but expanded for its use as an introduction to the present work to a length of approximately one-fifth of the volume. In great detail he presents Unamuno as the paradoxical and controversial figure that he is. This seeker after the essentially Spanish, even to the extent of attempting to create a Christ that is typically Spanish, can in manner, appearance, and dress be described by no single Spanish word of correct connotation—Marrero is compelled to use the English word *clergyman*. He is a Spaniard who uses neither tobacco nor alcohol, nor does he relish bull-fights. A professor of Greek, he makes few if any published contributions in his departmental field. Modern professors of Greek dwell in the innermost chambers of the Ivory Tower, at least they are not among the members of the professorial fraternity that easily gets into difficulties with congressional investigating committees. Unamuno was sentenced to prison once (sentence "suspended") and, soon after Primo de Rivera's accession to power, was exiled to the most desolate of the Canary Islands, from which exile he was recalled only because of the protest of an outraged world beyond the borders of Spain. The complexity of the man, who was to an unusual degree preoccupied with religion, is revealed by the fact that no full agreement with reference to his own religious belief has been reached by students of his work, in whose opinions he ranges all the way from atheist to misplaced Protestant and finally even to a would-be creator of a

Spanish Catholicism as contrasted with a Roman one. As an important prelude to the Christ theme, Marrero examines his various views on religion and discusses the intellectual influences that molded this man in rebellion, whose notion of teaching was to rouse people from apathy. In this process, Marrero employs the technique of the posthumous psychoanalytical treatment that has been used so convincingly by his compatriot, Gregorio Marañon, whom, in fact, he mentions.

The bulk of the work is dedicated to various aspects of the Christ theme as it is developed in Unamuno's works of poetry and prose, together with the intellectual and spiritual processes explaining them.

One of the broad differences between the attitudes of Protestant and Roman Catholic may be noted in the details of their symbolism. For the Roman Catholic in general, the cross includes the figure of the crucified Saviour; the Protestant displays the cross without the figure of Jesus. To explain his practice, the Protestant says, "We preach the risen Christ." To anyone with even a most casual acquaintance with religious art, there is a marked difference between the representations to be found in the Spanish tradition and that of other lands. There is something excessively gruesome about the figures of Christ in Spanish art, with their almost grotesque blobs of color representing oozing blood. The image of "the horizontal Christ" in the perpetual throes of the death agony yet never actually dying is, according to Unamuno, the symbol especially satisfying to the Spanish soul. He attributes this peculiar Spanish tragic mood to the geographical background in which the Spanish soul has been nurtured. Marrero, however, believes that in his "Spanish Christ" Unamuno seems to be presenting an image created by his own personal morbid predilection for the solitude of bleak mountain wastes, desert, and sea, which to him exemplify the eternity and the personal immortality for which he longs but in which he cannot on rational grounds believe. He attempts to explain

the psychological basis for Unamuno's position—the solitary inner struggle and anguish that constitute his normal condition—and place him, disciple of Kierkegaard that he is, in the tradition of the existentialists of today. Unamuno's claim that this somber, tragic view, which he wishes to consider typically Spanish, is the natural result of the heritage of the bleak Spanish "steppe" is delightfully challenged by Marrero in his description of the view of Christ held by the Orthodox Russians who could really be called children of bleak steppes but who greeted the risen Christ with joyous outbursts at Easter. Yet however correct Marrero may be in explaining what Unamuno was doing, he has not "explained away" the fact of the characteristic representations of Christ in Spanish art, which, of course, antedate Unamuno.

Marrero's discussion of Unamuno's interpretation of Cervantes' great character, Don Quixote, whom he actually treats as a personification of the peculiarly "Spanish Christ," may seem surprising to the casual American reader to whom Quixote appears to be a mildly amusing literary creation. Yet Marrero makes it very obvious that from the point of view of the European intellectual a comparison between Christ and Quixote is natural, even somewhat inevitable. He quotes several thinkers who have found food for deep thought in their study of Quixote in order to arrive at an understanding of the genius of Cervantes and, at considerable length, introduces the Russian Dostoevski's appreciation of Cervantes' hero as a Christ figure, which naturally leads to a discussion of the "Russian Christ" created by Dostoevski in the person of Prince Myshkin in the title role of *The Idiot*. The consciously planned parallel and contrast between these two fictional heroes is emphasized by the Russian's own observations on his "idiot."

The somewhat lengthy account of Dostoevski's hero as a basis for comparison with the "myth making" that is involved in Unamuno's creation of a "Spanish Christ" in his interpretation of Quixote becomes the

occasion for introducing information that should be of great value and interest to Americans, even if in its extent and in some of its detail this material seems adventitious to Marrero's main theme. We need to know that at the very foundation of Russian Communism there is a non-Marxian element that is so inherent in Russian culture and tradition that Dostoevski could give voice to it without recognizing it as such. Though he is frequently mentioned as one of the spiritual precursors of Communism, he would probably have been very much surprised at the imputation. And the presentation of Unamuno's "Spanishness" suggests that there are certain "grass roots" attitudes of the Spanish tradition that we may well try to understand if our dealings with peoples of that tradition are to rise above the level of the ineffectual. There is more in Marrero's volume than the study of a tortured and rebellious soul whose problems mirror those of our whole western world of today, though this in itself makes it a work of importance.

Reviewed by CHARLES J. ADAMEC

From Welfarism to Chaos

Beyond the Welfare State, From Welfarism to Chaos, by Gunnar Myrdal.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.

BEYOND THE Welfare State? Having heard something of Gunnar Myrdal, having perhaps read his *American Dilemma*, you will easily guess the answer: the Welfare World—or, as Myrdal prefers to say in each instance, the Welfare Democratic World, built upon the "principles" of "freedom," "equality of opportunity," and brotherhood. You will not, however, guess so easily the actual contents of this book, or the drift

of its argument, which is precisely *not* likely to please the American Welfare-statists with whom (wrongly, in this writer's opinion) Myrdal's name tends to be associated. The Myrdal of this volume, whatever the sins he has committed in the past, puts himself forward as no panegyrist of the Welfare Democratic state at all. Welfarism is *not* the wave of the future. (Unlike his supposed American counterparts, of whom incidentally he takes a dim view, he does not, officially at least, credit the existence of waves of the future.) We shall *not* solve our problems by making all states welfare states, or by competing with the Soviet Union in the creation of welfare states. The Welfare State has conferred great benefits, alike from the standpoint of his ideological commitment to the French Revolution, that is, more liberty, more equality, more brotherhood but also—for he does distinguish here—from the standpoint of making everybody (well, nearly everybody) in it enormously better off than he would have been without it. But along with conferring benefits it has intensified, perhaps even made itself directly responsible for, a whole series of problems that it has shown no capacity to deal with. It *does* produce inflation, thus creating justified doubts about its own viability. It *does*, by encouraging selfish behavior on the part particularly of "groups" engaged in "production," subordinate the interests of consumers in a manner that must, in the long run, endanger its own existence. Above all, from Myrdal's special point of view, it *does*, by encouraging selfishness, encourage nationalism, and so makes, within each Welfare State, for policies incompatible with and destructive of that international cooperation which alone can bring to a satisfactory resolution the world problems now clearly visible on the horizon. It has produced "international disintegration" (which, in my opinion, should be read "international chaos") and, short of the accomplishment of a breath-taking "educational program" that would bring its citizens to unlearn much of that which it

has itself taught them, must continue to produce international disintegration.

Myrdal is not about to draw the (for me) obvious conclusion, namely, that the Welfare Democratic State should never have been permitted to come into existence to begin with; but the "international case" against the Welfare State could hardly be better put than he puts it, and there is nothing to keep other persons, more likely to put it to good use, from making of it a formidable weapon in contemporary controversy. American conservatives capable of abstracting from the book's ideological bias can and should take to heart its specifically economic analysis of international instability, and make the most of it—programmatically, in insisting, with chapter and verse citations of a respected Liberal economist, that every advance toward the Welfare State is an advance toward international chaos (which, of course, good conservatives have known all along); polemically, in exposing as false the Liberal claim to a monopoly, or even an aliquot share, of genuine and responsible concern about the soundness and good health of the world economy. American conservatives especially, because one of the strengths of Myrdal's analysis is to be found in his demonstration that the United States is not yet "really" a Welfare State at all, which on his own showing presumably means that it could even now not go ahead and "become" one. That point, established by a writer who wishes America were a Welfare State, is reason enough for recommending the book to conservative readers—most of whom, as I am fond of pointing out, are unduly pessimistic about the extent of the Liberals' "victory" to date.

Reviewed by WILLMOORE KENDALL

Economics as a Moral Science

The Economic Point of View, by Israel M. Kirzner. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1960.

ECONOMICS has long been considered the dismal science by most educated men. Much of this negative attitude stems from a firm belief that economics (1) deals solely with the grubby business of acquiring material wealth, of money-making; and (2) postulates a coldly rational, coolly calculating, economic man, a man without sentiment or compassion, a man who would refuse a few coppers to his sick old mother because his only value in life is to "buy on the cheapest market and sell on the dearest."

Much of this picture of economics was always a caricature. To the extent that it was ever relevant, it was relevant only to British classical economics of the nineteenth century, and largely because these economists were not properly equipped to analyze the actions of consumers. Despairing of bringing the consumer into their theoretical framework, the classical economists concentrated on the businessmen and his drive for pecuniary profit. Now, generally, it is the consumer who has values, and guides the profit-seeking businessmen in the paths of production that will fulfill these values. The classical omission, coupled with John Stuart Mill's unfortunate — and positivistic — championing of the concept of the *homo oeconomicus*, gave enough room for the enemies of the hard realities of the economic discipline to heap scorn and abuse on the science as a whole.

Economics has come a long way since the nineteenth century, although the story is not generally known. In this fine and scholarly work, Professor Israel Kirzner

traces what has happened to the conception of the scope of economics since the early British classics. He shows how economics has broadened immeasurably through the years, until, in the remarkable achievement of Ludwig von Mises, it has become part of a general theoretical analysis of all human actions, of the science of "praxeology." And rather than being confined to certain specific goods or certain particular motives, economic analysis embraces all goods, material or immaterial, and all motives, and analyzes these actions from a certain particular aspect. The man who attends and enjoys a concert is engaging in an action analyzable by economics, even though his motive is "pure" and the good that he consumes is non-material. And not only interpersonal exchanges come under the praxeologic rubric, but also such purely personal actions as the deeds of Crusoe on his desert island. In brief, economics, or praxeology, deals with the logical implications of the universal, formal fact that human beings act, i.e., that they act purposively, employing means to achieve ends. Economics, therefore, in its profoundest sense, is not a quantitative, empirical statistical science as most people believe; it is a philosophical, qualitative, and deductive discipline.

It should be noted that economics is profoundly different from all other social or "behavioral" sciences. The latter, which try to develop scientific laws of the content of men's actions, are determinist, mechanistic, and therefore behaviorist: men are treated like stones to be "observed", charted, and "predicted". Genuine economics, especially economics as it has emerged in praxeology and as shown by Dr. Kirzner, is quite the opposite; instead of mechanistically substituting behavior for action, it grounds its deductions squarely on the axiom of action, which means in essence on the axiom of man's purposiveness and freedom of will. The conservative, properly suspicious of the anti-human essence of the "social sciences", should recognize that in economics, partic-

ularly economics in its most developed praxeological form, he has a staunch and extremely important ally. Praxeological economics rests squarely on the reality of the individual person, not on the collective; and instead of burying values and purpose, it portrays the individual as striving purposively to achieve his cherished ends. While, therefore, the actual construction of the edifice of economic law is strictly *Wertfrei*, in the deepest sense economics is not a "behavioral" nor even a "social" but — what Mill this time correctly called it — a moral science.

Reviewed by MURRAY N. ROTHBARD

Faction in the Global Assembly

Bloc Politics in the United Nations,
by Thomas Hovet, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

A TENDENCY toward domination by pressure groups and bloc voters soon becomes evident in all forms of representative government. The Founding Fathers of our nation were well aware of this, none more so than the sophisticated James Madison, who described those of his day as "factions actuated by material interest, impulse, or passion" and searched for means of reducing their influence. But enthusiasts for world government in our day have failed to take this tendency into full account. It was mentioned only once during the long deliberations that accompanied the drafting of the United Nations Charter. Apparently the delegations were not sufficiently alert or else they assumed that some of the worst traits of politicians and bureaucrats would

somewhat be sluffed off and self-serving individuals and aggregations would be transformed into disinterested statesmen once they began to act on a world stage.

This assumption was sheer illusion, of course; and political leaders of the United States should have been the last to overlook this tendency toward domination of politics by Mr. Madison's factions. Here we have many politicians and public officials of various types whose decisions can be dictated by special groups and many organizations whose members attempt to determine the course of legislation and the trend of administrative policy: labor groups; manufacturing, mining and petroleum interests; owners of public utilities; farm blocs; professionals, such as lawyers, physicians, dentists, organized bureaucracies, and educational associations; racial and other clannish groups; ardent reformers; and others. Unless their demands for financial favors cancel one another out by a process described as "countervailing," the final result is likely to be catastrophic inflation and fiscal bankruptcy.

I shall not dwell upon this point here. Readers need only to be reminded of what they may observe in recent political events in this country, especially the last few elections, national and state, or of what they can learn by careful examination of government in their own communities. The government of the town in which I live is reported—correctly, I believe—to have been controlled since 1946 by a combination of unionized labor, payrollees and down-the-line Negro voters. No raise in taxes nor any bond issue has been voted down during the past fourteen years. The latest illustration of the tendency on the national level is an organized movement to extract from the national treasury huge subsidies for the "eradication of slums" in our big cities, most of which have been plundered by their bosses and machines for a century. Unless an effective "countervailing force" is promptly organized, we probably shall soon have a new Cabinet officer, a Secretary of Urban Affairs.

Professor Hovet has made a tremendous effort to discover and describe group pressures and bloc voting in the Assembly of the United Nations since its establishment in 1945-46. His narrative and his numerous charts, while very illuminating, are in some respects too general, and he devotes too little attention to the influence of racial groups both in this world assembly and back of the scenes in the home countries, particularly in the United States, where unassimilated minorities and racial groups exert continuous pressure in behalf of their overseas kinsmen. By linking together the votes dealing with economic, technical, and humanitarian affairs he obscures the balloting on the financing of the United Nations and its special agencies. He should have given greater emphasis to the voting on resolutions and recommendations regarding expenditures. Representatives of the underdeveloped countries in the Assembly have constantly engaged in bloc voting in favor of more and more economic and technical assistance at the expense of the more prosperous countries, and unless some system of weighted voting can be devised in budgeting these heavy outlays, all the wealthier nations, and especially the United States, will eventually be balloted into bankruptcy and poverty. Participation in a global organization does not transform self-serving delegations into disinterested world statesmen. Although Professor Hovet does not formulate this conclusion, the facts clearly justify it.

Reviewed by J. FRED RIPPY

Dissenting for Freedom

The Language of Dissent, by Lowell Mason. Cleveland: World Publishing Co. 1959.

SOMEWHERE in your library, catalogued with the works of Jefferson, Locke, and Burke, should sit this book by Lowell Mason. Although the author may never achieve the eminence of that distinguished trio, there is little doubt that his warnings against mankind's most serious social malady, the tyranny of the State, place him in the same illustrious company.

Mr. Mason's battle against governmental abuse was not, by his own admission, of the spectacular variety. Instead, it was the dull, monotonous fight against petty arrogances, encroachments, and cruelties of administrative fiat, inequities largely obscured by the government's paternalistic promise of security. It was the day in, day out thankless war against bureaucrats, who, while insisting they wanted to preserve America's republican forms, were impatient with the legal safeguards written into the Constitution.

For eleven years, as a member of the Federal Trade Commission, Lowell Mason unerringly hurled his verbal brickbats at those who wished to supplant the Bill of Rights. During that time, he participated in more than 1,200 decisions, involving every conceivable area of commerce, more than half of which were affirmed either in whole or in part when appealed to the Circuit or Supreme courts. However, neither the number of decisions nor the percentage upheld by the courts reflects the character of this latter-day Horatius, who almost single-handedly within the FTC attempted to hold the bridge against creeping bureaucracy.

The Great Dissenter, as Mr. Mason came to be known, wrote more dissenting opinions than all other commissioners within the history of the agency. Whether or not he planned it that way, we can only speculate. However, he believed the best way to fight administrative tyranny was from the inside, and he therefore managed to get himself appointed to the Commission. Perhaps even he did not realize how thankless the task would be, nor did he realize that his personal staff would soon become an isolated island, surrounded at the FTC by a sea of resentment.

From the beginning, Lowell Mason believed, as did Jefferson, that rebellion to tyrants was obedience to God, and he promptly undertook what he considered to be his ministerial duty. One of his very first discoveries on the Commission was that federal laws governing businessmen were so nebulous, yet so all-encompassing, that anyone engaged in commerce could be found guilty of violating something. He found that the legality or illegality of particular acts depended less on the words of a statute enacted by one's elected representatives, than on the condition of the collective livers of a dozen anonymous bureaucrats. The commissioners determined who was to be sued in a manner not unlike playing pin the tail on the donkey.

In 1914, Congress acted on President Wilson's request to establish an agency empowered to investigate, complain, and try. It was envisioned that this agency would be comprised of experts, trained in business affairs, who would determine whether certain practices in commerce were unfair. That vision proved to be phantasmagoric. Today, thanks to the workings of "Mason's Law"—which holds that bureaucracy, out of view of the public eye, will arrogate to itself all power available under a statute, despite constitutional limitations—numerous similar agencies have sprung up. Not only are these agencies impressed with their own infallibility, but all of them operate under statutory commands so broad that they invent the means by

which they enact the duties Congress granted them. Under such an arrangement, the public interest is lost sight of or ignored, and, says Mr. Mason, quoting Amaury de Riencourt, through the gap thus opened between appearance and reality, the future Caesars come marching in.

Most administrative agencies consider any decision over business a success, but, the author states, it is only when a large corporate enterprise is throttled by administrative ukase that a really important victory is scored. Because corporations alone have the power and will to resist federal encroachment, administrative agencies go out of their way time and again in an effort to indict big business. No statue of limitations, no clear-cut evidence of guilt is needed. For when a company is sued by the federal government, the prevailing attitude of the commissioners is that where there is so much smoke, there must be some fire—even though most of the smoke was fanned by the Commission's own staffs.

Undernourished by lack of contact with the realities of the market place, the anti-capitalistic mentality of the bureaucrats—many of whom, Mason says, “would sooner sue a businessman than eat”—assumes an arrogance described in Isabella's denunciation of Angelo:

“... man, proud man,
Drest in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most
assured. . .”

Unfamiliar with the working of America's new ruling elite, the public generally accepts a corporate plea of guilt as conclusive evidence of wrongdoing. But is it? Technically, perhaps, but only because businessmen who charge everyone the same price for a product violate the Sherman Act, while those who don't charge everyone the same price violate the Robinson-Patman Act—an inconsistency which seldom bothers the commissioners. But even where businessmen are not indicted for either of the preceding violations, and are not guilty, they often find it more expedi-

ent, and less expensive, to capitulate. (This, by the way, was the attitude of General Electric when that company this past December pleaded guilty to anti-trust charges. The pleas, insisted G.E.'s lawyer, were not admissions of guilt, but, rather, were entered to end “what would otherwise be most protracted and expensive litigations.”)

A less compelling reason why companies plead guilty to violating administrative law, yet a legitimate reason nonetheless, is that—despite their stable of qualified lawyers—businessmen are woefully naive when it comes to contesting government litigation. They are, says Mr. Mason, like novices at a barn dance: often they do-ci-do when they should allemande left.

Big business is a natural whipping boy for bureaucratic caprice. Whereas a nation may stir itself long enough to protest injustice to an individual, who gives a second thought to star-chamber treatment of, say, a General Motors? Legions may do or die for dear old Rutgers, but who feels the same about a Texaco or a du Pont? And what does it matter if administrative proliferation extinguishes freedom's flame along Madison Avenue, so long as the lights continue to burn brightly far above Cayuga's waters, or along the banks of the Wabash?

While the foregoing explains why business is in disgrace with administrative fortune, and in bureaucracy's eyes, it does little to explain why—as a plaintive Edna St. Vincent Millay asked about love—liberty has slipped away in so many little ways. Paradoxically, Mr. Mason explains, it is because we have been so conditioned to fear the bully in uniform who personifies totalitarianism that we fail to understand that the man to watch is the one in the brown tweed suit. Mild, courteous, and scholarly, he has no boots, no gun, no warrant. Armed only with an identification card and a surfeit of precedents—the trappings of the modern totalitarian—he has the power to try people in absentia; the power to find guilt by trade association;

the power to order persons who have been found guilty of some unfair practices to stop other practices that are not unfair; and the power to order parties who have not been found guilty of anything to stop doing things that were not wrong, in order to correct evils committed by others.

Throughout the book, author Mason—wittingly or not—harkens back to the Rule of Law, that concept popularized chiefly by Dicey and Hayek. Quoting the late Harvard Professor Ralph Barton Perry, the author reminds us that the efficacy of law depends on a pervasive and continuing lawabidingness, which consists of a common understanding and general acceptance perpetually renewed. Laws which rely on enforcement, rather than acceptance, are more often than not bad laws. It was these which prompted John Locke to describe the end of law as “not to abolish or restrain, but preserve and enlarge freedom.”

Mr. Mason roams far afield in his defense of liberty. In both dissents and concurrences, he demonstrates a catholicity of interests. Whether he is criticizing the FTC for going beyond its legitimate protection of the public interest (“We are not guardians *ad litem* to the Mortimer Snerds who can read but won’t, who don’t have to sign contracts but do”), deprecating America’s sudden dislike of competition (“the American fetish for wanting to sit down while someone else does the competing”), or defending advertising as the enemy of the total state (which, he avers, prevents our daily dosage of advertising copy from being written on Pennsylvania Avenue), the soul of Lowell Mason’s message is both brevity and wit—with an admixture of satire thrown in.

Whether his opinions are concurrences or dissents, his exegesis is brilliant. And his incursions against the dread collectivist enemy end not with a whimper, but with a resounding bang.

Reviewed by EDWIN MC DOWELL

The Meaning of Orpheus

The Orphic Voice: Poetry and Natural History, by Elizabeth Sewell.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.

READERS AND students of modern poetic theory will undoubtedly be familiar with the name of the present book’s author. Elizabeth Sewell has already published several volumes of criticism; one is a fine brief study of Paul Valéry; another, *The Structure of Poetry*, which takes up the problems of poetic language, ends in a study of Rimbaud and Mallarmé. Both books seem preparations for the more complicated problems raised in *The Orphic Voice*.

If this new volume is a continuation of the earlier ones, its intended scope and ambitions are much greater. Indeed, what Miss Sewell proposes to do is break down the nearly insurmountable barriers raised in the modern world between poetry and science—especially between poetry and biology—and demonstrate the unity of these two human enterprises in their common dependence on language. But, more than that, both poetry and science, Miss Sewell insists—when they are following their true course—are bent upon the same task: the uncovering and interpretation of the history of nature, which is seen as a dynamic process. We, as men, are the end products of that process and participants in it. Thus we interpret ourselves together with the history of a dynamic natural process of which we are living parts.

Science, in giving itself over to the abstractions of mathematics, in distrusting language and poetry, has defected from its real purpose. Poetry, in creating for itself

theoretically an imaginary and eternal realm opposed to the vicissitudes of time and nature, has betrayed its vocation as an "instrument of research" into nature. Miss Sewell returns to the ancient myth of Orpheus to find a figure that will re-unite these disciplines and chart a true path for them. The myth of Orpheus is a parable of "poetry as a form of power." In her study, she traces the question of this power "in the living universe," and also the corollary question, "what is the biological function of poetry in the natural history of the human organism?" In spite of the separate directions which poetry and biology have taken, Miss Sewell discovers a tradition of poets and scientists who have referred to the Orphic legend and have seen in their own fashion that "language and mind, poetry and biology meet and bear on one another in the figure of Orpheus." A chronological study of the Orphic concerns of these writers, all of whom the author characterizes by their "postlogical" thinking, constitutes the rest of this lengthy book.

Miss Sewell, then, attempts to demolish the old antitheses of science and poetry, intellect and imagination, mind and body, and asserts that the whole human organism enters into the act of thinking—with the so-called mind apparently at the top. The steps of investigation lead her from this to the close connections between body and imagination, asides on ritual and dream, and on into the relation of the human organism or self to the background of nature whence it emerges. Language, and writing, "may incorporate in itself all the unexpressable elements in simpler types of behavior, offering a special insight into living behavior in a wide context." And this, to put it briefly, opens the way for Miss Sewell to investigate language and poetry and biology as they reflect "back to the organism [man] its own activity." The chapters which follow are devoted to aspects of the work of various writers—including Ovid, Shakespeare, Francis Bacon, Linnaeus, Goethe, Wordsworth, and Rilke

—as they engage in speculations and researches for the purposes of such broadly human self-knowledge. In each case, the writer's concern in these areas is linked to an interest in the myth of Orpheus.

It is impossible within this short space to offer a more adequate summary of Miss Sewell's ideas or her treatment of this Orphic tradition. Her book is most original and will certainly prompt a great deal of further study. However, I do have a few reservations which I should like to mention here. First of all, there is a curious indirectness and obscurity in the handling of some of the material that makes Miss Sewell's line of thought and argument difficult to follow at times. This has nothing to do with her style, which is simple and straightforward, but rather with a kind of opacity in the presentation of certain concepts. Again, there are some stretches in which I thought the continuity of her explorations was all but lost.

But the major objection derives from the arbitrarily restrictive quality of the Orphic tradition the author espouses. Though she obviously needed some kind of guiding and limiting principle for the book, I frequently felt in reading it that Miss Sewell might have achieved more without her attachment to the Orphic legend. The use of that legend in the study often seems either forced or extremely tenuous. Inevitably, as all such traditions do, it becomes obsessive and exclusive, as did Robert Graves' cult of the White Goddess. Some writers find a place in Miss Sewell's tradition simply for mentioning Orpheus in a rather obscure corner of their works. But a poem like Edith Sitwell's "Eurydice," for example, escapes her notice, though that poem and most of Dame Edith's later writings would be, I imagine, of considerable interest to Miss Sewell. A poet like Theodore Roethke, who never mentions Orpheus but is everywhere engrossed in themes dealing with evolutionary process, spirit and nature, could not be included because of the Orphic limitations Miss Sewell imposes. Perhaps this amounts to petty criticism, but the

author tends toward a point at which she might well believe that writers not occupied in using their poetic art as an instrument of research into the history of nature are no more than fabricators—or at least not of much use. In such a case—though Miss Sewell is by no means guilty of this—an interesting theory winds up by attaining a kind of critical tyranny: instead of humility before art, dictatorship over it.

These reservations are somewhat serious, but not grave. The book remains one of the very important and brilliant efforts in poetic theory of recent years. And it heralds a breakthrough into new territory. I think it will be remembered for a long time to come as a heroic, pioneer endeavor.

Reviewed by RALPH J. MILLS, JR.

Philosophy in Hemingway

Hemingway and the Dead Gods: A Study in Existentialism, by John Killinger. University of Kentucky Press, 1960.

IT HAS LONG been common practice among Hemingway's critics to dwell upon the limits of the author's work rather than to explore its possibilities. During the last two decades he has been scored for "a failure of sensibility," "a narrow, somewhat immature sense of the world," and the inability to portray either a real woman or mature heterosexual love.

Mr. Killinger's book is striking in its opposition to this tendency. The work is a comparative study which strives to expand the possibilities of Hemingway's world, as viewed in relation to (and also *from*) the nontheistic existential perspective of Sartre, Beauvoir, Camus, and their philosophical predecessors. The result is interesting; it accords Hemingway some philosophical merit that seems due and it opens a new approach for consideration of his work.

There are limits, however. I am reminded of Sartre's reading of *The Sound and the Fury*; it is enlightening, but it is more Sartre than Faulkner. The same applies to Mr. Killinger's study. While he often elicits "demonstrable affinities between Hemingway and the existentialists," one is left with the impression that the author's perspective has distorted the work of a distinctly individual writer.

Initially Mr. Killinger appears to approach his task soberly aware of the critical dangers of his orientation. "I have no intention," he notes, "of tailoring Hemingway into a poor man's Heidegger, or of bestowing philosophical significance on the fiction of a man who would be the first to deny that he is a philosopher." The study is at its best in the early chapters on "The Role of Death" and "The Simple Versus the Complicated." Here Mr. Killinger points out convincing affinities between the ethic of the Hemingway code hero and the existentialist's authentic man. Both follow an ethic of form, purified by the repeated choice to confront death and by the perpetual flight from social entanglements.

Hoped-for parallels do not dovetail as neatly in later chapters on the dead Gods, on Hemingway's social emphasis of the late 'thirties, and on "The Hero in Love." The treatment of social affirmation in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* neglects the positive aspects of that novel, bringing the "No man is an *Iland*" theme from Donne into an unconvincing conjunction with temporary existentialist brotherhood. Likewise,

Mr. Killinger slights the positive attempt to portray near-mystic love in the same novel; the affair between Robert Jordan and Maria surely transcends the Beauvoir affair of utter masculine domination.

As a whole, however, Mr. Killinger seems to fail on a more serious count—that of critical discrimination. Even when one makes allowances for the philosophical orientation of his study, there remains the right to expect distinctions. For example, can it be, as Mr. Killinger's assertion of affinity after affinity seems to indicate, that

Hemingway's work is one linear production, existentially viewed, from beginning to end? The dimension of qualitative evaluation is missing.

For the Hemingway student the fundamental question this book evokes is broader yet: "How far can the man's world view be pushed?" Mr. Killinger has opened a viable approach, but he has also demonstrated the need to assess its limits carefully, and by extension the limits of the novelist himself.

Reviewed by DAVID SUMNER

The Prophet

Gently, like angel-hair adrift on sloping
Currents in dusk and autumn, a curve
Of mist blows across the lighted transept,
Each drop a seed of lightning, sown
Into silence, the slow dark motion
Of a minor world, afloat in space.

And what do we await? A word, a face
From the leaden cataracts of that outer dark;
If one would only come (we cry), the world
Could rip its orbit, saints and demons mate—
The slug of life skip like a smooth stone
Along the surface of creation's waters.

And then he comes, with quiet ancient war,
His angel-hair consumed in lakes of fire.

LARRY RUBIN

Socrates

("Now, if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain."—*The Apology*)

He was right, of course. That is our holy hour
When every trembling of blood and bone is stilled
And the float of brain has drawn up into black—
A hint of finality, like a glance from God.

Our little love is not enough. All
Lovers know this, and stretch their love
Into their sleep, and make great swells,
Like whales moving undersea.

In the dark we are alone—again
The pitch, the pool, the blending into night.
While the swells subside within the brain.
A little hemlock does its work of love.

LARRY RUBIN

Metaphysics and Human Nature: A Reply to J. V. Langmead Casserley

DONALD A. ZOLL

WE ARE indebted to Mr. J. V. Langmead Casserley for his article, "Personality in Psychology and Metaphysics," in the Fall issue of *MODERN AGE* sharpening the discussion which arose from the contributions of Fr. James V. Schall and myself in the Spring number. While Mr. Casserley "sharpens" the colloquy by his rather intense criticism, I fear that this is accompanied by a certain "dulling" of the precision of the argument. I should like, very briefly, to endeavor to reply to Mr. Casserley with the view of reintroducing a note of philosophical rigour. To do this, I should like to approach Mr. Casserley's comments on their own ground, namely, on the metaphysical front.

To begin with, I will let pass the reference to "Christian Aristotelianism," but I do so with a heavy heart and only in the interests of brevity. I am aware, of course, that I would be raking up old bones to assert that the conjoining of Aristotelian philosophy and early Christianity, the para-

mount achievement of the Scholastics, is by no means as harmonious a union as the Scholastics had thought nor as compatible as the contemporary Thomists rather blithely accept. However, it is not on this issue that Mr. Casserley and I find ourselves in profound disagreement. Mr. Casserley writes:

Our contemporary intellectual culture, whether inside or outside the academic profession, still contains many more Christians and Aristotelians, even Christian Aristotelians (I am not quite sure who these are—D.A.Z.), than Jungians. In our world of thought all movements are minority movements, but the Christian is still very much the largest. Compared to it the Jungian is microscopic.

I find this passage incomprehensible. I would be most happy to admit that there are more extant "Christians" than there are "Jungians," although I think we have a fallacy of classification here. But assuming for the moment that we are

counting heads between a class of persons described as Christians or "Christian Aristotelians" and a class of persons described as "Jungians," I am at a loss to appreciate the significance of this rather prosaic fact. Surely Mr. Casserley is not taking the position that one can assess the value of a philosophy by the numbers of its adherents? If so, I should point out that Christianity itself would have been forced to entertain grave doubts regarding its validity if measured against the legions of "pagan" devotees at the period of its inception as an intellectual movement.

Perhaps what Mr. Casserley really means to suggest is that the weight and majesty of tradition, the "authority" of history rests with the Christians. "The Christians and the Aristotelians," he states, "will still be in the debate by the end of the century, no doubt, as always, under pressure, but a lusty and living force, whereas almost certainly Jungians and Freudians by that time will be half-forgotten." Mr. Casserley appears able to "mortgage the future" (to borrow an expression of Eliseo Vivas) and I commend him for his historical bravery. He speaks like a confident empiricist. Unfortunately, I cannot make such a daring prediction—I cannot even validly assert that human life as we know it will exist "by the end of the century." Mr. Casserley speaks of my "error of historical judgment and foresight." My errors of "foresight" must largely be ones of omission, but from my understanding of the nature of the historical process, I would submit that the fluctuations of human creativity are such that to allege the enduring ascendancy of a given dogma is a most questionable proposition.

Mr. Casserley develops what he describes as a "conservative philosophy of history." In substance, this historical concept is a rather sweeping indictment of the transient present as a sort of cultural debauch in which contemporary intellectual activity cannot be judged. One must somberly await the judgment of the ages. "Pioneers like Jung and Freud do not belong to the ages," he comments, "for the ages have not yet digested them. They still belong to their own age, and therefore in a sense as yet to no other." I would observe that it is surely a truism that no man initially belongs to any age but his own and that it is equally safe to say that the ultimate worth of modern depth psychology must be evaluated to some degree by the long-range impact of it upon human society. This is not a very startling observation. We would certainly allow that Bach as an artist has "withstood the test of time," but would we care to deny the aesthetic

significance of a Stravinsky or a Bartok? It is a prescription for intellectual sterility to decry the contemporary solely on the obvious but specious grounds that it is in fact contemporary. Such becomes a meaningless tautology. The fallacy implied is that we judge not upon the intrinsic merit of a work of art or philosophy, but that we can only judge it in terms of some historical measurement. It is with almost embarrassment that I would submit so obvious a rejoinder that the work of Newton or Copernicus was quite as intrinsically valid and significant to the progress of human knowledge at the moment of its creation as it was when it assumed the status of a generally-accepted *fait accompli*.

These questions are raised by Mr. Casserley by way of introduction. His primary attack is directed against the nature of psychology and its relationship to metaphysics. I have no elemental quarrel with Mr. Casserley's description of what psychology endeavors to do, but I am astonished by his quite full-blown bifurcation of man's "psychic business" and the metaphysical origins of such phenomena. Here we are confronted with a dualism not any less comprehensive, nor any more tenable, than that of Descartes. Mr. Casserley leaves us in no doubt on this point:

But this kind of description [psychology], however detailed and accurate, can never give us a philosophy of personality because philosophy of personality is not primarily concerned with how man operates or what man appears to be but with what, metaphysically speaking, man is. Indeed, in the Christian tradition, it is precisely our philosophy of personality which enables us, even compels us, to stand in a kind of metaphysical-theological judgment over man as he appears to be and to observe that the basic human tragedy is that man's becoming does not match his being, that his historical performance is vastly beneath and utterly unworthy of his metaphysical stature, and that the persistent misfortune observed in the record of historical performance can only be understood in terms of this vast disparity between the comparatively mean appearance and majestic reality.

Now, I confess that much of what Mr. Casserley is saying here does not convey a great deal of precise meaning to me. However, I believe it is fair to point out that he endeavors to posit some sort of ontological bifurcation. Perhaps the psychic nature of man he might choose to describe as mere "appearance," denying it the character of reality. If this is the case, then we must deny the entire possibility of psychology, perhaps, in-

deed of all human knowledge. I do not think that Mr. Casserley wishes to lead us down the road to solipsism. No, psychic phenomena must possess reality of some sort, but he might assert that it is a different sort of reality than the "transcendental" reality which lies deeper at the core of human personality. The human being, then, is split into a psychic reality and a reality of some other variety. Have they any connection in the existential situation? Apparently the answer is negative. If this is the case, what is the causal origin of psychic life? Is it a mere biological reductionism? What, then, of the causal origin of the transcendental side of the reality of the human personality? What in fact Mr. Casserley has done is to commit an old ontological fallacy: he has supposed that higher orders of reality create the lower orders or strata. Along with 19th Century Idealism, he asserts that one can turn the nature of being upside down. But surely ontological categorial analysis can reveal that unless one posits a hopelessly dualistic ontology, there must be relevance between the strata of existence. Such strata may enjoy categorial uniqueness, but they must also, besides novelty, enjoy some essential hierarchical unity. The case on behalf of the assumption that the lower strata of existence must be always included in the higher (that consciousness, for example, must presuppose more fundamental and less novel categories) would require too lengthy an exposition here. The point to be made is that either Mr. Casserley is content, along with many of his theistic colleagues, with a mystically-conceived dualism or he must face up to the task of deriving ontic categories. In short, he must offer some account for the very inter-relatedness of psychic and metaphysical life which he implicitly denies. That they are related, I have no doubt. From a number of lines of possible argument, I would assert that bifurcation of the human personality as he suggests flies in the face of rigorous ontological analysis. The psychic life of man, conceived of as an ontic category, is but a part, but an integral not an isolated part, of not only the strata of being of an individual man, but of the order of nature itself. For Mr. Casserley to assume that a growing familiarity with this psychic life does not provide insight into the nature of the human species in its full metaphysical range ultimately would force him to either a mysticism or, even worse, a denial of the orderly ontological character of the universe, substituting a solipsistic chimera of fleeting phenomena or a subjectivistic dream-world.

I hope I do not do injustice to Mr. Casserley

when I submit that he chooses the dualism as a way out. It is evident that he does so when he offers us the notion of "self-transcendence". He states:

Wherever we draw the line between the *I* and the *me*, there will always and inevitably be an element of self-transcendence which escapes from the frame of reference in which the *me* is known, simply because the *I*, after all, is that frame of reference.

Now this appears to be a cogent observation so long as we do not inquire as to what is the nature of the *I*. Mr. Casserley restricts the psychological investigation to the *me*. Well and good, and I shall certainly admit that it is unlikely that any psychological method is capable of uncovering all that is constitutive of a given human being. If the *I-me* differentiation is an operational one—or even possibly an epistemological one—then I can see no reason other than to cautiously agree. But this is not, I take it, what Mr. Casserley means. If asked to define what is the *I*, I infer that he would argue that the *I* constitutes a nexus of elements that not only "transcend" the *me*, but also transcend the analyzable elements which differentiate the *I* and the *me*. In so far as the novel conjunction of elements within the personality produce an organic whole in which the integral elements are thereby transcended, we have no issue. But what Mr. Casserley hints at is that a man is something more than the elements that make him up. If my knowledge of *I* is more exhaustive than a knowledge of *me* available to an observer, it is so because of the very nature of myself. That nature "transcends" only to the extent that it incorporates, assimilates in the thoroughly novel fashion the range of influences which produce the personality in its entirety. These influences may certainly be below the cognate level; they may be the result of responses to aesthetic or moral value in an objective sense (if one wishes to espouse a realist concept of value, for example), but my very ability to conceptualize is rooted in an essentially existential exposure. This is even true of the human product of language. I was surprised that Mr. Casserley did not boldly account for his concept of "self-transcendence" by positing divine immanence or a divinely-originated "human spirit." If this is in fact what he argues, then the issue is at least clear.

Mr. Casserley complains that I have a "lack of any power, at all events as far as his article is concerned, to see that his psychological descrip-

tions themselves require philosophical interpretation and evaluation and that they might well receive it from the very traditions of theological thought which he regards as outmoded." His professional exhortations aside, I submit that "philosophical interpretation" is indeed required and I urge this be done with some measure of analytical dispassion and discrimination. He asks, for illustration, "Why are we invited at the next breath to dismiss the theological and Christian versions of these great archetypes, like the fall and original sin, as being for the contemporary mind now devoid of meaning?" I do not believe that I alleged that they were devoid of meaning and would agree that they are pregnant with symbolic meaning. But their meaning, I submit, is not because they vouchsafe some exclusive truth, but because they are a part of a complex of human products that shed considerable light on the composition of man's nature. Mr. Casserley endeavors to shift his ground by trying to have it both ways. He wishes that Christian mythology be accorded its rightful place in the pantheon of archetypes, but he wishes also for its recognition as yet something apart, something wholly and inevitably unique and other-worldly. Jung, he suggests quite accurately, is "a great psychologist of our religiousness," but he understandably laments that Jung (like Toynbee) "champions a religion of human religiousness rather than of divine self-revelation." I would rather underplay Jung's religious congeniality, but I certainly feel that Dr. Jung should best be interrogated on this question. But it is a strange thing to observe at once the "eclectic urge" of many theologians in seeking to bring all commendable social doctrine under the religious wing (and indeed to make "Christians" historically out of rather unlikely prospects) while at the same time indulging in such parochial observations as Mr. Casserley's statement in regard to Jung that, "Christianity for such an observer is simply another religion, whereas for the Christian it is the redemption of religion, and it is presupposed in the Biblical tradition that religion, like all human beings,

is something that needs redeeming, for the normal name for religion considered as a human activity in the Bible is not faith but idolatry."

There are passages in Mr. Casserley's article with which I take fervent dissent and which, also, I feel require no articulate reply. He speaks of the "psychic depths" as the "depths of fallen man" and elsewhere, "empirical psychology is necessarily the psychology of fallen man—what else could it be—and the empirical psychologist repeatedly makes observations which confirm the hypothesis of original sin . . ." These comments and the remainder of his article are religious polemics with which I have no urge to quarrel except when they are put forward as philosophical argument.

In one sentence Mr. Casserley succinctly states the core of his attack: "The point that I am making as against Mr. Zoll is that apart from the solitary figure of Christ the philosophy of personality has no empirical theme and must remain entirely a matter of metaphysical speculation." I would endeavor, if I can glean his meaning, to conclude with a short refutation of this proposition. I cannot dispute with Mr. Casserley his assertion regarding the metaphysical indispensibility of Christ since I am sure we have no common philosophical ground on which to rest such a dialogue. On the other hand, I would like to make two observations: (1) If the philosophy of personality has no empirical theme (devoid of the "figure of Christ"), then any attempt to develop such a philosophy in Mr. Casserley's view must rest solely on the grounds of some variety of mystic experience through revelation, certainly not through reason and "metaphysical speculation" is certainly within the province reason. (2) I agree that such a philosophy of personality must be developed by careful attention to the metaphysical problems. This is a rational undertaking. I would suggest that Mr. Casserley does not, in fact, address himself to metaphysics at all. His position seeks to avoid metaphysical problems, not to solve them. What my theologian critic proposes for a philosophy of personality is not metaphysics, but apologetics.

Conservatism and Freedom: A Libertarian Comment

MURRAY N. ROTHBARD

MODERN AGE is to be warmly congratulated for its articles on "Conservatism and Freedom" in the Fall, 1960 issue. Certainly, there is no more important intellectual task than launching a dialogue toward a synthesis of the two most important intellectual currents on the American "Right" today: the conservative and the libertarian. MODERN AGE can make, and has begun to make, a notable contribution toward that dialogue. As a libertarian, I have been aware for some time of the importance, not only of converting authoritarian conservatives to the cause of freedom, but also of convincing the libertarians of the great importance of recognizing the existence of an objective moral order. As both Messrs. Meyer and Evans point out, there can be no truly moral choice unless that choice is made in freedom; similarly, there can be no really firmly grounded and consistent defense of freedom unless that defense is rooted in moral principle. In concentrating on the *ends* of choice, the conservative, by neglecting the *conditions* of choice, loses that very morality of conduct with which he is so concerned. And the libertarian, by concentrating only on the means, or conditions, of choice and ignoring the ends, throws away an essential moral defense of his own position.

I was particularly impressed by Frank Meyer's admirable article. I pass over reluctantly the temptation to quote extensively from his essay. I don't think there is anyone in the "conservative" camp who has as great an understanding of, or sympathy with, the libertarian, or "classical liberal," tradition. In contrast to Mr. Evans, for example, who chides the libertarian for believing that liberty is the highest moral end for man, Meyer sees that the best libertarians have realized, with Lord Acton, that liberty is the highest *political* end, i.e., the highest end that is proper for government, the organized arm of coercion, to achieve. I am a devoted adherent of a large part of the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophical tradition; but one part of that tradition has been politically disastrous for the West: the Greek notion that the State is somehow the most important ethical institution in society, and that therefore what is good for men to pursue is automatically good for the State to pursue. There, I believe, is the critical error of the authoritarian conservative creed, of the old-style "natural law" tradition before its proper corrective in the individualist, natural rights variant of that tradition as coined in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Here, perhaps, is the gravest failure of the Meyer and Evans articles: the failure to distinguish, in discussing classical liberalism, between the eighteenth and the nineteenth century versions of that creed. Their strictures apply, and properly so, to the nineteenth century version, which, admittedly, is much more common today: Benthamite, utilitarian, even positivistic—a version particularly prevalent among neo-classical economists. It is this wing of liberalism that has been remiss in recognizing objective moral values. The older seventeenth and eighteenth century version, however, was quite different: it believed staunchly in an objective moral order of natural laws, discoverable by man's reason; and, as part of that moral order, it discovered the importance of individualism and the natural rights of person and property as the proper political end. It therefore worked, though often unwittingly, within the Thomist natural law tradition of the West, adding a full libertarianism to that tradition. Whether or not the older libertarians were Christians theologically, they were certainly Christians philosophically. Neither Meyer nor Evans, therefore, do proper justice to those libertarians of the Enlightenment who have, in a sense, already anticipated our dialogue and our synthesis.

Aside from this general caveat, I have only a few minor criticisms of Mr. Meyer's article. Meyer recognizes the primacy of reason, and realizes that simple reliance on tradition is an impossible task. Because of the infinite number of historical traditions handed down to us, we must select and choose; and our only weapon in this selection is our reason. And yet, despite his basic recognition of the primacy of reason, Meyer leans too far over on the "conservative" side of this dialogue by emphasizing that reason must operate "within tradition," and not in any sort of "ideological *hubris* . . . ignoring the accumulated wisdom of mankind." Now when Mr. Meyer recognizes that the conservatives must employ reason to select between true and false traditions, he has placed himself above and not within tradition, and necessarily so. A man cannot be within something, and yet judge it from an outside standard. Here I think Meyer has fallen for what is essentially a straw man version of the libertarian, rationalist creed. Every intelligent rationalist recognizes the great value of studying past thinkers and past accumulations of knowledge: for no man is omniscient, and therefore it is an enormous time-saver and gain in efficiency, knowledge and clarity, to build

on the best writings of the past, instead of trying to spin out all the laws of the universe *de novo*, which is to act as a savage with no inherited record of civilization to help a man on his path to knowledge and wisdom. While modern historicists and relativists scoff at such accumulated wisdom, certainly no genuine rationalist libertarian will do so. But to say this does not give up the supremacy of reason — quite the contrary.

My only other quarrel with Mr. Meyer is his fondness for the term "tension" to describe the proper balance between freedom and value; tension implies a precariousness and an underlying contradiction which I don't think exist. Properly developed, the relationship between freedom and ethics is a peaceful and cohesive harmony, a harmony of a unified natural law, rather than a precarious tension. In the political sphere, that harmony comes about through the confinement of the coercive arm of society to the defense of individual rights of property.

With Mr. Evans, on the other hand, my differences are much more serious. I have already mentioned his confusion of political ends with general moral ends. He also erects a false dichotomy in believing that the libertarian wants freedom because he believes man is naturally good and should therefore be turned loose, while the conservative wants freedom because he realizes that men can be bad, and therefore wants to limit potentialities of evil in society. This, too, is a straw man. Rousseau believed that man is naturally good, corrupted by his institutions; but only a few libertarians in the past have believed this, and I myself have yet to meet a libertarian who holds to such a puerile absurdity. All libertarians whom I have met believe, as all sensible men do, that man is a mixture of good and evil: that he is capable of both types of actions, given his free will to choose. The libertarian wants, simply, to create such institutions in society that will maximize the channels, the inducements, for doing good, and to minimize the opportunities to do bad. We want freedom from the State because the State is the only legal, and by far the most powerful, channel for committing evil in society; and because, having freedom, man can exercise his opportunity to perform good actions. The positive and the negative, the freeing of the good and the checking of the bad, are two sides to the same libertarian coin. The same applies, incidentally, to the much abused "philosophical anarchist" variant of the libertarian creed: no philosophical anarchist worth his salt believes any longer in man's "natural goodness." Viewing

the State as the legal engine for crime and evil, he wishes to abolish it, and to substitute various other forms of defense of the property rights of the individual. The real question that the anarchist poses, and that no one has really tried to answer, is this: is the State the only, or the most efficient, possible instrument for defending the rights of person and property in society?

We come now to Mr. Evans' apotheosis of James Madison and the Constitution. Belonging roughly to the Jeffersonian wing of the inner debate of the Founding Fathers, I regard Madison as a weak trimmer and fuzzy compromiser, rather than a sagacious combiner. Without the unnecessary Madisonian concessions to the profoundly statist programs and conceptions of Hamilton, the Constitution would have been a far more libertarian and a far more lasting instrument than it has proved to be. But there is more involved here: for Mr. Evans, despite the black record of the present century, persists in believing that the American Constitution has succeeded gloriously in its mission. From any libertarian, or even conservative, point of view, it has failed and failed abysmally; for let us never forget that every one of the despotic incursions on man's rights in this century, before, during and after the New Deal, have received the official stamp of Constitutional blessing. The Constitution has been stretched a very long way. If Mr. Evans should reply that these tyrannical acts have been really, and in the strict sense, unconstitutional, I would hasten to agree.

But that is my whole point: that the instruments set up by the Constitution—in particular, the erection of a monopoly Supreme Court with the final power to decide what is Constitutional—embody a fatal flaw in any constitutional attempt to limit the State. In short, when you give the State itself the final power to interpret the very instrument that is supposed to limit the State, you will inevitably find the Constitution being stretched and distorted, until it becomes merely a means of lending an unjustified aura of prestige to the State's despotic actions.

Calhoun, one of the great political thinkers in American history, went to the heart of the matter when he criticized the common reliance on a written constitution restricting government power:

... It is a great mistake to suppose that the mere insertion of provisions to restrict and limit the powers of government, without investing those for whose protection they are inserted with the means of enforcing their ob-

servance, will be sufficient to prevent the major and dominant party from abusing its powers. Being the party in possession of the government, they will, from the same constitution of man which makes government necessary to protect society, be in favor of the powers granted by the constitution and opposed to the restrictions intended to limit them . . . of what possible avail could the strict construction of the minor party be, against the liberal interpretation of the major, when the one would have all the powers of the government to carry its construction into effect and the other be deprived of all means of enforcing its construction . . .*

The Constitution, in short, was a noble attempt to solve the problem of restricting government to its proper sphere; but it was a noble attempt that failed, and therefore we must begin to search for more stringent and effective measures.

Two final comments on the conceptions of conservatism and classical liberalism. In the first place, I do not like the term "conservative," nor does any other libertarian. This term stands in the way of a constructive synthesis, for it implies not only the "natural conservatism" mentioned by Frank Meyer—the blind and tropistic defense of whatever *status quo* happens to exist—but also, more seriously, it carries with it the conservative position of the nineteenth century, when conservatism was born. For nineteenth century Conservatism, far from criticizing the Benthamites from the old natural rights point of view, was essentially a reaction against all that liberalism stood for: in particular, individual freedom, and the economic freedom that produced capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. The Conservative Party of Prussia, the first effective conservative grouping, was expressly formed to defend the institution of serfdom threatened by the rising influence of freedom and free enterprise. The irrationalist, organicist, and étatist biases of Conservatism all fed and influenced the supposedly anticonservative socialists of the nineteenth century. Even today, there is in the concept of "conservatism" an atmosphere redolent of Throne-and-Altar which has no place in any desirable "Rightist" synthesis. To put it bluntly and concretely, I would say to the conservatives: we libertarians will give up Bentham if you will give up the Crown of St. Stephen.

And, lastly, having indicated the neglected strengths of the classical liberal tradition, I must

*John C. Calhoun, *A Disquisition On Government* (The Liberal Arts Press, 1953), pp. 25 ff.

indicate some of the weaknesses of that tradition, even in its enormously superior eighteenth century version. The chief defects of Enlightenment liberalism, I believe, are these: an inordinate passion for democracy, and an inordinate hatred for institutional religion, particularly for the Roman Catholic Church. The true liberal should place foremost, in judging government, the policies that that government pursues; who runs the government is of secondary, purely instrumental importance. Of course, all other things being equal, it would be nice to have democratic voting ratify libertarian policies, but this is of minor importance. Democracy is simply a process, and once elevated into an end-in-itself, it becomes a potentially mighty engine for mass tyranny and popular collectivism. Furthermore, democracy, by encouraging the idea of equal voting by all men, grants the vote before it is properly earned, and therefore fosters an excessive and dangerous egalitarian tendency in society.

The intense hatred of the Enlightenment for the Catholic Church was a tragic thing; for it severed, on both sides, two traditions which really had a great deal in common, and set these two mighty forces at almost permanent odds. This hatred pushed the Enlightenment liberals into numerous and grave anti-libertarian measures to oppress the Church: confiscation of church prop-

erty, outlawing of monasteries and the Jesuit order, nationalization of the Church, and, perhaps the gravest of all, the erection of a system of public schools. For the establishment of public schools makes the grand concession, the concession that education of the young, one of the most important functions of society, is properly to be conducted by the coercive State. And if schools, why not other educational media, why not radio and television and newspapers, and why not, indeed, every other social good and service? The very existence of the public school—even if Americanism groups see to it that its textbooks are not tainted with socialism—cries aloud to its little charges the virtue and sanctity of government ownership and operation, and therefore, of socialism.

The libertarian, then, in building upon the older classical liberal tradition, must not only abandon utilitarianism and positivism; he must also abandon that tendency toward a worship of democracy and an unreasoning hatred of Catholicism that led him, among other flaws, to the erection of a vast incubus of statism and tyranny, the public school. And in doing so, he will also take a long step forward toward that very synthesis of the Right-wing *Weltanschauung* that we all recognize as so important in the present-day world.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, JULY 2, 1946 AND JUNE 11, 1960 (74 STAT. 208) SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION OF: MODERN AGE: A Conservative Review, published quarterly at Chicago, Illinois, for October 1, 1960.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business manager are: Publisher, David S. Collier; Editor, Eugene Davidson; Managing Editor, none; Business Manager, Hyung W. Pak; all of Room 634, 64 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago 4, Illinois.

2. The owner is: The Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies, Inc., (an Illinois not-for-profit corporation which issues no stock), Room 634, 64 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago 4, Illinois.

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4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge of belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

5. The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was: Five thousand two hundred and eighty-nine.

/S/ Hyung W. Pak
/T/Hyung W. Pak, Business Manager

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 4th day of October 1960.
/S/Dorothy W. Mickelberry

(Seal)

(My commission expires September 16, 1964)

Something a Saint Thought Long Ago

Balance at last, full summer's green caparison:
Harmony, wholeness, radiance, as Aquinas said.
There is a sense of pasture everywhere—
Grazing up the trees to sky's blue sea-edge, one
Might think that one had died,
Been reincarnated, quite given up the human love affair.
That great peace of the soul, culminating at intervals,
as with the Schoolmen—
When will it in this century, or later, come again?
Forsaking pastures, I could give my heart for tents
Billowing above us like these trees, perhaps only a circus-pleasure,
But still all of us here together, earth's dream not yet a loss,
Defunct, used up. I live for the moments
When I browse free in a radiant ring of measure
Like fauna among flora, not minding that fangs tear, paws cross,
If the animal-human dream which contains us opens beyond these trees,
And there is still time under endless green to hate, recover, and love
at ease.

CHARLES EDWARD EATON

Seeing New

Every once in a while you see a known word thoroughly
New: something like 'Easter-egg' or 'mushroom' you look at
Unprepossessed and taste of it fresh depths of flavor such as
A perceptive first-year student of an ancient tongue might.

That is just how I should wish to savor objects of
Everyday attention: I'd like, every now and then, as I go
Hurriedly down the street or even as I sit working at my
Desk, to look up and feel as if I was suddenly seeing some
Long familiar shape dished up to me for the first
Time—as if, say, I was spending my first afternoon
In a boisterous Slavic city where, from now on, I was going to
Make my home, happily taking in all the quick, enchanted
Newnesses sandwiched unexpectedly here and there.

I like to imagine that once you have finally
Arrived at the position we're all of us somehow or other
Moving toward, every single object you come upon will
Strike you precisely that way every time you
Come upon it: as something utterly fresh and strange and
Revealing—a long familiar noun or verb or adjective or
Preposition conjured up new for your own special
Relish out of life's rich, unrepetitious vocabulary.

JOHN MOFFITT

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Grace Richards Conant has had excellent opportunity to study the situation in East Germany; she lived for some years in Germany with her husband, James Bryant Conant, United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. This is her first contribution to *MODERN AGE*.

Stanley Parry is chairman of the department of political science at the University of Notre Dame.

Ludwig von Mises, author of *Theory and History*, *Planning for Freedom*, and a number of other works, was professor of economics at the University of Vienna between 1913 and 1938. Prof. von Mises has been teaching at New York University since 1946.

Francis G. Wilson, author of *The American Political Mind* and *The Case for Conservatism*, is professor of political science at the University of Illinois.

Andrew Gyorgy, professor of government at Boston University, is the author of *Geopolitics* and other works.

Noel Stock, an Australian, has been working on the manuscripts and papers of Ezra Pound in Italy.

Robert M. Davies, author of *The Humanities of Paul Elmer More*, is chairman of the division of the humanities, Thiel College, Greenville, Pennsylvania.

Our book reviews are contributed by *Felix Morley*, author of *Freedom and Federalism*; *Frank S. Meyer*, author of *The Moulding of Communists*; *George Morgenstern* of *Chicago Tribune*; *Charles J. Adamec* of Knox College; *Willmoore Kendall* of Yale University; *Murray N. Rothbard*, a noted economist of New York City; *J. Fred Rippy*, professor emeritus of history of the University of Chicago; *Edwin McDowell* of the *Arizona Republic*; *Ralph J. Mills, Jr.* of the University of Chicago; *David Sumner* of the University of Michigan.

Rejoinders are by *Donald A. Zoll* of the University of Tennessee, and *Murray N. Rothbard* who also contributed a book review to this issue.

The poets in this issue are *Clara Laidlaw* of East Lansing, Michigan; *John Knoepfle* of Edwardsville, Illinois; *Irene Dayton* of Rochester, New York; *Charles Edward Eaton* of Woodbury, Connecticut; *John Moffitt*, author of *This Narrow World*, our frequent contributor.

NEWS OF THE INSTITUTE

THE INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL STUDIES, a non-profit corporation organized to encourage and disseminate studies which are calculated to add to understanding of philosophy, history, and related fields and their application to human endeavor, has initiated a program of meetings, conferences and seminars for the benefit of its members and friends. During 1960 and 1961 these meetings have been held either at the Cliff Dwellers Club or the Sky Line Club in Chicago, with the exception of the meeting of February 26, 1960, which was a debate on the National Defense Education Act in a joint meeting with the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists on the campus of Northwestern University.

The following additional meetings have also been held in 1960-61: On October 14 Mr. Jameson Campaigne, Editor of the Indianapolis Star, spoke on "A Philosophy of Foreign Policy," at a luncheon meeting at the Union League Club in Chicago. On October 29 Hubertus Prinz zu Loewenstein, former member of the Bundestag of the West German Federal Republic and a well-known professor, historian and author,

spoke at an evening meeting on the subject "The Moral and Spiritual Defense of the West."

On November 4, 1960 Eugene Davidson, Editor of *MODERN AGE* and former Editor-in-Chief of the Yale University Press, and an authority on German-American relations, spoke to the Institute on "The Problem of American Relations with a Divided Germany." On January 13, 1961 the largest meeting of the Institute to date was held and Professor Eric Voegelin of the University of Munich, and at that time Visiting Professor at the University of Notre Dame, gave an address to the Institute in which he analyzed at great length the philosophy he has expounded so successfully in his works, *The New Science of Politics*, and his six volume study of history entitled *Order and History*. The Institute was particularly pleased to have as visitors that evening many professors from neighboring universities from the departments of political science, history and philosophy. In addition numerous students, particularly graduate students from these universities, also attended and queried Professor Voegelin at length.

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